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Kurzdarstellung
(Abstract in German)
In bestimmten Anwendungsfeldern enthalten digitale Tonaufzeichnungen zuweilen sensible In-
halte. Beispiele hierfür sind historisches Archivmaterial, das in öffentlichen Archiven unser
kulturelles Erbe bewahrt; oder Tonaufzeichnungen als Indizien im Kontext von Strafverfolgung
und Zivilstreitigkeiten. Angesichts der Leistungsfähigkeit moderner Bearbeitungstools für Multi-
media ist dieses Material anfällig gegenüber Manipulationen des Inhaltes und Fälschung des Ur-
sprungs in böwilliger Absicht. Unbeabsichtigte Veränderungen aufgrund von technischem oder
menschlichem Versagen können in der Praxis ebenfalls vorkommen. Die Vertrauenswürdigkeit
dieses Materials im Sinne von Unverfälschtheit des Inhaltes und Echtheit der ursprünglichen
Quelle sind daher kritische Faktoren.
Für die Behandlung dieses Problems stellt diese Dissertation daher ein Verfahren zur Verifika-
tion der Integrität und der Authentizität digitaler Tonaufzeichnungen vor. Es ist unempfindlich
gegenüber gängigen Bearbeitungsschritten im Lebenszyklus der Audiodaten, die die subjek-
tive Klangwahrnehmung nur unwesentlich oder gar nicht beeinflussen. Beispiele hierzu sind
verlustbehaftete Kompression bei hoher Klangqualität oder verlustfreie Formatwandlung. Es
ist das Ziel, de facto falsch-positive Detektionen in der Gegenwart dieser – legitimen – Bear-
beitungsschritte zu vermeiden, wie sie bei Standardverfahren für kryptografiebasierte Echtheit-
sprüfungen zu erwarten wären. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, wird eine geeignete Kombination
der Technologien der ”Digitalen Wasserzeichen” mit audio-spezifischen Hashfunktionen unter-
sucht.
Hierzu wird im ersten Schritt ein geeignetes schlüsselabhängiges Audio-Hashverfahren entwick-
elt. Es nutzt und erweitert Erkenntnisse des sog. ”Audio-Fingerprintings” aus dem Bereich der
inhaltsbasierten Audio-Identifizierungsverfahren. Der vorgestellte Algorithmus (im Folgenden
bezeichnet als ”rMAC”-Authentifizierungscode) erlaubt die sog. ”wahrnehmungs-basierte” Veri-
fikation der Integrität. Dies bedeutet, Integritätsverletzungen als solche zu klassifizieren (erst)
sobald sie hörbar werden.
Als weiteres Ziel werden diese Authentifizierungscodes mittels Audio-Wasserzeichen-
Technologie unhörbar innerhalb der Audiodaten eingebettet und gespeichert. Dies erlaubt
die Authentifizierungscodes auch über die oben erwähnten, zulässigen Bearbeitungsschritte
hinweg mitzuführen und für eine spätere Integritätsprüfung verfügbar zu halten. In dieser
Arbeit wird dazu ein existierendes Audiowasserzeichen-Verfahren gezielt weiterentwickelt.
iii
Die Schlüsselabhängigkeit der rMAC- und Wasserzeichen-Algorithmen erlaubt es auch, in
eingeschränktem Maße, die Authentizität der geschützten Audiodaten zu prüfen. Hierzu
analysiert diese Dissertation auch den Aufwand für Bruteforce-Angriffe auf das vorgestellte,
schlüsselabhängige Verfahren der Echtheitsprüfung.
Die experimentellen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das entwickelte Verfahren eine gute Trennschärfe
bei der Klassifizierung zwischen echten und gefälschten Audioinhalten bietet. Es erlaubt weit-
erhin eine zeitliche Lokalisierung der Datenveränderungen innerhalb einer Datei. Die experi-
mentelle Evaluation liefert schließlich auch Empfehlungen über geeignete technische Feinein-
stellungen des Verfahrens.
Über die Frage der wahrnehmungsbasierten Echtheitsprüfung für Audio hinaus, liefert diese
Dissertation auch neue allgemeine Erkenntnisse in den Bereichen des Audio Fingerprintings
und der digitalen Wasserzeichen für sich.
Die Hauptbeiträge dieser Arbeit wurden auf Fachkonferenzen der Multimedia-Sicherheit
vorgestellt. Diese Publikationen wurden anschließend von einer Reihe anderer Autoren zi-
tiert und haben daher weiterführende Arbeiten zum Thema mitbeeinflusst.
iv
Abstract
In certain application fields digital audio recordings contain sensitive content. Examples are
historical archival material in public archives that preserve our cultural heritage, or digital
evidence in the context of law enforcement and civil proceedings. Because of the powerful
capabilities of modern editing tools for multimedia such material is vulnerable to doctoring of
the content and forgery of its origin with malicious intent. Also inadvertent data modification
and mistaken origin can be caused by human error. Hence, the credibility and provenience in
terms of an unadulterated and genuine state of such audio content and the confidence about its
origin are critical factors.
To address this issue, this PhD thesis proposes a mechanism for verifying the integrity and
authenticity of digital sound recordings. It is designed and implemented to be insensitive to
common post-processing operations of the audio data that influence the subjective acoustic
perception only marginally (if at all). Examples of such operations include lossy compression
that maintains a high sound quality of the audio media, or lossless format conversions. It is the
objective to avoid de facto false alarms that would be expectedly observable in standard crypto-
based authentication protocols in the presence of these legitimate post-processing. For achieving
this, a feasible combination of the techniques of digital watermarking and audio-specific hashing
is investigated.
At first, a suitable secret-key dependent audio hashing algorithm is developed. It incorporates
and enhances so-called audio fingerprinting technology from the state of the art in content-
based audio identification. The presented algorithm (denoted as ”rMAC” message authentica-
tion code) allows ”perception-based” verification of integrity. This means classifying integrity
breaches as such not before they become audible.
As another objective, this rMAC is embedded and stored silently inside the audio media by
means of audio watermarking technology. This approach allows maintaining the authentication
code across the above-mentioned admissible post-processing operations and making it avail-
able for integrity verification at a later date. For this, an existent secret-key dependent audio
watermarking algorithm is used and enhanced in this thesis work.
To some extent, the dependency of the rMAC and of the watermarking processing from a secret
key also allows authenticating the origin of a protected audio. To elaborate on this security
aspect, this work also estimates the brute-force efforts of an adversary attacking this combined
rMAC-watermarking approach.
The experimental results show that the proposed method provides a good distinction and clas-
sification performance of authentic versus doctored audio content. It also allows the temporal
v
localization of audible data modification within a protected audio file. The experimental evalu-
ation finally provides recommendations about technical configuration settings of the combined
watermarking-hashing approach.
Beyond the main topic of perception-based data integrity and data authenticity for audio, this
PhD work provides new general findings in the fields of audio fingerprinting and digital water-
marking.
The main contributions of this PhD were published and presented mainly at conferences about
multimedia security. These publications were cited by a number of other authors and hence had
some impact on their works.
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”This is a journey into sound.”
(Geoffrey Sumner, 1958)
ix
The quotation on the previous page was taken from the introduction of the LP album ”A journey into stereo
sound ... an introduction into ffss” (London Records, 1958). It is one of the earliest vinyl records produced
in stereo. The album’s introduction was narrated by the actor and commentator Geoffrey Sumner.
x
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Chapter 1
Motivation and Introduction
Nowadays, computer hardware and software provide many ways of producing, recording, edit-
ing, distributing, and archiving digital multimedia content. Especially modern editing software
for digital images, video, and audio data allow applying modifications to that content very ef-
fectively and efficiently. As a consequence, such content can be modified inadvertently or even
tampered with easily and with leaving little traces, if at all. Examples of significant content that
is vulnerable to forgery are petabytes of data from historical archival records preserving the
cultural heritage of a civilization or user created content on the Internet. Digital exhibits could
also be subject to tampering before being used as evidence by law enforcement agencies or at
court. Nowadays content manipulations can be applied easier to multimedia content in digital
storage formats than it used to be the Analog Age.
In the public, the challenge of forging digital multimedia content is very often discussed for
pictures in the first place. And it is common knowledge that photographs have been tampered
with as an act of censorship or propaganda since the early days of analog photography in the
19th century. Sometimes, press photos are edited in order to beautify the picture or drama-
tize the picture. Also the current discussion about so-called ”fake news” and indications of
systematic desi-nformation by different entities remind us about the credibility of media data
circulating in the press. Hence in the Digital Era, the statement
”...seeing is not believing”.
as by Farid or Zhu [ZST2004, Far2009] reminds us of this vulnerability.
1.1 Credibility of Digital Audio Data
Like photography, the history of sound recordings goes back to the 19th century, namely to
the invention of the phonautograph device by de Martinville in 1860 or the phonograph by
Edison 1877. Since then an uncountable number of analog and digital audio media have been
created. And in certain scenarios, the relevant content is actually contained in pieces of audio
information, instead of pictures (in motion). This is obviously true for pure audio content like
voice recording / transmissions or radio broadcast. But it also applies for sound tracks contained
in various kind of ”video” data.
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Insertion, splicing, deletions, muting, or trimming of audio media can be applied easily and
could mean a significant change of what a human user hears and eventually understands. For
example in a voice recording even an added, modified or deleted statement of short duration
(for example: by the words ”yes” or ”no”) or a prefix syllable (for example: e.g. by the words
”agreed” versus ”disagreed”) can totally reverse its meaning. Even worse, complete audio record-
ings can be made up from scratch which can spoof a forged origin of a certain piece of audio
evidence. And like for digital images, such forgery can be applied and concealed to an aver-
age listener easily using audio editing software and other measures: Accordingly, hearing is not
believing!
Hence, the credibility and provenience for of these media in terms of verifying its genuine
and unadulterated state are vital. Examples of such significant content are historical archival
material preserving the cultural heritage and digital evidence are outlined in the following.
1.1.1 Preserving the Cultural Heritage in Public Archives
Sensitive audio content worth protecting is present in historical archival records that preserve
the cultural heritage. The most relevant classes and a few motivating examples of such content
are:
• Historical Speeches: Examples of famous quotations across different centuries that con-
tribute to cultural memory are part of common knowledge. Recordings of such events
have been available since the end of the 19th century. Providing their availability is the
natural mandate of public archives and similar cultural institutions.
• Oral History Interviews: In addition, public archives provide millions of testimonies of
contemporary witnesses from different eras and culture circles. In contrast to the previ-
ous example of well-known public speeches, these testimonies preserve the memory and
experiences of an uncountable number of ”ordinary” people.
• The News: News about current events and affairs in the public contribute to contempo-
rary history too. The same is true for collected news content even if it is not broadcast
eventually but remains hosted by news agencies. Here, verifying authenticity and in-
tegrity of the sources (inquiries, reporters, informers, photographers, camera crew etc.)
has always been a major obligation for journalists and writers.
Figure 1.1.: Examples of cultural heritage (from left to right, sources given in parentheses):
Inauguration speech Nelson Mandela 1994 (unknown South African TV station),
Audio tape archive at Yad Vashem Archive, Jerusalem, Israel (Baz Ratner/Reuters),
German TV newscast ”Tagesschau” (ARD/NDR ),
Berlin Philharmonics/Sir Simon Rattle 2012 (Michael Trippel )
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• User Created Content: Any kind of user-created content that circulates on the Internet
or in private circles expresses the interests and concerns of a society (and can be, in turn,
be published in The News again).
• Radio/TV Programs: Also trivial everyday TV and radio programs and even commercial
advertisement in TV/radio broadcast reflect the cultural variety of a modern civilization.
• Music: Serious music and pop music are important elements of the cultural heritage
too. Music from various genre and created/performed by various artists, composers or
conductors is available.
All the types of audio content mentioned above are available to the public as analog or digi-
tal/digitized recordings from archives, museums or other cultural organizations, or are available
as commercial products, or are circulating the Internet.
1.1.2 Verifying Digital Evidence
Another important class of significant audio content is evidence that is contained in digital audio.
Examples are given in the following.
• Police Interrogations and Court Trials: The testimony of a witness or victim or the
confession of a suspect during police interrogations, court trials (including video hearings)
are often recorded using electronic video equipment or simple dictaphones. This is done
exhaustively in many countries (but not in Germany).
• Lawful Interception / Electronic Bugging: Eavesdropping on criminal suspects is carried
out by law enforcement in the course of criminal investigation. Here, audio surveillance
by electronic bugging of crime scenes or wiretapping a suspect’s phone communication or
computer in the course of lawful (and also strategic) interception is a common measure
for collecting evidence.
• Military Combat Operations: In military combat, the combat units and their equipment
are often provided with live video transmission and recording devices. Voices, environ-
mental noise (e.g. gun shots), or the radio communication can be used for investigating
incidents or even war crimes.
• Police Operations in the Public: Often, police operations at major public events involving
large crowds (e.g. demonstrations, sports events) are documented by police squads on the
Figure 1.2.: Examples of digital evidence (from left to right, sources given in parentheses):
Police interrogation, Russell Williams murder case (Ottawa Police Service),
Leaked footage of US combat operations, Bradley Manning case (US Army),
Body-worn camera at Birmingham Police Dep., UK (West Midlands Police/Flickr),
Cockpit voice recorder, Germanwings 4U9525 airplane disaster (BEA )
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spot with video cameras, with ”body-cams” worn on the body or with dash-cams in the
police patrol cars. Also the protesters sometimes take recordings of the police actions
with cell phone cameras etc. In case of illegal conduct on either side this footage can be
published or brought into criminal or civil proceedings.
• Dash Cams: On-board ”dash cams” in vehicles of private users seem to become more and
more popular in some countries. Again, the audio sound track in such user-created video
footage can support to substantiate civil claims in case of traffic accidents.
• Video Surveillance / CCTV: Finally, video surveillance systems of public areas and private
premises have become more and more in use. Under certain legal conditions, such closed
circuit TV equipment (CCTV) also captures the sound which can be used as evidence in
criminal or civil cases.
• Telephone Communication: Business-to-customer communication over the phone has
been common for decades in retail or home banking services. Sometimes, the call centers
make a recording of the phone conversation to provide evidence in case of customer
complaints. Further examples of such kind of significant phone calls are recordings of
emergency calls to rescue services or the police.
• Civil Aviation and Shipping: Commercial airplanes and vessels must be equipped with
recording devices (e.g. cockpit voice recorder / data voyage recorder). In case of an accident
or a disaster, the final minutes of the crew’s conversation, announcements to passengers
and other sounds/noises have to be held available for later investigation. This also applies
to the radio communication recorded at the spot of the air/naval traffic controllers.
The examples on digital evidence given previously have in common that a complete chain of
proof is vital. As a consequence, the proposed protection mechanisms should be integrated in a
(trusted) recording device like a voice recorder, camera or into the monitoring center.
Examples of audio media corresponding to cultural heritage and digital evidence are visualized
in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. In light of these examples, the notion of credibility of audio data
will be discussed in more detail in the following.
Finally note that the set of audio test data used in the experimental evaluation in this thesis
reflects most of the fields listed previously. For an exhaustive list of the audio test samples the
reader is referred to Appendix B.
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1.2 Challenges and Objectives in Audio Data Authentication
Before discussing and selecting suitable technical approaches for closer investigation, the most
important challenges of the investigated protection system shall be explained.
1.2.1 Integrity and Authenticity in the Audio Domain
The previous overview demonstrates that audio data by itself or as the sound track of video
content can represent sensitive content. The general credibility objective of this thesis work
comprises that the content is not maliciously tampered with and the confidence about its origin
is provided. This directly corresponds to the security objective of integrity and authenticity
which are recalled in the following:
Integrity of Audio Data
It is recapped that the term integrity itself has its origin in the Latin expression ”integrita¯s” which
literally means
”integrita¯s (Latin): completeness, soundness, ’the undiminished or unimpaired condi-
tion of a thing’ ”
and figuratively corresponds to ”correctness” or ”inviolability”. It also refers to the opposite
notion of ”tangere (Latin): to touch” [LS1879]. Well-known standard mechanisms for integrity
verification like hash functions or checksums can verify said ”correctness” and ”completeness” of
its input data very exactly and sensitively. But especially for audio data there exist many post-
processing operations that, in fact, do change the binary representation but leave the audio
content in its said ”undiminished” state from the perspective of an average human listener. For
example, after lossless format conversions or marginally lossy compression in the course of post-
processing of audio data, it still provides said ”soundness” [sic!] with regards to what a human
user hears or understands.
Hence the notion of ”integrity” and the correspondent concept of ”maliciousness” have to be de-
fined appropriately and more precisely in practice. This will be elaborated upon in the following
Section.
Authenticity of Audio Data:
About the notion of ”authenticity” it should first be noted that this term is derived from the
expression
”autenticus (Latin): original (document), genuine ... ’that comes from the author’ ”
from ancient times [Gla1982]. In the context of audio data said genuineness shall be imperative
for the trusted identity of the individual person, entity or device that originally created a par-
ticular audio medium. According to the examples above, this might cover from which archive
or press agency a medium originates, which voice recorder or video camera device was used,
which interviewer or music artist created a certain work etc. But it also covers that the medium
itself has to be genuine in that it is not completely made-up as a malicious act or that it has not
been mixed-up with the actually authentic medium by mistake.
Please note: in the research community on multimedia security the objectives of integrity and
authenticity are both subsumed under the term ”data authentication” as a very common deno-
tation.
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1.2.2 Modeling of ”Perceptual Identity” of Audio
For digital audio recordings not every detectable act of data modification during the life-cycle of
a media can be regarded as a malicious violation of integrity, as can be seen from the following
examples:
1. Some common modifications are ”transparent” with regards to sound sensation and re-
main inaudible to average listeners. Examples are
• transferring recordings from a MP3 voice recorder to an Audio CD
• ”ripping” an Audio CD to lossless formats like linear PCM-WAVE, FLAC, or
MPEG-4 ALS.
• upsampling to 48 or 96 kHz
• lossy encoding at high quality settings e.g. MP3 at bitrates of 256 kbit/s or higher
• lossless conversion to the BWF or RF64 format in the course of ingesting such data
into audio archives.
Please see [Ros2009] for detail on the ”preservation of archival sound recordings” and usage
of the common archiving file format BWF [Cha1997] and its extension RF64 [EBU2009].
Interestingly, even lossy encoding at good sound quality settings is not even considered as
”editing a copyright protected work” in terms of the strict German copyright laws [Bru2004,
Loh2008].
Such acts usually do not have to be regarded as malicious.
2. Other modifications are in fact audible and can even diminish the sound quality – but
do not change what listeners ”understand” intellectually about the semantics. Examples
are the transcoding of a voice recording to an MP3 file at medium or lower sound quality
settings for the sake of saving storage space or bandwidth. Another example is down-
mixing of 5.1 channel sound tracks to stereo.
The comprehension of the content’s meaning would still be ”correct” so that the legitimate
transcoding cannot be regarded as a malicious act either.
3. Finally, for other audible non-malicious modifications it is indifferent if they mean a
change of the ”correctness” or not. An example is a noise cancellation filter that atten-
uates background noises in a voice recording or telephone conversation. Depending on
the context such background noise can be both irrelevant or vital: On the one hand,
such noise cancellation can improve the intelligibility of the voice communication and
indeed increases / improves what a listener understands. This is a desired feature for
example in everyday hands-free or outdoor telephone conversation. On the other hand,
the background noise can reveal important information about the context or the physical
environment of the phone conversation. This might be relevant in investigation of crim-
inal cases or other incidents: in this case such noise filtering can inadvertently or even
maliciously mask incriminating (or exonerating, resp.) evidence.
The reader should bear in mind that the previous examples are very specific for audio or other
kinds of multimedia. The notion of ”lossy compression”, ”analog transmission” or ”back-
ground/foreground noise” do not apply for textual data (like e.g. in documents), numerical
data (like e.g. in financial figures or bank transfers) or binary data (e.g. executable object code
or encrypted data). For these kinds of non-multimedia data, even small changes of the content
can almost never be tolerated. Hence, the notion of integrity will have to be revised and adapted
to the case of protecting multimedia from forgery and tampering.
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The examples show that in a multimedia context, also the notions of ”semantics” or ”content”
by themselves are ambiguous and often context-dependent. And it would take large efforts to
extract, process and assess the identity of data semantically by technical means: for example
current technologies for semantic-based information extraction or knowledge extraction are ex-
tremely wide fields of research that would go far beyond the scope of this thesis after all. In
addition, most semantic technologies are focused on textual input instead of voice data or even
general audio (music, noises etc.).
On the other hand, the ”perceived identity” of general audio data is somewhat easier to model
and to measure from a technical point of view: albeit not trivial, human auditory perception
and perceptual quality have been deeply analyzed in lossy audio coding, audio analysis, and
in cognitive sciences for decades. Mathematical models on psychophysics were developed that
can predict the influence of objective sound modifications on the subjective sensation by a lis-
tener. An overview of most important findings in psychophysics of human auditory perception,
denoted as psychoacoustics in the remainder, can be found in the Appendix A.2. For avoiding
the need to bridge the ”semantic gap”, data integrity verification will rather be conducted on a
perceptual level in this thesis work as proposed in the following.
Proposal: The following hierarchical model of different levels of integrity for multi-
media is introduced:
1. Binary Integrity: This describes the identity of data on the level of its digital
representation. Two pieces of audio data are regarded as identical on a binary
level if all data words are identical, i.e. if they are identical ”bit by bit”.
2. Perceptual Integrity: This describes the identity of what an average human
user perceives from a multimedia data set. Here, the sensation of what he/she
hears of the data is the relevant criterion. Two pieces of audio data are regarded
as perceptually identical if they sound identical. This means that average users
could hardly tell these audio data sets apart by listening to the data.
3. Semantic Integrity: This reflects the meaning (i.e. the semantics) that is asso-
ciated with the data. Semantic identity is maintained when a user understands
the same from the two compared data sets or, more generally spoken, when they
correspond to the same notion.
For simplification purposes, the different levels are regarded in ascending order (see Figure 1.3):
for example, perceptual identity is a sufficient condition for semantic integrity. This defi-
nition is inspired by the model of so-called soft authentication described by Zhu, Tewfik and
Swanson [ZST2004]: the authors distinguish manipulations that preserve the perceptual qual-
ity (denoted by the authors as ”quality-based”) from manipulations that preserve the semantic
meaning (denoted as ”content-based”).
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Figure 1.3.: Hierarchical integrity model used in this thesis work
As a convention, the strict requirements of exact integrity verification as it the case for crypto
hashes etc. are relaxed for protection of audio and other multimedia data: The investigated
approach shall rather provide a certain degree of tolerance to admissible or at least to inaudible
modifications of audio. Perceptual Identity can and will be utilized as necessary criterion for
verifying/falsifying the semantic integrity of a piece of audio data throughout this thesis work.
1.2.3 Challenges and Objectives
Mechanisms for protecting data integrity from cryptography for arbitrary or data or multimedia
data, but also from general communication or computer science have been known for long. But
only a few are in line with the relaxed integrity modeling of perceptual integrity.
In light of the real-world examples explained so far, this thesis work will use, extend and develop
algorithms from multimedia security research to verify the perceptual integrity of digital audio
recordings. To achieving this, the following objectives are defined:
• Sensitivity to audible modification: For the detection of malicious tampering it is ob-
viously desired that the system utilizes authentication codes that indicate that two audio
signals (or parts of it) are perceptually different. That shall allow detecting malicious
doctoring.
• Invariance to inaudible modification: The system shall be invariant or, at least, only
little sensitive to common transformations of audio media that leave the audio percep-
tually similar. Unlike for cryptographic integrity verification techniques, admissible and
common post-processing steps shall be tolerated in light of perceptual integrity defined
above.
• Localization: The motivating examples from Section 1.1 show that in some scenarios
even doctoring of short section of a few seconds duration or less can cause significant
changes of the semantics in a voice recording. Thus, the design of the system should
provide a sufficient temporal localization of an attack. Localizing a potential attack on the
data could even help identifying the attacker’s intent.
• Assessment: In addition, the proposed approach should give a graduated estimate on the
severity or likelihood of data modification caused by the attack. This is in contrast to plain
binary ”accept/reject” verification results as for example in common crypto primitives or
protocols.
• Availability / Embedding: As explained before, in large amounts of multimedia data it
can be difficult to retrieve the correct original recording or its separated authentication
codes (e.g. as in hash databases). This applies especially when large amounts of multime-
dia data have to be handled for example in stock photo/video agencies or in public audio
archives. Another challenge is that for long-term archiving applications it can be expected
that the data will be transcoded to other (i.e. newer) file formats from time to time. Hence
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it is desirable to keep the verification codes ”inside” the protected media data instead of
maintaining them as separate meta data as overhead in a proprietary file format or the
like.
• Source origin authentication: As a minor thesis objective, it is desirable to verify the
origin and/or the original (sic!) creator of a sound recording.
• Security: The system should withstand attacks aimed directly at the respective algo-
rithms. Efforts for deliberate doctoring by exploiting weaknesses of the protection mech-
anisms shall be too high to carry out.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of this PhD thesis is given as follows. This first Chapter has given the overall
motivation for the authentication challenge for this thesis’ subject. Special focus was put on
the modeling of the term ’integrity” in light of protection audio data. This allowed identifying
objectives for a suitable authentication protection mechanism by means of digital watermarking
and perceptual audio hashing.
The following Chapter 2 recalls at first existing technical solutions for integrity protection. This
will show that and why a suitable combination of digital watermarking with perceptual hashing
is a suitable approach to address the thesis challenges. Subsequently, the state of the art in
the techniques of audio hashing, watermarking and perceptual modeling is discussed as their
respective combination is the technical basis for this thesis work. Finally, the related work
in the research area of authentication mechanisms based on audio hashing/watermarking is
recalled and analyzed for need for further research. For the sake of readability of that Chap-
ter, correspondent technical background that is utilized in this thesis work is presented in the
correspondent Appendix A for the interested reader.
In Chapter 3 the proposed approach is explained. This includes proposed enhancements to
existing audio hashing and audio watermarking approaches and their eventual integration into
an authentication watermarking system.
Security aspects of the audio hashing and watermarking components with regards to brute-force
attacks are evaluated theoretically in Chapter 4.
The empirical evaluation of the proposed approach is given in Chapter 5. Note that the list of
all audio test samples that were used in the experiments can be found in the correspondent
Appendix B. For the sake of readability of the Chapter, additional Figures showing plots of
exhaustive test results are given in Appendix C.
Finally, in Chapter 6 the results of this thesis work are summarized with regards to major con-
tributions and shortcomings as well. This allows identifying potential for future research and
the overall usefulness of the proposed solution as a protection mechanism.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This Chapter at first gives an overview and a comparison of general integrity verification mech-
anisms. This shows why the investigated approach is an interesting and relevant research field
of investigation for audio authentication. Then the definition and the ”state of the art” in the
technologies of audio hashing, digital watermarking and psychoacoustic modeling are recalled
as they are the technical basis for this thesis work. Finally, the related work in authentication
watermarking is reviewed. This allows identifying the need for further research and classifying
the proposed approach.
2.1 Existing Integrity Protection Mechanisms for Digital Data
The following Section gives an abstract categorization and a concrete overview of existent pro-
tection mechanisms in light of integrity protection for audio data. That allows distinguishing
the selected approach from the state of the art.
2.1.1 General Categorization Criteria
The existent mechanisms can be characterized according to the following criteria:
• Integrity Model (Binary versus Perceptual Identity): Most mechanisms aim at veri-
fying or maintaining the integrity exactly on a binary level. Other approaches are more
”tolerable” as they immanently tolerate certain deviance in the data from its original state.
Note: The tolerance / invariance to admissible distortions is commonly denoted as robust-
ness which will be used in the remainder.
• Modification of the Cover Content (Active versus Passive Protection): Active mecha-
nisms cause a modification of the data at the point in time from which the protection be-
comes effective. The modification can be reversible or irreversible. In passive approaches
the data remains unchanged at protection time.
• Workflow (Pre-Processing versus Post-Processing): Some mechanisms require a prepa-
ration or pre-processing stage before the protection becomes effective. Other approaches
allow being applied on the respective data at any arbitrary point in time without previous
preparation. Obviously, such post-processing is only possible for passive mechanisms.
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• Protection Objective (Verification versus Prevention versus Reconstruction): A num-
ber of mechanisms do not technically prevent data modification but allow verifying the
integrity at a later point in time. Other mechanisms maintain the integrity by actively
preventing data modifications or, at least, by allowing a reconstruction of the original state
of the data.
2.1.2 Overview on Integrity Protection Mechanisms
The most common algorithm classes for integrity protection suitable for audio data are discussed
and compared in the following. Pure hardware-based solutions like WORM storage media
(”write once, read many [times]” like optical CD-R media), write blocking equipment (like in
forensic hardware), or quantum key distribution are not discussed in detail for the sake of
simplicity.
2.1.2.1 Cryptographic Hashes
Cryptographic hashes (”crypto hashes”) are standard approaches in cryptology for integrity
verification. They are defined as algorithms that map a binary input data set c0 of ar-
bitrary length to a compact, binary message digest H(c0) of fixed length, typically 128 to
512 bit. The crypto hashes are – by design – extremely sensitive: even the slightest change
in the input data causes significant changes of the output hash due to an intended algorith-
mic ”avalanche effect”. According to Preneel’s work on the ”Analysis and Design of Crypto-
graphic Hash Functions” [Pre1993], the first formal definition was given by Damgård not earlier
than 1988 in [Dam1988].
Especially collision-secure one-way hash functions feature a number of properties that are vital to
meet cryptographic security objectives. As explained by Preneel or by Menezes et al. [MVO1996],
the most important are
• First Pre-image resistance / one-way property: The hash function must be one-way, i.e.
for any arbitrary value h0 it must be ”hard” to find a matching data set as pre-image c0 so
that h0 = H(c0).
• Second pre-image resistance: For a known given data set c0 with its hash h0 = H(c0), it
must be ”hard” to find another data set c′0 6= c0 as pre-image so that H(c′0) = H(c0). Such
pair is denoted as a hash collision.
• Strong collision resistance: It must be ”hard” to find/create a pair of two distinct data
set (c0, c1) that hash to an (arbitrary) identical result H(c0) = H(c1).
The term ”hard"’ reflects that finding a 1st pre-image or creating collisions (the ”birthday at-
tack”) is computationally demanding and the task cannot be solved with reasonable efforts in
light of the particular application or desired security level.
Widely used crypto hash approaches are MD5 [Riv1992], the Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-1 [EJ2001] (still) and its more secure successors SHA-2 and SHA-3, or the family of the
RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest (RIPEMD) [DBP1996].
Beyond the context of cryptographic verification of integrity, hash functions are a widely used
auxiliary algorithms for the general purpose of data identification (i.e. indicating the identity of
data sets). For example, they are commonly used applied in sorting and matching algorithms,
for processing database queries or in data de-duplication.
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Categorization: Crypto hashing is a passive verification mechanism which requires pre-
processing at protection time. By design, it does not provide any robustness due
to the intended algorithmic ”avalanche effect”. Security of crypto hashes with re-
gards to pre-image and collision resistance is heavily investigated in cryptanalysis. For
example, successful collision attacks for MD5 and SHA-1 were found in the mean-
while [WYY2005, SSA+2008, SBK+2017].
2.1.2.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
In extension to crypto hashes, the construction algorithm of some hash algorithms allow for
including a dependency from a secret key K . Such kind of key dependent hash H(c0,K) is com-
monly denoted as (keyed) message authentication code (MAC). An example is the CMAC which
is derived from block-based encryption functions [Dwo2005]. Another example is the family
of HMAC (like HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-MD5) which is algorithmically derived from cryptographic
hash functions as explained above [KBC1997]. They are being used in the TLS protocol for
integrity verification.
Note: MACs also allow verifying the authenticity of the data origin to some extent: if the MAC
of a given data set is verified as ”correct”, the creator of the MAC’ed data must be in the set of
users or entities that have access to the symmetric MAC key.
Categorization: MACs can be categorized identically to crypto hashing.
2.1.2.3 Fuzzy Hashing
A new family of hash functions allows identifying data sets that are only almost identical. This
so-called fuzzy hashing is realized by piecewise/partial hashing of elaborately selected data
subsets. Unlike crypto hashes, the fuzzy hash values of almost identical data sets are almost the
same (e.g. in terms of Hamming distance).
The approach and the terminology was introduced by Kornblum [Kor2006a, Kor2006b].
Fuzzy hashing is well suited for searching, matching, and forensic applications like match-
ing executable binary code or human-readable text strings. Frequently-cited algorithms are
ssdeep1,2 [Kor2006b], the F2S2 algorithm [WSY2013] by Winter, Schneider and Yannikos or
saHash [BZLB2014] by Breitinger and Baier.
For more detail and references to other fuzzy hashing algorithms, please refer to the intro-
duction given by the thesis author in co-authorship in [SYZW2015]3.
Categorization: Similar to crypto hashing, fuzzy hashing is a passive verification mechanism
which requires pre-processing at protection time. It provides a certain level of robustness
to minor data modifications in the input data. However, because of their algorithm design,
fuzzy hashing approaches are not well suited for multimedia applications.
1 The ssdeep project: http://ssdeep.sourceforge.net
2 All URLs in this thesis lastly retrieved and verified in February 2017 (if not specified otherwise)
3 References to scientific publications by the author of this thesis are indicated in the remainder with a bar mark
on the left page margin. The exhaustive ”List of Publications” published by the thesis author can be found
on pp. 157.
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2.1.2.4 Perceptual Hashing
The technology of perceptual hashing is an identification technique for digital multimedia. As
in every hash algorithm, an input data set of arbitrary length is mapped to a compact, content-
based descriptor or message digest of very short length. In the case of perceptual hashing, the
hash extraction process is insensitive or even invariant to inaudible/admissible transformations
of the input signal. Equivalent denotations are robust hashing and also audio fingerprinting.
This is achieved by extracting and post-processing of perceptually relevant audio features, so-
called robust4 features. Robust audio hashing is sensitive to moderate distortion like, for ex-
ample, caused by lossy MP3/AAC or AVS compression [Gao2005] or DA/AD conversion in the
course of analog transmission (loudspeakers, microphone etc.).
Perceptual hashing allows identifying audio data that sounds similar to each other. Conversely, it
allows identifying data modifications as soon as they become audible. Thus, perceptual hashing
will be used in the context of this thesis to identify audible modification as an indicator for
doctoring of the audio.
A more detailed explanation of perceptual (audio) hashing will be given in Section 2.2.
Categorization: According to the categorization explained before, perceptual hashing requires
pre-processing at the point of time from which the protection shall become effective It is a
passive mechanism that allows future integrity verification at a later date. The algorithms
provide a certain level of robustness to data modifications in the audible multimedia con-
tent.
2.1.2.5 Digital Audio Watermarking
Digital watermarking is a technique for hiding a secret binary message silently into multimedia
data. The embedding is achieved by deliberately applying minor modifications to the con-
tent that represent the symbols of the message to be hidden. The message embedding is done
without changing the file format or file size. In audio watermarking the perceived sound qual-
ity is maintained as well. To achieve this the degree of embedding modification is controlled
and minimized by using skillful mathematical psychophysical models (”psychoacoustics”) that
reflect human perception.
If carefully carried out, the embedded audio watermark message is inaudible and it can tolerate
moderate distortion of the marked content – at the same time. The latter property is denoted as
robustness also in the watermarking research area: detection of the embedded message symbols
at a later date is possible even if the marked content undergoes certain post-processing for
example lossy MP3/AAC compression or analog transmission.
Integrity protection based on watermarking can be realized as follows: The embedded message
represents an inaudible ”digital seal” that breaks if malicious doctoring is applied to parts of the
watermark protected media. This elaborated upon in Section 2.3.3.
Categorization: Watermarking is an active protection mechanism that allows integrity verifica-
tion. Note that with a few approaches even a reconstruction of the original state is possible
to some extent if the spatial resolution of verification is very high.
See Section 2.3 of this thesis for more detail on watermarking in general.
4 Note that the term robustness shall denote the tolerance (or even invariance) to minor data modification in
the remainder of this thesis.
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2.1.2.6 Checksums
Checksums are well-known error detecting codes in computing and communication technolo-
gies which allow indicating transmission errors. Like in hashes and MACs, an input message of
arbitrary length is mapped to a short message digest of very short length.
Very common is the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) proposed by Peterson and Brown [PB1961]
in the 1960s based on the modulo/remainder of the binary polynomial divisions. The typical
length of CRC codes is 32 bit as in the CRC-32 standard. Other common checksum types are
parity checks, Fletcher codes, speed-optimized Adler codes, or (weighted) cross summing like in
ISBN book identifiers, serial numbers of bank notes, ID cards/passports etc.
Categorization: Like hashes and MACs, checksums are passive mechanisms that provide a sep-
arated verification code. The CRC output is very sensitive to any kind of input data mod-
ification. It can be shown that it provides no security against malicious tampering of the
data. For example, even if the construction of the polynomial division in CRC-32 codes
was extended to 128 bit or greater, collisions can be created easily with little computa-
tional efforts due to the insecure algorithm design of CRC codes.
2.1.2.7 Digital (Multimedia) Forensics
Digital Forensics in general is the discipline of acquiring, analyzing and reporting of/about
evidence in digital data. The objective is collecting information or traces thereof from hard
drives, mobile devices, remote storage clouds etc.
Forensics especially for multimedia data provides powerful approaches for
• reconstructing the history of modifications,
• identifying meta data about the data’s origin (like location and time of recording),
• identifying the recording conditions (the microphone, encoder device/software etc.), or
• recovering deleted fragmented files by exploiting the file syntax (so-called file carving).
This is usually based on analyzing skillfully selected data features. Tampering is indicated by
finding discontinuities or other unexpected statistical anomalies in the suspicious data set. For
example, forensic for audio data allows
• identifying editing of audio data by analyzing the reverberation/echo characteristics
in a microphone recording caused by the room acoustics as proposed by Mailk and
Farid [MF2010],
• identifying date and time of a recording based on the 50 Hz/60 Hz sound caused by the
mains hum of the electric network frequency (ENF) [GS2012, CGW2012],
• identifying the MP3 encoder software version as published by Böhme and West-
feld [BW2004] which allows identification or repudiation of a certain recording device
as data source,
• detecting the presence of double compression in MP3 or AMR-compressed audio file which
can indicate that an authentic file was opened, then modified and eventually saved (hence
compressed) again [BDRF+2013, LYH2014],
• file carving for deleted and fragmented MP3/AAC audio data, as for example published by
the author beyond this thesis work [ZTS2012, SYZW2015].
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Categorization: According to the categorization explained above, forensics obviously is a pas-
sive technique. Its robustness characteristics are very varying across different sub-
categories of multimedia forensics. In addition, most publications lack a thorough dis-
cussion of their vulnerability to targeted circumvention as was shown for example by
Nguyen and Katzenbeisser [NK2011] for image forensics. Hence, traces be removed or
”implanted” into digital data so that a lot of forensic algorithms can be fooled. A virtual
”arms race” between forensic, counter forensic, anti-counter forensic (and so on) can be
observed in the literature after all.
2.1.2.8 Forward Error Correction
One discipline for maintaining the data integrity in noisy transmission channels is forward error
correction (FEC). This channel coding technique from communication theory allows overcoming
transmission errors by encoding the binary input message to a new representation with many
redundancies. This encoded message is transmitted instead of the original message. On the
receiver side, a correspondent decoder can cope with transmission errors to some extent and
can retrieve the correct original message again. For example, FEC is utilized in a vast number
of communication standards (like Ethernet, GSM, Digital Video Broadcast (DVB), satellite links,
Bluetooth, WLAN), for storage media (like CDs/DVDs, Solid State Disks), or in optical QR codes.
Well known examples of such channel coding schemes are Hamming codes [Ham1950], RS codes
invented by Reed/Solomon [RS1960], BCH codes developed independently by Bose/Chaudhurim
and by Hocquenghem [BRC1960], or the Turbo codes by Berrou [BGT1993] for general purpose.
The interested reader is referred to the textbook by Moon [Moo2005] which is the standard
reference for FEC techniques.
Categorization: FEC is an active mechanism that intends to reconstruct the original state of data
instead of identifying potential data modifications explicitly. Hence FEC is not suitable for
achieving the main integrity objectives of thesis work because in the case of intentional
breaches of data integrity they would be ”repaired” instead of being indicated explicitly.
Another drawback is that the FEC-proprietary encoded representation is not compliant
with the input file format. Even more, it increases the data payload by several times of
the original size in.
Note: Although it might appear abstruse discussing FEC in light of this thesis work, this tech-
nique is however useful as an auxiliary means: Turbo coding is used for increasing the robust-
ness of the proposed watermarking approach, see Section 3.4.2.
Own research on Turbo coding was conducted as a separate research activity by the thesis
author. It was investigated and successfully improved in the course of a supervised student
thesis by Berchtold [Ber2008]. This is not further elaborated upon in this thesis.
2.1.3 Comparison and Conclusion
Among the mechanisms described above, only perceptual hashing, digital watermarking, and
some multimedia forensic algorithms allow integrity verification even if the content under-
goes legitimate modifications due to their robustness. Interestingly, robust watermarking and
perceptual hashing can be tuned so that they even provide the same level of insensitivity to
post-processing operations, for example down-mixing from stereo to mono, lossy transcoding
(MP3, AAC etc.) and even analog microphone recording.
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That is, while common cryptography mechanisms fail when content is transcoded or taken from
the digital to the analog domain, watermarks and perceptual hashes can persist and keep the
content protected here. Hence other solutions cannot be considered further for being investi-
gated in this thesis work.
The elaboration on the different technologies for integrity protection from the previous Section
is summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Mechanism Protection Objective Robustness Security Localization
Digital Watermarking verification (reconstruction) high medium yes
Checksums verification (reconstruction) no low yes
Forward Error Corr. reconstruction high – no
Crypto Hashes/MACs verification no high yes
Perceptual Hashes verification high medium yes
Media Forensics verification varying medium yes
WORM Media prevention no high –
Write Blocking prevention no low –
Table 2.1.: Categorization of different integrity protection mechanisms according to objectives
and robustness (Dashes indicate that property does not apply)
Looking at the overview of the techniques described above, a very promising approach is given
by combining perceptual hashing and robust watermarking. This addresses the challenges of
this thesis work as defined above in the Introduction in Section 1.2 and shows a number of
advantages:
• Perceptual hashing allows recognizing acoustic events that sound similar to an average
listener. Conversely, it is very likely that perceptual hashing can also detect malicious
tampering. Hence the content integrity can successful be verified on a perceptual level.
Standard cryptography solutions like crypto hashing or MACs would raise false alarms in
light of perceptual identity.
• Watermarking allows for making the perceptual hash available as an authentication code
embedded inside the protected audio. Watermarking as an active mechanism does not
rely on the availability of an existing security infrastructure that provides the authentic
verification codes. The advantage is that the watermark message can easily be made
available again.
• Because of watermarking robustness capabilities, the embedded perceptual
hash/authentication code is available even if the protected media data undergoes
moderate lossy compression or the like.
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Active Passive
Pre-Processing Digital Watermarking Checksums
Forward Error Correction Crypto Hashes/MACs
Fuzzy Hashes
Perceptual Hashes
WORM Media
Write Blocking/Locking
Quantum Key Distribution
Post-Processing - Media Forensics
Table 2.2.: Categorization of different integrity protection mechanisms according to processing
modes
It must be admitted that watermarking does apply modifications to the audio. Skillful utilization
of psychophysical models on human perception provide that the data modification in the course
of watermarking will not become audible and will not interfere with the desired degree of
integrity.
The details of combining watermarking with perceptual hashing will be explained in Sec-
tion 2.3.3 under the term ”content-fragile watermarking”.
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2.2 Perceptual Audio Hashing / Audio Fingerprinting
This Section recalls the state of the art in perceptual audio hashing. This allows comparing the
proposed hashing approach with the state of the art in audio hashing.
Note: The following explanation assumes the reader to be familiar with the technical basics
of digital audio data, spectral transforms, windowing etc. as recalled in Appendix A.1 for the
interested reader.
2.2.1 Perceptual Hashing Model and Terminology
Perceptual Audio Hashing is an identification technique specially designed for digital audio data.
Technically, perceptual audio hashing is defined as a mechanism for mapping an audio input
signal of arbitrary length to a compact, content-based descriptor or message digest of very
short length as output. Formally spoken, an audio data set c0 is mapped to a binary se-
quence H = H(c0). Unlike in cryptographic hashing, the perceptual hash value is robust to
minor transformations of the input signal. An audio data set will be regarded as ”similar” in
terms of perceptual hashing even if the data undergoes e.g. moderate lossy MP3/AAC compres-
sion or DA/AD conversion in the course of microphone recording.
Confusingly, this technology is synonymously known under the keywords
• ”audio fingerprinting”,
• ”robust (audio) hashing’’ or
• ”content-based signatures”
in numerous publications in the state of the art.
For achieving its robustness, perceptual hashing algorithms extract acoustic features from the
data that are relevant with respect to the human perception and can be exploited for identifica-
tion. Hence, Doets and Lagendijk in their publication on ”Theoretical Modeling of a Robust Audio
Fingerprinting System” [DL2004] comprehensibly define the extracted audio ”fingerprint” as
”...a compact representation of the perceptually relevant parts of audio content, which
can be used to identify an audio file, even if it is severely degraded due to compression
or other types of signal processing operations”.
This expresses the technical aspects of robustness in terms of insensitivity to lossy compres-
sion etc. which is desired in many audio applications.
For example, the recording of a particular symphonic concert on Audio CD and its MP3 copy
shall have the same, or at least similar, fingerprint. Conversely, different performances of the
same concert by different orchestras/conductors shall have different fingerprints. Also cover
songs or remixes of the same original pop song shall have audio fingerprints distinct from one
another. Research for identifying such new versions of a song is being conducted (for example
in [CS2007a, CDXZ2015]) but is out of this thesis scope.
A different definition by Haitsma, Oostveen, and Kalker [HOK2001b] emphasizes more the sub-
jective perspective of the human listener by describing it as
”...a function that associates to every basic time-unit of audio content a short semi-
unique bit-sequence that is continuous with respect to content similarity”
This also expresses that it is common to extract hashes not only from complete audio files but
also from sections thereof. The ”semi-uniqueness” is defined by the authors as the property
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that for two signals that represent different content, their perceptual hashes shall allow to
distinguish these signals. To elaborate upon this point, the term ”continuous” suggests that
human perception and assessment of ”acoustic similarity” can be modeled and measured by
mathematical functions with a continuous co-domain.
According to the integrity modeling discussed in Section 1.2.2, perceptual hashing provides and
assessment of identity on a level of perception or sensation, instead of semantics or even true
understanding.
Perceptual Hashing Model
As explained by Lancini [LMP2004], the typical perceptual hash extraction is carried out in the
following processing steps (see Figure 2.1):
Figure 2.1.: Processing steps for extraction of fingerprint/perceptual hash
1. Pre-processing: At first, the input data is prepared to improve the efficiency or the robust-
ness. For the example of this thesis work the PCM input data can be subject to re-sampling
to a standard sample rate and to down-mixing to mono.
2. Framing: Typical frame lengths in this thesis work are 1024 or 2048 which represents 23
or 46 milliseconds for which the stationarity is sufficiently provided for most music and
voice content.
3. Windowing: If a spectral transform is carried out (in the following step) the framed audio
data is often multiplied sample-by-sample with an appropriate windowing function, for
example Hamming or von Hann window. It avoids undesired effects due to spectral leakage
(as explained in A.1.3.3) in the spectral domain.
4. Spectral Transform: In most approaches, an appropriate spectral transform is applied on
the windowed frames. Often, the spectrum is more revealing with regards to sound recog-
nition than the temporal representation is. Typical spectral representations are using DFT
coefficients, the (modified) discrete cosine coefficients (DCT/MDCT), or the so-called Mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC). This thesis work will utilize performance optimized
implementations of the DFT.
5. Feature Extraction: From the representation in the transformed spectral basis, suitable
features are selected for extraction. The skillful selection of features in this processing
step is vital for the robustness and distinction performance of the overall algorithm. In
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some algorithms the feature extraction stage is dependent on a secret keyK as additional
input.
6. Output Modeling: The selected features are analyzed according to a predefined algo-
rithm. Usually, the extracted robust hash is a binary sequence. However, in some ap-
proaches it is an n-tuple with real-valued, i.e. continuous elements, instead.
Ambiguity of the Term ”Fingerprinting” in the Literature
The reader is reminded that the term ”fingerprinting” is a commonly used synonym for ”percep-
tual audio hashing”. Unfortunately, the term is ambiguously used. It appears in other fields in
multimedia security research that are not investigated in the scope of this PhD thesis, namely
• as a synonym for ”transaction watermarking” that can identify different copies from the
same original work
• in the denotation of ”collusion-secure fingerprinting” which is a coding technique used in
transactional watermarking (as discussed in Section 2.3.4.3),
• in the denotation of ”camera sensor fingerprints” for image authentication in forensics
and
• in biometric fingerprints (i.e. dactylograms from minutiae features on human fingers).
For the avoidance of confusion5, for the remainder of this thesis the term fingerprinting shall
denote robust identification methods for audio data as defined in this Section. The terms per-
ceptual hash, robust/audio hash are also common and will be synonymously used throughout
this thesis.
Perceptual Hash Characteristics
The robust hash must withstand attacks that are intended to fool the hashing algorithm for
example by tampering or manipulating the content without being indicated by the hash. For
this, Cano, Gomes et al. [CGB+2002] or Mıçak [MV2001] define a number of characteristics that
the perceptual audio hash should provide:
Randomness: As every hash calculation, the perceptual hashing implies a significant ”compres-
sion” of the data because a hash of short length is assigned to an input data set of arbitrary
length. Here, the probability for a hash collision shall be as small as possible. For this, the
robust hash values should be equally distributed among all possible pieces of audio data
that sound different. More precisely: if one interprets the M -bit hash as a M -digit dual
number, the values of this number shall be equally distributed i.e. shall occur with a prob-
ability of p = 2−M . A necessary condition for this is that each (binary) digit is equally
distributed on {0,1}.
Discrimination performance: For the detection of perceptually relevant transformations of the
signal, it is required that the hash values H should be different for two perceptually dis-
tinct audio signals:
c0 6= c′0 ⇐⇒ p(H(c0) = H(c′0))≤ 1/2M . (2.1)
5 For example, this ambiguity caused an unfortunate rejection of a research paper submitted by the thesis au-
thor. The paper actually addressed a research topic (beyond this thesis work) in the field of ”collusion-secure
fingerprinting”. But it was regarded by one of the reviewers as if ”perceptual hashing” was addressed. Under
this unfortunate misconception the rejected paper appeared as ”difficult to read” to the reviewer because of
”a lot of confusion”.
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The upper bound reflects that the hash values can be identical by coincidence. This re-
quirement shall allow the detection of clearly noticeable modifications or even malicious
tampering of the audio data.
Even more, it is required that the hash values of two hash protected audio signals c0 and c
′
0
that are known to be perceptually distinct, should be mutually independent:
p(H(c0) = h1|H(c′0) = h2)≈ p(H(c0) = h1) ∀ h1,2 ∈ {0,1}M . (2.2)
This means that an attacker must not be able to predict the hash value for a given piece of
audio (or parts of it) from previously calculated hash values. This should make systematic
attacks as difficult as possible. Like in crypto hashing these two requirements should
discourage from an collision attack by keeping the effort for an adversary as ”hard” as
possible.
Robustness: The robust hash must be invariant to transformations for which the audio data
remains perceptually similar. The following condition must be fulfilled:
c0 ≈ c′0 ⇐⇒ p(H(c0) = H(c′0))≈ 1 . (2.3)
For the integration into authentication watermarking as investigated in this PhD thesis,
the hash must be robust against the distortion introduced by watermarking, too.
It is obvious that the discrimination and robustness properties are somewhat mutually
exclusive: In practice, perceptual hashes provide a ”gray area” of distinction performance
when increasing levels of distortion and/or tampering are applied to the protected input
data.
Compactness: The extracted features must provide a very compact representation of the con-
tent. In the context of this PhD thesis, the robust hash will be embedded as a robust
watermark message. In the construction of the hash, it should be reflected that robust au-
dio watermarking schemes usually provide a very limited embedding capacity. Hence, the
hash should be as compact as possible (see Section 2.3 for an elaboration on watermarking
and its ”capacity” properties).
Granularity: The design of the system should allow to extract a meaningful perceptual hash
from sections of the input data. That permits an identification even if a part of the analyzed
content is missing. In the context of this thesis, this shall allow the temporal localization
of malicious tampering inside a file, for example by its time-code.
If utilized for authentication purposes, the perceptual hash must meet a number of security
requirements. Creating hash collisions deliberately must be computationally difficult. The ran-
domness and discrimination property explained before are important conditions for that.
In addition, Fridrich et al. pointed out that for achieving this, the ”Feature Extraction” step
must be key-dependent [FG2000]. Other approaches for achieving a more secure audio hash
can be realized by a key-dependent quantization of the features (see Nouri [NZAF2012]) or
the projection of the feature vectors on a key-dependent basis (see Radhakrishnan [RM2002,
RXM2003]) .
In addition, efficiency/computational demands and scalability are usually named as important
characteristics, too. In the context of this PhD thesis, this is of minor relevance and not analyzed
much further. See Section 3.4.3 for some information on runtime performance of this thesis
work.
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2.2.2 Applications of Perceptual Hashing
Beyond this thesis work perceptual hashing for audio by itself is the technical basis for a number
of other application fields too. The most important are outlined in the following [HOK2001a,
AHH+2001b, dGCG+2003]:
Music Recognition and Sales: Perceptual audio hashing is used in commercial systems for recog-
nizing music songs and providing meta data about it. This might be helpful for a consumer
to recognize and retrieve the title of an unknown song that he/she listens to on the air
or in a public environment. Current commercial recommendation services for this are
provided by Shazam Entertainment Ltd.6, Audible Magic Corp.7.
Content Filtering: Perceptual hashing is also used for identifying and banning copyright in-
fringements in company networks or on platforms for user-created content. For example,
Youtube’s Content ID system8 (based on technology licensed from Audible Magic Corp.)
prevents uploading banned content to the Youtube platform again (even in modified ver-
sions).
Automatic Music Library Organization: Many users have a somewhat unsorted collection of mu-
sic files on their computers or mobile devices. Perceptual hashing allows tagging all songs,
i.e. by artist name, song title etc. and de-duplication in a music collection. Examples for
such services or products are the mufin player9, the sound recording tools by Audials AG10,
the Audio CD database by Gracenote Inc.11, or MusicBrainz12.
Broadcast Monitoring / Audience Measurement: Perceptual hashing enables music artists or
music labels to monitor the popularity of a work across mass media broadcasting. Copy-
right collecting societies (like e.g. the German GEMA) can verify if royalties are paid ac-
cordingly. Finally, marketing agencies can monitor if commercial advertisement is dis-
tributed according to airtime agreements with broadcasters. One commercial provider is
Musictrace GmbH, Erlangen, Germany13.
User Interaction, ”Second Screen” services: Perceptual hashing can enrich services for user en-
tertainment. It can trigger that value added content (like background information, adver-
tisement) is displayed on a mobile phone or tablet computer in parallel to consuming a
TV programme or movie. Here, the mobile device virtually serves as a ”second screen”.
Watermarking support: Perceptual hashing can be a supporting mechanism to watermarking in
various ways: For example, perceptual hashing can help deciding if given audio content is
known as having been watermarked earlier, in the first place. This can help saving com-
putational efforts by avoiding (time-consuming) watermark detection when the content is
unmarked anyway.
Different authors propose using perceptual hashes to increase the efficiency of tempo-
ral synchronization during watermark detection (e.g. by Hauer for video watermark-
ing [HS2006]).
6 Shazam Entertainment Ltd., London, UK: http://www.shazam.com
7 Audible Magic Corp., Los Gatos, USA: http://www.audiblemagic.com
8 Content ID by Youtube/Google Inc.: https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370
9 mufin software by mufin GmbH, download source: http://www.heise.de/download/mufin-player-1145769.html
10 Audials One/Tunebite software by Audials AG, http://audials.com
11 Gracenote Inc.: http://www.gracenote.com (formerly known as CDDB)
12 Musicbrainz by MetaBrainz Foundation, San Luis Obispo, USA: https://musicbrainz.org. The service uses the
”AcoustID” fingerprinting technology by Lukas Lalinsky: https://oxygene.sk/category/acoustid
13 Musictrace GmbH: http://www.musictrace.de
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As another example, Mıçak uses an approach in which a perceptual hash serves as the
secret watermark key for embedding and detection [MV2001]. This can prevent copy
attacks or information leakage about the key by analyzing watermarks with same mes-
sage across many different watermarked media. The interested reader is referred to Sec-
tions 2.3.1 and 2.3.4.3 about the definition of the terms ”watermark keys” and ”copy
attacks”, resp.
Own publications on this topic were published by the thesis author [ZSN2006,
SZB2010, ZSB2012]. These works are beyond the scope of this thesis and are not
elaborated upon.
Some fingerprinting algorithms are technically suitable for several purposes at the same time.
One example is YouTube’s Content ID algorithm: it allows strict content filtering (denoted as
”blocking”) but also broadcast monitoring for ”monetizing” using the same audio hashing sys-
tem14.
Finally, it has to be emphasized that integrity verification as in an information security context
usually is not among the applications of perceptual hashing.
2.2.3 Example: Fourier-based Audio Hash by Haitsma, Kalkeret al. (”Phillips Hash”)
The following explanation again assumes the reader to be familiar with the basics of the Fourier
transform as recalled in Appendix A.1.3.
One of the most frequently cited and discussed research contribution in audio hashing was
presented by Haitsma, Kalker, and Oostveen [HOK2001a, HOK2001b], conducted at Phillips
Research, Eindhoven, The Netherlands. This ”Phillips Hash” is explained first because many
other publications in the state of the art – and this thesis work – were influenced by this work.
The design impresses by its simplicity and its desired robustness properties.
The robust feature extraction uses a spectro-temporal analysis of the absolute value of Fourier
coefficients of the audio signal. For extracting a so-called sub-fingerprint from each audio frame,
the following processing is carried out:
• In the original algorithm, the audio signal is digitally represented by PCM samples and
analyzed in rather large frames of L = 214 =16384 samples that overlap by 31/32. Large
frames provide a fine frequency resolution but poor temporal resolution. The latter is
compensated for by the large frame overlap.
• The frame data is weighted with a Hamming window [S+1997] first for avoiding spectral
leakage effects. Then the Fourier transformation is computed.
• Subsequently, the Fourier magnitude coefficients {rk} are resampled according to a loga-
rithmically scaled frequency axis: the linear frequency axis with indices k is mapped onto
a decimated scale according to 33 musical semi-tones with indices i correspondent to 300-
2000 Hz. The decimated spectrum is expressed in terms of the quantity {ei,t} which is the
partial signal energy in the i-th semi-tone at the t-th time-step. This takes into account
that the human perception of pitch can be modeled mostly on a logarithmic frequency
scale like it is commonly known for musical tones.
It was found experimentally, that the mutual spectro-temporal differences between these energy
coefficients are a quite robust feature for arbitrary music and voice audio material. A robust
feature is derived by comparing the differences of neighboring energy coefficients (at frequency
14 Youtube Content ID, user manual at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370
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indices i and i+1) at a given time index t to those in the following time-step t+1 according to
the following definition:
di,t := ei,t − ei,t+1 −

ei+1,t − ei+1,t+1

, i = 1...32 . (2.4)
Audio hash bits Hi,t are defined by the authors as the sign of the quantity di,t :
Hi,t =
§
1 if di,t ≥ 0
0 if di,t < 0
.
According to Equation (2.4) from the original algorithm, FFT coefficients are ”picked” in reg-
ularly increasing order across time and frequency indices: consecutive hash bit indices corre-
spond to consecutive/adjacent frequency indices.
A visualization of the feature selection is given in Figure 2.2. Note that the plot only gives a
symbolic visualization of a small range from a domain of 12 by 10 time-frequency indices. In
the actual implementation of the algorithm the following settings are used:
• A 32-bit so-called sub-fingerprint is extracted at time index t ′ by evaluating the 33 energy
coefficients per frame according to Equation (2.4).
• This is carried out repeatedly 256 times, every 11.6 milliseconds with an overlap of 31/32.
A complete fingerprint block {Hi′,t′} is defined as the concatenation of those 256 consecu-
tive sub-fingerprints, i.e. t ′=1...32, i′=1...256.
• Hence the payload of the fingerprint block is 256 · 32 bit = 8 kbit. It covers approxi-
mately 256 · 11.6 milliseconds ≈ 3 seconds of audio. Hence the fingerprint data rate is
approximately 8 kbit/3 s ≈ 2.6 kbit/s. This rather high data rate is mainly caused by the
31/32 overlap which compensates for the limited time-resolution of the single Fourier
transforms.
Figure 2.2.: Feature selection scheme in Phillips audio hash – Symbolic representation of DFT
indices in the time-frequency domain. Every set of four correspondent coefficients
denoted as ”Rm” contributes to the m-th hash bit. Coefficients R1 which are corre-
spondent to the first hash bit are highlighted for demonstration purpose
Note that a correspondent approach for video data was introduced by the same au-
thors [OKH2001] based on average block luminance values instead of Fourier coefficients.
More experimental results, thorough theoretical analysis and extensions on this audio
hashing algorithm can be found in the original works or in a large number of sec-
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Figure 2.3.: ”Phillips Hash” feature extraction example; black dots = ’1’, white dots = ’0’, each
row contains one sub-fingerprint;
Plot (a): Audio hash of input audio section, Plot (b): Audio hash from MP3 com-
pressed copy of input audio section, Plot (c): XOR difference between Plots (a) and
(b); bit error rate = 0.078;
Source: [HOK2001a]
ondary sources [DL2004, HBMS2007, BHMS2007a, BHMS2007b, JYLN2007, JLLN2008,
LYK2009, GSM+2012, CH2014, Seo2014, YWN2015].
Robustness Aspects
Although simple by its definition in Equation (2.4), the quantity d provides a high level of ro-
bustness: Obviously, energy differences between coefficients are robust to changes of the total
volume. The feature is also robust against moderate levels of lossy compression, re-sampling,
filtering, dynamics compression, noise addition, and even DA/AD conversion using a tape
recorder. Unlike for crypto hashes, the bit error rates caused by such moderate transforms
are 5 to 10% as reported by the authors.
Example: An example from [HOK2001a] is shown in Figure 2.3: Plot (a) visualizes a finger-
print block, i.e. the ”height” represents a duration of approximately three seconds. Note
that the temporal transitions of the sub-fingerprints over time in Plot (a) and Plot (b) are
very smooth along the time-axis (from top to bottom). This is caused by the high correla-
tion between neighboring rows because of the 31/32 overlap. The fingerprint difference
between Plots (a) and (b) is shown in Plot (c): it demonstrates that the perceptual hash
is rather insensitive to moderate MP3 compression of the audio: the bit error rate be-
tween the fingerprints of the original audio and its MP3 copy in 128 kbit/s is 7.8% only,
as claimed by the authors.
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Security Aspects
Own research (as published in co-authorship [TNSZ2009]) showed that the overall algorithm
can be fooled by targeted attacks.
In [TNSZ2009] it was shown that inaudible modifications can be applied that can nevertheless
change some of the fingerprint bits. This is favored by two circumstances:
• The value of the extracted feature di,t shows a continuous distribution. In some cases
its absolute value
di,t is near zero. In this case, even slight modifications or deliberate
attacks to the energy coefficients that contribute to di,t can flip its sign and hence flip the
value of the fingerprint bit. Coover et al. denote such bits as ”weak bits” [CH2014] which
is a concept that does not exist in crypto hashing. This behavior can be expected from the
definition of the quantity di,t : As the four energy coefficients in Equation (2.4) will have
similar expectation values, the expectation value of di,t will actually be near zero.
• The selection of energy coefficients that contribute to di,t is not key-dependent. That
allows studying systematically which of the hash bits are ”weak” as defined above with
minimum efforts. This is why introducing a pseudo-random feature selection is a condi-
tion for a secure perceptual hash construction model as was explained in Section 2.2.1.
This allows protocol attacks by creating false positives which can make the perceptual hash
appear useless. It could also be used for circumventing audio hash based content filtering
mechanisms. Hence an additional randomization step is investigated in the literature on audio
hashing and in this thesis work.
2.2.4 State of the Art in Perceptual Audio Hashing Algorithms
This Section gives an overview on publications on perceptual audio hashing.
2.2.4.1 History of Audio Data Hiding Research
The topic of perceptual audio hashing became increasingly investigated from the year 2000
which is many years after digital production, archiving, and distribution of music had become
common on a large scale. Until nowadays, the research progress in this field has been steadily
increasing, as can be seen from Figure 2.4.
As can be expected from the overview on applications in Section 2.2.2 above, most works in the
field consider retrieval mechanisms e.g. for recognition of music content, discriminating speech
from music content, advanced music genre categorization or even recommendation services.
Apart from content filtering applications, audio hashing has not been thoroughly investigated
in the information security research community.
2.2.4.2 Audio Hashing Algorithms
The approaches in the literature are roughly categorized according to the following criteria:
Feature domain: Perceptual audio hashing analyzes audio features in different data domains.
All approaches that are regarded as relevant for this thesis work analyze audio features
mainly in a spectral domain, e.g. Fourier/DFT, MFCC, MFCC or Wavelets.
15 IEEE Xplore Digital Library: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org
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Figure 2.4.: Number of available publications about ”audio hashing/fingerprinting” (over time)
that are available at/via IEEE Xplore Digital Library15
Internal randomization: A few approaches discuss or even propose internal randomization dur-
ing feature extraction for providing a more secure hash calculation. That is, a dependency
from as secret key can be implemented in some of the algorithms.
It can already be mentioned here that the robustness is not a significant criterion to distinguish
algorithms as all selected audio hashes show a sufficient robustness to common distortions on
the hashed audio (as claimed by the authors). Notable publications apart from the Phillips Hash
approach as explained above are outlined in the following:
The ”Shazam Hash”
An approach by Avery Li-Chun Wang [Wan2003, Wan2006] from Shazam Entertainment Ltd.,
London, UK, derives low-level features in the Fourier domain: It heuristically identifies domi-
nant peaks in the Fourier spectrum which are denoted by the author as ”anchor” points. Then,
the displacement vectors between such anchors, i.e. their mutual difference of the time and fre-
quency indices are evaluated and utilized as characteristic feature, see Figure 2.5. In terms of
the MPEG psychoacoustic modeling as explained in Section 2.4 the anchor points are somewhat
similar to tonal components (but not identical).
The Wang algorithm is integrated in the commercial Shazam system for music identification.
The interested reader can investigate its outstanding robustness by trying the Shazam by him-
self/herself16.
The ”AudioID” algorithm
It was developed by Allamanche, Herre, Cremer et al. [AHH+2001a, AHH+2001b] at the Fraun-
hofer IIS institute. It is based on an analysis over time of the volume/loudness in the time-
domain and the so-called spectrum flatness measure (SFM) and spectral crest factor (SCF) in the
Fourier domain which describe the tonality of the spectrum as characteristic features. These
quantities are rather basic statistical characteristics as simple as, for example, ratios of geomet-
ric means versus arithmetic means, or maximums over frequency coefficients which are easy to
compute. The exact definitions can be found in the MPEG-7 specification on ”low level audio
descriptors” (LLD) [ISO2002].
16 Shazam smartphone app for Android or iOS, http://www.shazam.com
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Figure 2.5.: ”Shazam Hash” feature extraction example;
Left Figure: Fourier spectrogram as false color plot (higher Fourier magnitudes indi-
cated by darker color);
Right Figure: position of isolated peaks in spectrogram (crosses), displacement vec-
tors between ”anchor” peak versus other peaks in ”target zone”
Source: [Wan2003]
The same main features are being utilized in a different way in the work by Lancini [LMP2004].
This AudioID is included in the consumer software mufin player17 for automated re-organization
of music collections and is utilized for commercial broadcast monitoring services by the Music-
trace GmbH, Erlangen, Germany18.
Miscellaneous Fourier Domain-Based approaches
Like the examples explained above, the majority of approaches in the literature on audio hash-
ing utilize features derived from the Fourier magnitudes (while Fourier phases are discarded).
Significant works are outlined in the following:
• One DFT-based approach was published by Seo [SJL+2005]. Interestingly it reflects human
perception by temporarily dividing the high-resolution spectrum (2048 FFT coefficients)
in 16 critical bands in the range of 300-5300 Hz. Then, the set of indices of the centroids
in each of the critical bands is used as a robust feature. Jang et al. proposes [JYL+2009]
an extension thereof by skillful filtering and quantizing the centroid identification result
followed by mutual comparison of those quantized values (”pairwise boosting”).
• Baluja and Covell et al. from Google Inc., Mountain View, USA, proposed their Waveprint
algorithm [CB2007, BC2007]. It extracts characteristic features by applying a Wavelet
transform on the DFT spectrogram as post processing operation for improving the robust-
ness and discrimination performance.
• In an approach by Yu Liu [LYK2009] the Fourier spectrum is evaluated similar to the
Phillips hash approach described above. Then the energy spectrum is subject to post-
processing by the DCT which is a standard approach for de-correlating the spectra. This
is a reasonable approach for abstraction: because of the large overlap of the FFT frames
17 mufin player published by MAGIX Software GmbH, http://www.mufin.com
18 loc. cit
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the spectra are slowly varying over time which introduces many correlations between the
spectra.
• Malekesmaeili proposed an interesting approach based on the so-called chroma feature
over time [MW2012, MW2014]. This is a post-processing operation that evaluates the
spectrum according to octave series: for a given frequency f0 the octave series is defined as
all octaves at frequencies (2n · f0) with n ∈ Z. The chroma feature accumulates frequency
components irrespective in which octave they are present. This is well suited for (but also
limited to) analyzing music content. It is also a starting point for developing an audio
feature that is invariant to pitch shifting. As claimed by the authors it outperforms the
Shazam hash.
• A work by Shibuya et al. describes an approach that extracts so-called pseudo-sinusoidal
components [SAN2013]. These are defined as peaks in the Fourier spectrum that are
constantly dominant over a short period of time. Hence it shares some of its core ideas
with the Shazam hash approach.
• Ouali et al. presented a simple approach that compares the Fourier coefficients in the
spectrogram against their arithmetic mean across one second of duration [ODG2014].
• Finally, Coover and Han from Gracenote Inc., Emeryville, USA, propose an approach that
develops the Phillips Hash further [CH2014]. As explained in Section 2.2.3 closer analysis
shows that not all bits in the original audio hash of a certain audio segment are equally
robust to distortions. The authors distinguish such ”strong bits” from ”weak bits” for defin-
ing a so-called power mask for increasing the robustness. This idea is adapted by Seo et al.
[Seo2014] for improving the performance of the hash matching process.
Various MFCC-based Approaches
A number of algorithms analyze the so-called Mel-frequency cepstrum coefficients (MFCC) (as
explained in Section A.1.4.1) along with the plain Fourier spectrum. The MFCC spectrum is
commonly utilized in (but not limited to) tasks of speech recognition and speaker recognition.
Significant MFCC-based works in audio hashing are listed in the following:
• Grutzek and Knospe et al. presented works on applying the feature extraction principle of
the Phillips Hash on MFCCs [GSM+2012, Kno2013]. Subsequently, in an internal process-
ing step an intermediate result of feature extraction is subject to a cryptographic message
authentication coding, namely the CMAC [Dwo2005]. This is claimed to preserve the pri-
vacy as the CMAC is a secure one-way function which prevents reconstructing the audio
sound from the final hash result. The authors themselves state that the privacy protecting
CMAC post processing is not sufficient to provide security in authentication applications
as the MFCC extraction itself is not secure.
• Cheng et al. [CCW2003] proposes a general audio hashing algorithm using Hidden Markov
Modeling (HMM) of feature vectors consisting of low-level audio features like the loud-
ness/volume and the zero-crossing-rate in the time-domain, the bandwidth in the Fourier
domain and the MFCC spectrum.
• Another MFCC and HMM based approach by Gomez, Cano et al. [GCdG+2002] solely for
integration in authentication watermarking is outlined in the Section 2.5 on Related Work.
• Özer and Memon propose a post-processing on the MFCCs by utilizing the singular value
decomposition (SVD) as ”mathematical tool” et al. [OSMA2005]. See Appendix A.1.4.2
for a brief explanation of the SVD. In simple words, the SVD provides a very abstracted
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”summary” of the principle axes of the MFCC spectra that allows extracting robust features
for audio identification.
MCLT-based Approach
Mıçak et al. presented a perceptual hashing approach in [MV2001] based on signal statistics
in the spectral domain. Here, the complex modulated lapped transform (MCLT) is used. This
transform from the family of discrete cosine transforms (DCT) are common in lossy compression,
for example in Dolby AC-3 for audio or JPEG for images.
The publication is relevant and inspiring in the context of this thesis for the following reasons:
• It gives a formal and comprehensible definition of requirements on perceptual hashes in
general, as cited in Section 2.2.1.
• It proposes to use adaptive quantization in the feature extraction step of the hash calcula-
tion. The goal is improving the robustness of the scheme.
• It reflects the human auditory perception in a simple way to some extent by ignoring fre-
quency components that are below the absolute hearing threshold in silence (as explained
in Section A.2.4. For this, a binary feature is extracted by comparing the MCLT coefficient
with the hearing threshold: the so-called significance map indicates if a spectral coefficient
is greater or smaller than the correspondent hearing threshold.
Experimental results show a good robustness against many attacks that are inaudible or just
little audible. However, targeted attacks on the collision security were not evaluated.
Interestingly, the author discusses to utilize the MCLT-based audio hash output as the secret key
input for consecutive watermarking. Using such content-dependent key increases the security
of any watermarking algorithms with regards to copy-attacks. The interested reader is referred
to Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.4.3 about the definition of the terms ”watermark keys” and
”copy attacks”.
Key-dependent Bitstream Hashing for MP3/AAC data
An interesting aspect is addressed by the works of Jiao et al. in [JYLN2007, JLLN2008]. It of-
fers the opportunity of hashing for compressed MP3 and AAC input with lower computational
efforts: these bitstreams already provide the audio spectrum in the so-called in MDCT represen-
tation. This reduces computational demands because only marginal parsing efforts for obtaining
the spectra are required.
In the context of this thesis, this means a certain limitation because it is also desirable to protect
plain PCM audio data and other audio formats too. Nevertheless this work is somewhat inspir-
ing because the authors propose a key-dependent pseudo-random selection of MDCT coefficients
in the feature extraction and hash modeling steps. Hash values of the same audio but with
different keys are shown to be independent in these works.
Audio Hashing based on Zernike Transform
An audio hashing approach by Ning Chen and Hai-dong Xiao [CX2013] makes a virtual ”detour”
by applying techniques from digital image processing and optics. The (presumably time do-
main) audio signal is divided into frames and the data is temporarily projected / reordered into
a two-dimensional representation. Then the dataset is developed in terms of 2D-Zernike poly-
nomials which were originally introduced [Zer1934] for calculations in (analog) phase contrast
microscopy.
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The motivation for this particular method can be understood from the property of Zernike mo-
ments providing an image data representation that is invariant to translation, rotation and
scaling [Tea1980, KH1990]. Authors show that this is, in turn, a suitable robustness property
for audio hashing too. Eventually the robustness was successfully evaluated by the authors
for the presence of content-preserving audio transforms. Nevertheless, detection of malicious
tampering was not the objective of the work by Chen.
Key-dependent Wavelet based Approach (by Nouri, Abdolmaleki )
For the sake of completeness, the approach by Nouri, Abdolmaleki et al. shall be men-
tioned [NZAF2012]. Although somewhat imprecise in its technical detail, the work is significant
as it discusses a key-dependency in the Wavelet feature selection.
2.2.5 Summary, Discussion and Current Research Trends
Perceptual hashing is nowadays a well investigated and developed technology. Research
progress is being constantly published in major multimedia processing conferences and jour-
nals from time to time. Technically, most algorithms analyze the audio data in a spectral
domain, especially the Fourier domain. Doing so, most approaches achieve a sufficient ro-
bustness suitable for the main applications of audio hashing like music recognition or second
screen services. Low bit error rates are observed for the most important admissible transfor-
mations of the audio content like lossy compression or DA/AD conversion in the course of
loudspeaker playback/microphone recording. Most of the algorithms are only little robust to
time stretching or pitch shifting which is, however, of minor relevance for tampering detection.
It is notable that a significant portion of works in the state of the art consider the ”Phillips hash”
modeling: many authors (still) discuss certain aspects of this algorithm in more detail [DL2004,
HBMS2007, BHMS2007a, BHMS2007b] or apply its overall idea to their own works [JYLN2007,
JLLN2008, LYK2009, GSM+2012, CH2014, Seo2014, YWN2015].
About the selection of features it is also notable that for the sake of robustness many algorithms
focus on identifying salient features, mostly dominant peaks in whatever spectrum. This would
be insufficient with regards to the thesis objectives because also the audio spectrum off the peaks
can contain audible and significant content.
Example: A synthetic but nonetheless instructive audio data example can be seen in the ”Nu-
merical Example” in Section 2.4.1: a white noise signal is mixed with pure sine tone sig-
nals. This sound s (loosely spoken) as ”beeps with background noise” (see Figure 2.13).
But only the sine tones would contribute to the audio hashes proposed by Avery Li-Chun
Wang or Shibuya [Wan2003, Wan2006, SAN2013] which could be insufficient with re-
gards to tampering detection.
On the other side, utilization for authentication purposes is rarely discussed in perceptual audio
hashing. Thus, security aspects with regards to ressillience against circumventing the tamper-
ing detection have been out of scope in the state of the art. However, a few publications do
introduce a randomization process in the feature extraction and hash modeling as required
for secure authentication. According to Jiao or Nouri this can be realized by a key-dependent
(not: content-dependent) quantization of the features or the projection of the feature vectors
on a key-dependent set of basis vectors [JLLN2008, NZAF2012]. The latter is also stressed in
a work by Radhakrishnan [RM2002] or in an early work by Fridrich on secure image hash-
ing [FG2000].
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Publication Time DFT MDCT MFCC Wavelets other key-dependent
[HOK2001a] x
[AHH+2001a] x x
[MV2001] x
[CCW2003] x x x
[SJL+2005] x
[OSMA2005] x
[Wan2006] x
[BC2007] x
[JLLN2008] x x
[JYL+2009] x
[LYK2009] x
[GSM+2012] x x x
[NZAF2012] x x
[CX2013] x
[MW2014] x
[SAN2013] x
[ODG2014] x
[YWN2015] x
Table 2.3.: Categorization of perceptual hashing in the literature (in chronological order); Left
columns: First author and reference, middle columns: data domain for feature ex-
traction, right column: key-dependent (”x” = yes)
The main properties of the approaches described above with regards to the data domain of
feature extraction and the discussion of security aspects are summarized in Table 2.3. Note that
the overview so far covers audio hashing given by itself, mostly used for music identification.
A few more hashing approaches that are proposed exclusively in the context of authentication
watermarking will be explained in the Related Work in Section 2.5.
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2.3 Digital Audio Watermarking
This Section recalls more than sixty years of audio watermarking for analog and digital audio
signals. This allows comparing the watermarking-related aspects of the investigated approach
with state of the art in audio watermarking.
2.3.1 Watermarking Model and Terminology
Digital Watermarking is a technique for hiding information into digital multimedia data. The
hiding is done without changing the file format and the perceived quality compared to the
original input: the watermark is technically transparent and invisible or inaudible, respectively.
The wording in data ”hiding” reflects that the technique is a practice from the field of cryptology
which has been under research and in use since ancient times. But unlike cryptography and
cryptanalysis, watermarking and the related field of steganography of digital data are rather
young disciplines. For example, the first ACM Information Hiding Workshop, a well-respected
academic conference on these research subjects, took place not earlier than 1996 [And1996].
A frequently cited definition by Dittmann in [Dit2000a, p. 20] introduces the terms of ”embed-
ding” and ”detection” and stresses the technical nature of the watermark as
”...a transparent, imperceptible pattern that is embedded in the data. The watermark-
ing procedure...includes an embedding process (embedding or marking algorithm) and
a retrieval process (retrieval algorithm, retrieval of message). The watermark pattern
mostly is a pseudo-noise pattern that encodes the watermark message” 19.
In extension, Cox, Miller, and Bloom [CMB+2007, page XV, Preface] define watermarking as
being
”...a practice of hiding a message about an image, audio clip, video clip or other work
of media within that work itself”.
This stresses the purpose of watermarking: the embedded messages in somehow related to the
media content (e.g. representing copyright information, user IDs or authentication codes).
Watermark Embedding
Most embedding approaches are based on adding a pseudo-noise signal, modifying statisti-
cal or quantization properties or replacing perceptually irrelevant parts of the cover data by
the watermark message. The basic embedding model consists of the following elements (see
Figure 2.6):
Cover data: This is the input data C0 to the embedding process. In focus of this PhD thesis
will be audio data. The audio content covered can be available on its own or it can be
present as the sound track in a ”video”. Audio cover data can be represented either in the
raw/temporal domain, for example, PCM audio samples in WAVE files or Audio CDs. Or it
can be given in the spectral domain: examples are spectral coefficients as present in MP3
or AAC data or (temporarily) as the output of a Fourier transform.
Message: The input message M mostly is sequence of message symbols of a certain length.
Mostly, the alphabet of symbols is binary.
Unlike in the research field of steganography, the embedded watermark message is seman-
tically related to the watermarked content, e.g. a copyright notice, an individual ID about
19 Definition translated literally from German
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Figure 2.6.: Watermark embedding model
the particular copy of the file, or any kind of metadata about the watermarked content. In
the context of this PhD thesis, the embedded meta data will allow verifying the integrity
of the cover data.
Secret key: The confidentiality of and the access to the embedded information is provided by
a secret watermarking key K1 as input data. Depending on the watermarking algorithm,
the key may be the seed of a random number generator which is used for controlling the
embedding positions in the media. Watermark keys in current watermarking approaches
are symmetric. Hence the key provides a proof of authenticity in that the watermark must
have been embedded by an authorized entity from the set of entities that have access to
the watermarking key20
Watermarked media: The output to the embedding process is the watermarked media CW . It is
usually created in the same data format as the cover data input.
Watermark Detection and Retrieval
Each watermarking embedding algorithm corresponds to a watermark detection algorithm. In
many approaches, including the one investigated in this thesis, at first the algorithm attempts
to detect the pure presence of an embedded message. If this synchronization is successful with
a sufficient degree of significance, the embedded message sequence is eventually retrieved from
the marked data (see Figure 2.7).
The message is detected and retrieved by either correlation, evaluating the quantization prop-
erties of the data, several statistical methods or comparison of the marked data with the cover
data, if available. Common embedding and detection principles will be explained in detail in the
state of the art overview in Section 2.3.4.
One outstanding property of digital watermarking in comparison to other security mechanisms
is the inseparably interwoven relationship between embedded information and the protected
multimedia data: For most algorithms, the process of embedding is irreversible and the wa-
termark cannot be removed. Even more, while common cryptography mechanisms fail when
content is converted to other file formats or taken from the digital to the analog domain, water-
marks can persist and keep the content protected.
20 It should be noted that the term ”key” is frequently used in an ambiguous manner in the watermarking research
community. Some authors propose applying the encryption of the watermark messageM using a secret ”key”.
But for the remainder, the term ”(watermark) key” shall denote a secret which defines where and how the
message is embedded into the cover media and which is shared between embedding and detecting algorithms
and parties.
35
Figure 2.7.: Watermark detection and retrieval model; Dashed line: Utilizing the original cover
data is optional (non-bind watermarking)
Watermarking Characteristics
Digital watermarking algorithms can be categorized with respect to different characteristics (see
Cox [CMB+2007], Dittmann [Dit2000a] or Kalker [Kal2001]):
Transparency: The watermark should be imperceptible as possible, i.e. the degradation of the
acoustic or visual quality caused by the embedding should be minimal. For achieving this,
this thesis work uses psychophysical models like the one explained in [ISO1993a] for
controlling the embedding modifications. Furthermore, the embedding should be trans-
parent to the digital representation of the signal: the embedding is usually done without
changing the file format.
Robustness vs. Fragility: Most approaches are designed as robust watermarking algorithms:
here, the embedded message can still be detected and retrieved even if the watermarked
data is subject to further post-processing or signal transformation or DA/AD conversion.
Robustness usually is determined by using different levels of redundancy during embed-
ding. That can be done by embedding each message bit repeatedly, i.e. using larger sec-
tions of the cover to embed each message bit. Also on the coding level, redundancy can
be exploited by including forward error correction coding or collusion-secure fingerprint
coding.
In contrast, the more rare fragile watermarking approaches for integrity verification are
designed so that the embedded message is destroyed by moderate or even any signal
transformation. The different classes of fragile watermarks can be used for integrity veri-
fication and are hence explained in detail in Section 2.3.3.
Security: The watermark should withstand attacks aimed directly at the embedded information.
Unauthorized retrieval or modifying of the watermark message without knowledge of the
secret watermark key shall be prevented. Successful deletion of the message shall require
transforms or distortions of the marked media that are so strong that they render the
media unusable and ”spoil” the sound quality. Following Kerckhoffs’ Principle [Ker1883],
the security shall not rely on the confidentiality of the embedding/detection algorithm,
but only on the confidentiality of the secret key.
Note: Security attacks in general are explained in Section 2.3.4.3 while the security of the
approaches extended in this PhD thesis are analyzed in Chapter 4.
Symmetry vs. Asymmetry: Almost all watermarking approaches are symmetric security mecha-
nisms so that the keys for embedding and detection are identical, i.e. they are secrets
shared between embedder and detector . Approaches for public watermark detection are
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under discussion [HG1997, CK2001, HQ2002, YL2005] but they are not comparable to
the properties of asymmetric encryption algorithms for the time being.
Invertibility: In most watermarking approaches in research and practice, the embedding process
is not reversible. Furthermore, in some approaches an initial embedding process leaves
the watermarked content in a state that prevents it from being watermarked a second
time using the same watermark key but with different watermark message. This property
is useful with regards to preventing forgery of watermark messages in case that the key is
compromised.
The property was investigated by the author beyond the scope of this thesis in
the context of watermarking support for secure key exchange protocols [ZSKR2010,
RKSZ2010].
Conversely, there exists a class of (few) watermarking algorithms that allow restoring the
original state of the audio data (so-called invertible watermarking).
Capacity / Data Rate: The capacity of an algorithm is defined by the amount of data embedded
within a certain image area or audio playback time in bit. It is often specified as the
embedding rate in bit per second or as the ratio of the message length divided by the file
size of the cover data21. Current audio watermarking solutions vary from only a few bits
per second (in robust watermarking) up to thousands of bits per second of payload (e.g.
in semi-fragile or invertible watermarking).
Blind, Informed and Non-blind Detection: This aspect describes whether knowledge about the
unmarked cover file is required for the detection or not:
• For non-blind watermark detection, the original data is required. Note that non-
blind detection is obviously futile for integrity verification because tampering could
be identified by comparing the suspicious media with their correspondent (assumed
available) cover data directly.
• For informed watermarking, at least some meta data about the cover needs to be
available (apart from the watermark key),
• If only the key but no further meta data is required, the approach is called blind
watermarking in the literature22.
In addition, the efficiency / computational demands23 is usually named as important character-
istic for practical applications like audio streaming or CD/DVD creation. In the context of this
PhD thesis, this is of minor relevance and not analyzed much further. See Section 3.4.3 for some
information on runtime performance of this thesis work.
Not all of the requirements on the presented properties can be fully met at the same time. Many
of them are mutually competitive, especially transparency, capacity, and robustness. Hence,
watermarking techniques have to be parametrized appropriately to be suitable their application
scenario.
21 Please note that some authors more precisely define the ”capacity” like in communication theory as the theo-
retical upper bound of information that can be embedded into the cover data, or carrier, resp. This is different
from the usually smaller embedding rate that an algorithm actually achieves. However, the latter definition is
commonly used in the watermarking literature and will be used in the remainder.
22 Although the term ”blind” reminds of visual impairment, the wording is common for all watermarking schemes,
i.e. including audio
23 Note that this processing time properties at runtime are commonly but confusingly denoted as ”complexity”
in the watermarking research community. It shall not be confused with algorithmic complexity in terms of the
”big O(...)” notation.
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2.3.2 Audio-specific Conditions for Watermarking
Most approaches in watermarking research have been developed and presented for image data.
Nevertheless, audio watermarking is a significant field of research in watermarking. The domain
of audio data technically differs significantly from image and video with regards to opportunities
and challenges for watermarking. This includes:
• The time-dependent nature of audio data: A raw sound signal (e.g. as PCM data)
can be represented as a purely time-dependent scalar amplitude signal x t . In contrast,
raw image data like gray values or RGB values of pixels can be represented as being
scalar quantities depending on two spatial image coordinates/indices. The same quantities
in video data are even dependent on three coordinates (namely in the spatial and the
temporal dimension).
• Audio specific attacks: As a consequence of the one-dimensional nature of raw sound
data, serious attacks as in image/video watermarking based on geometrical distortions are
not applicable to the audio domain (and vice versa) in principle or in a meaningful manner.
Examples are rotation or geometric distortions (shearing, perspective projection etc.) for
images, or down-mixing of stereo content to mono or adding delay effects and echoes in
audio.
• Uncompressed storage formats: In audio data also uncompressed and lossless com-
pressed storage formats/codecs are common as input format. For input video file data
such standards are not used in practice because of huge storage or bandwidth require-
ments.
• Human perception of audio: Obviously, auditory perception greatly differs from visual
perception. Psychophysical models for audio (as explained in Appendix A.2) do not apply
for visual perception, and vice versa. The same is true for the superior sensitivity of the
human ear to sound across many orders of magnitude in frequency and volume and to
even small differences thereof.
For completeness, note that watermarking approaches for other audio-related data types are
available for example for music description protocols like MIDI [Dit2000b], or printed music
sheets [MNS2001, BSN2002].
For completeness it should also be mentioned that beyond the field of audio, the largest
number of publications in watermarking is available for image and video data. Also
approaches for many data types beyond multimedia like plain text [TTA2006, CC2010,
HSWZ2013], vector-based drawings and fonts [WM2013], 3D models [BBC+2004, ABHB2009,
TBSS2013], databases [Li2006, BSS2013], integrated circuit layouts [CT1999a], software bi-
naries [CT1999b, SSSS2008], DNA sequence data [Lee2014] etc.
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2.3.3 Authentication Watermarking Versus Other Watermarking Applications
At first the most common applications of watermarking are recalled:
• Copyright Marking: the embedded message gives proof of ownership; used for resolving
claims of copyright
• Transactional Marking: messages is auser ID or the like for tracing individual media
copies when distributed to different users; used in tracing illegal internet piracy or docu-
ment leakage
• Broadcast Monitoring: the message allows recognizing music songs on the air or online,
and in metering devices/apps
• Copy Control / DRM: the message triggers external copy protection means in terms of
digital rights management (DRM)
• User interaction/”2nd screen”: the message triggers interactive features of TV programs
or DVDs on a separate mobile phone or tablet
• Media annotation: the message represents arbitrary meta data about the cover data.
These applications have in common that a high level of watermarking robustness is required:
the embedded message must be invariant to even strong levels of distortion or forgery attacks
on the watermarked content. For more detail, the interested reader is referred to the text books
by Cox [CMB+2007] or Dittmann [Dit2000a].
Authentication Watermarking Types
Watermarking can also be applied for integrity verification. In the literature on media security
this is commonly (and in the author’s opinion a little fuzzily24) subsumed under the term of
”authentication watermarking”. To be more precise, the term can describe watermarking-based
protection of either
• data integrity by itself [WM2000, FGD2001, LS2006b], or
• both integrity and data source authenticity [BBF+2000, DKSV2004, CDF2006].
In authentication watermarking methods the embedded message can indicate potential acts of
tampering (see Zhu and Swanson [ZS2003]). This can be realized in different ways:
• Fragile Authentication Watermarking: In these approaches the embedded watermark is
not robust at all. Instead it is being destroyed even by slight modifications of the marked
content. Here, the embedded message can be seen as a ”digital seal” that breaks if changes
are applied to parts of the watermark-protected media. The failure of detection is intended
and allows indicating that the data was potentially doctored.
• Semi-Fragile Authentication Watermarking: If the embedded integrity watermark mes-
sage is capable to withstand a tolerable amount of modification of the marked content,
the approach is often denoted as semi-fragile watermarking in the literature. This term
expresses that the watermark here is less vulnerable to distortion than in pure fragile wa-
termarking. For integrity verification, often a static watermark message or a dynamic time
code is embedded. Here the objective is that malicious doctoring renders the watermark
unreadable while minor data transformations (like lossy encoding) maintain the message.
24 It has to be admitted that the denotation as ”authentication watermarking” appears to be misleading because
the term ought to be correspondent to the objective ”authenticity” in the first place. Nevertheless it has been
a very common wording in the research community on digital watermarking for more than fifteen years – and
will be used in the remainder of this thesis.
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• Content-Fragile Authentication Watermarking In this thesis work ”content-fragile water-
marking” is investigated. Here, deliberately selected content-dependent meta data about
the original state of the cover data is embedded as a robust watermark message. In the
context of this thesis work, perpetual hashes will be used as embedded authentication
code messages. The initial publication about the overall concept of combining perceptual
hashes with digital watermarking in this manner was published by Dittmann [Dit2001]
already in 2001.
About the latter, the wording in the literature is ambiguous to some degree, unfortunately, as
the concept of ”content-fragile watermarking” is also denoted as
• ”mixed watermarking-fingerprinting” [GCdG+2002],
• ”self-embedding” [FG1999, YH2004, NAK+2016],
• ”content-based authentication watermarking” [GMS2008a].
• ”semi-fragile (signature) watermarking” [FKK2004].
Note that the wording as ”content-...” by Dittmann or Gulbis is ambiguous to some degree as
the authors do not exactly describe which level of identity (e.g. in terms of the definition in
Section 1.2.2) shall be achieved. Nevertheless, all approaches using the listed wording operate
beyond the level of binary identity though.
Comparison
First of all, it is important to notice that the content-fragile watermarking technique in
general has much higher capacity requirements than in applications related to protecting
copyrights/anti-piracy. In this thesis work a dynamic authentication code and additional meta-
data of approximately 150 bit needs to be embedded every few seconds. Conversely, in copyright
transaction watermarking for example it is sufficient to embed a static or dynamic ID of a few
dozen bits for a few times somewhere in the file.
On the other hand, the robustness requirements in content fragile watermarking are smaller to
some extent: in the case of very strong distortions being applied to a watermarked media (for
whatsoever reason) the watermark detection might be faulty or will even fail. In authentication
watermarking this can be tolerated as it (nevertheless) indicates breaches of integrity.
Finally, a very good transparency is desired in almost any watermarking applications. Audible
quality loss on the recipient side can hardly be acceptable in any application – neither in this
thesis work.
An exhaustive overview about the requirements on watermarking in different applications is
given in Table 2.4.
2.3.4 State of the Art in Audio Watermarking
This Section gives an overview on publications on the approaches in general audio water-
marking. It discusses the history of research on audio watermarking, algorithms from the state
of the art, their security and other aspects in the field.
2.3.4.1 History of Audio Data Hiding Research
According to Cox and Miller [CM2002] the technique of ”electronic watermarking” has been
under research and development since the 1950s. But not until the mid 1990s, academic re-
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Watermarking purpose Robustness Capacity Transparency Security
Fragile authentication low various high high
Semi-fragile auth. medium low high high
Content-fragile auth. medium high high high
Copyright / ownership high low high high
Transaction tracing high low high high
Copy Control high low high high
Broadcast monitoring high low high high
2nd Screen high low high low
Annotation medium high high low
Table 2.4.: Comparison of watermarking characteristics across different applications; dashed
lines: watermarking grouped into the application fields of ”data authentication”
(upper area), ”copyright/anti-piracy” activities (middle) and miscellaneous ”rich me-
dia services” (lower).
search in the field significantly increased. It was sparked when digital recording, processing,
storage, online distribution, and illegal piracy became more and more apparent. That time,
many ”pioneer works” were presented at/in special conferences and journal issues on multime-
dia security or signal processing only. Examples are the ACM Information Hiding, ACM MMSEC,
ACM IH&MMSEC, or the SSWMC multimedia security conference hosted at the IS&T SPIE Elec-
tronic Imaging.
Figure 2.8.: Number of available publications about ”audio watermarking” (over time) that are
available at/via IEEE Xplore Digital Library and Microsoft Academic Search 25 (re-
trieved February 2017)
In the early 2000s, a few more watermarking-focused conferences could establish itself due to
increasing attention, for example the IEEE IIH-MSP and IWDW conferences. From then, the
topic has received increasing attention also by related major journals and conferences with
larger audience and greater attention, for example conferences ACM Multimedia, IEEE ICASSP,
25 IEEE Xplore Digital Library: loc. cit.,
Microsoft Academic: http://academic.research.microsoft.com
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IEEE ICIP, the IEEE journals ”Multimedia” and ”Signal Processing”, the ”IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing”, and the journal ”Digital Signal Processing” published
by Elsevier, as can be seen from Figure 2.8.
Nevertheless, watermarking and the related field of steganography have remained under-
represented at major conferences in general IT security though. As an example, at the five
most frequently-cited conferences on general information security26 in the years 2010-2015,
there had been very few (i.e. less than five) publications listed on the term ”audio watermark-
ing”.
Figure 2.9.: Percentage of available publications about ”audio watermarking” versus ”image wa-
termarking” by/via ACM Digital Library, Elsevier/ScienceDirect, IEEE Xplore Digital
Library, Microsoft Academic ; total numbers given bar-wise data descriptors (re-
trieved February 2017)
Finally, resources in watermarking for audio has always lagged behind the watermarking
research for other media types, especially watermarking for image data. As an exam-
ple, at the well-respected resources at ACM Digital Library27, IEEE Xplore Digital Library28,
Elsevier/ScienceDirect29, and Microsoft Academic30, the total number of publications on "im-
age AND watermarking" in their abstracts is at least four times greater than for "audio AND
watermarking". That means that audio watermarking is of moderate interest in the research
community as compared to watermarking for image data, unfortunately.
26 ”Top 5” conferences according to the ”Impact Rating” provided by the Microsoft Academic Search (loc. cit.);
namely: CCS, EUROCRYPT, S&P, USENIX, and CRYPTO (Impact Rating values retrieved May 2015; rating
service now being decommissioned at the website, see: https://academic.microsoft.com/FAQ)
27 ACM Digital Library: http://dl.acm.org
28 loc. cit.
29 Elsevier/ScienceDirect: http://www.sciencedirect.com
30 loc. cit.
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2.3.4.2 Audio Watermarking Algorithms
The works of the state of the art can be categorized as follows:
Feature Domain: The data domain for embedding can be either the time domain or an elabo-
rately selected spectral domain (like Fourier, DCT, Wavelet, SVD etc.).
Embedding Principle: Several fundamental embedding methods of embedding and detection
algorithms are known. Most important are so-called echo based, Spread Spectrum, Patch-
work, and QIM approaches etc. which will be explained in the following. Note that these
principles can be applied to watermarking for other media types like image, video etc., too.
In the following the most important classes of algorithms and corespondent publications are
reviewed in rather chronological order of evolution. The interested reader is referred to the re-
cent work by Hua et al. [HHS+2016] for a more detailed review and discussion on a hierarchical
categorization of algorithms.
Notch-filtering based approach by Hembrook
One of the first known analog data hiding methods for copyright protection of audio content was
developed by Muzak Inc. from Seattle, USA, and eventually patented in the 1960s [Hem1961].
An analog notch filter was applied to the audio spectrum that selectively muted a very narrow
sub-band in the audio spectrum at 1.0 kHz. Here, the time intervals of the sub-band removal
represent the embedded messages in Morse code. The deliberate filtering of this sub-band usu-
ally can hardly be perceived by a human listener. But the absence of this frequency component
can easily be detected using a matching narrow band-pass filter and which reveals the hidden
Morse code.
Correlation-based Embedding/Detection in the Temporal Domain
Early approaches are based on adding pseudo-noise sequences to the PCM signal by mixing
in the time domain. Different pseudo-noise sequences or respective offsets in these sequences
correspond to different message symbols. The detection and retrieval of the watermark is con-
ducted using correlation-based analysis of the marked audio. Simplified, the Nyman-Pearson
cross correlation coefficient indicates the presence of the respective message symbol.
One of the most frequently cited ”pioneer works” following this principle was presented by
Boney, Tewfik and Swanson [BTH1996, SZTB1998]. Here, a pseudo-random noise sequence is
added to the input signal in the time domain. This work meant a significant progress to the state
of the art and was one of the first works that exploited frequency masking characteristics: Prior
to its adding, the noise sequence is subject to filtering according to a psychoacoustic model.
Here, the authors could benefit from research on lossy audio coding that made a lot of progress
in parallel, those days. A number of approaches extending these works were presented, for
example by Bassia [BP1998] or Lemma et al. [LAOVdK2003].
Spread Spectrum Watermarking in the Spectral Domain
Adding pseudo-noise sequences in temporal or frequency domain can be regarded as an example
of the general spread spectrum technique. In watermarking, adding a noise sequence effectively
means adding a noisy wide-band signal. That is, the watermark message/signal is being ”spread”
over a wide frequency band. This is why many watermarking approaches have been proposed
explicitly under the name of spread spectrum watermarking since the late 1990s.
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The most frequently cited spread spectrum based works were published by Cox et al.
[CKLS1996, CKLS1997] or Kirovski et al. [KM2003]. Many works proposed spread spectrum
algorithms for the spectral domain instead of the temporal domain, for example Chung et al.
[WSK2000], Li et al. [LY2000] Haitsma et al. [HvdVKB2000], Lu et al. [LLC2000], and recently
by Hamdouni [HALT2013] and Khalil [KA2015]. It is still subject of theoretical analysis e.g.
about the maximum channel embedding capacity [ZXH2015].
Again the presence of the watermark is detected by calculating the correlation coefficient be-
tween the (known) watermark pattern and the audio data (which is carried out in the spectral
domain instead of the temporal domain). Interestingly, a work by Nakashima uses the spread
spectrum not only for detecting the watermark but also for estimating the spatial location of the
detector in a movie theater at detection time [NTNB2006].
Note that spread spectrum technology is rather a general principle from communication theory
than a watermarking-focused algorithm. It was firstly investigated much earlier, at the begin-
ning of the 20th century for example by Nikolai Tesla [Tes1903]. It was increasingly investigated
in the course of World War I and World War II for secure radio communication [GK1942]. Nowa-
days, Spread Spectrum technology is still being adapted in military or civil telecommunication
like cellphone communication (before 4G) or in WLAN.
”Patchwork” Watermarking
In so-called Patchwork watermarking, the embedding of a message bit is based on enforcing that
certain statistical signal properties of the data are changed to abnormal values that unmarked
cover data usually does not have [BGML1996]. The watermark detector can later identify the
presence of such statistical anomalies and can retrieve the watermark.
The detailed description of the Patchwork principle and the origin of its name can be found
in the later Section 2.3.5.1. A Patchwork audio watermarking approach in the DFT domain
proposed by Steinebach [Ste2003] is utilized in this thesis work and is explained in detail in
Section 2.3.5.2.
Other publications on audio Patchwork watermarking were presented in the DCT domain by
Yeo et al. [YK2001], or in the FFT domain by Arnold et al. [Arn2000] and by Tachibana et al.
[Tac2003]. Interestingly, the latter approach was optimized for processing delay especially in
live processing. More recently, an approach for the cepstrum domain (see definition in Sec-
tion A.1.4.1) was presented by Hu [HC2012] while Natgunanathan extends existing DCT-based
approaches [NXE+2013].
Note that the Patchwork principle and the previously explained spread spectrum principle are
analytically equivalent as will be shown as a corollary in Section 2.3.5.3 below. However, both
terms have been commonly used in the literature over the years and hence are given here
separately for historical reasons.
SVD-based embedding
Another kind of embedding in the spectral domain is utilizing the mathematical formalism
of the singular value decomposition (SVD) as recalled in Appendix A.1.4.2. The SVD allows
identifying independent (and hence robust) components in the input cover data. In numerous
fields of science and engineering the SVD formalism is used as a ”mathematical tool” – so it is
in watermarking: Embedding a message bit by modifying the spectrum of singular values was
found to be an effective starting point for many SVD-based watermarking schemes. They offer
high embedding capacity (up to a few hundred bits per second) especially in recent years for
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example by Jian Wang [WHT2011]: Here, the DCT spectrum in selected sub bands is analyzed
in terms of the SVD and then watermarked in the ”SVD domain”. Other SVD-based works were
presented by Lei or Dhar [LSZ+2012, LST2013, DS2013].
Quantization Index Modulation (QIM)
A few years after the introduction of Spread Spectrum watermarking the so-called quantization
index modulation (QIM) was proposed. This approach embeds watermark information by en-
forcing the quantization properties of the cover data to a pre-determined scale. For the two
message symbols ”one” and ”zero”, two different quantizers are defined and applied on the
input data. On the detector side, the message bit symbol is retrieved from the marked sample
by identifying which of the two quantizers is the best match. It was introduced and defined by
Brian Chenet al. in a very frequently cited work [CW2001].
In the work by Xiang-Yang Wang [WNY2009] the watermark bit is embedded into the statistical
mean value of low frequency components in the Wavelet domain according to human auditory
masking.
A more general overview / meta study of QIM embedding into mean values in whatever spectral
representation was recently given by [LZ2016].
In the already mentioned work by Lei [LSZ+2012] a watermark is inserted in the coefficients of
the LWT low frequency sub-band taking advantage of both singular value decomposition (SVD)
and QIM.
A frequently cited work by Xinkai Wang proposes QIM embedding in the Wavelet domain,
too [WWZ+2013]. Although presenting promising results the work lacks a thorough experi-
mental evaluation (as will be discussed in Section 2.3.6 on ”Cursory Transparency Evaluation”).
Finally, very recent works by Fallahpour [FM2012, FM2015] and Hu [HHC2014, HH2015] ap-
plying the QIM principle in the DFT, DCT, and Wavelet domain, resp., have to be mentioned.
Quantization steps are defined by means of Fibonacci series. Detailed results can be found in
Section 2.3.6 on ”High-capacity Embedding”. These works were recently picked up by Neethu
et al. for QIM embedding in the Haar-Wavelet domain [NK2016]. However, they are not fur-
ther investigated as the evaluation in the publications based only a very small number of audio
samples and human test subjects for listening tests.
Least Significant Bit Watermarking (LSB Watermarking)
The most simple implementation of QIM is the so called least significant bit watermarking. Here,
the integer representation of cover data is used as the starting point. The respective least
significant bits (LSBs) of a set of cover data samples are replaced by the binary message symbols.
The two different message symbols ”1” and ”0” correspond to the quantizers for ”odd” and ”even”
quantization which shows that LSB watermarking is a very simple implementation of the QIM
principle.
Phase Coding
As an alternative to modifying the absolute value of FFT coefficients, also the FFT phase can
be exploited. This is taking advantage from the fact that the human ear is insensitive to slow
variations of the FFT phase, as explained early by Bender et al. [BGML1996]. The principle is
exploited in works e.g. by Dong et al. [DBI2004] and Arnold et al. [ABV2009, ACB+2014]. The
latter is also the technical basis of the commercial audio watermarking systems by Technicolor
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(formerly Thomson). Finally, a recent work by Ngo and Unoki [NU2015] proposes a QIM-
like approach on the FFT phase coefficients.
Echo Hiding
An early approach introduces imperceptible echoes for embedding the message as presented
by Gruhl, Lu, and Bender [GLB1996]. Here, different durations of delay (a few milliseconds)
are used for embedding different message symbols. The delay value of the echo can be detected
subsequently and the message symbol can be retrieved. Interestingly, embedding and detection
are carried out in different domains: embedding is done by applying an echo filter kernel in
the temporal domain. The detection is usually done in the cepstrum domain (see definition in
Appendix A.1.4.1).
More recent works on echo hiding were published by Wen-Chih Wu [WC2008], Huiqin
Wang [WNSM2008], Erfani [ES2009], and Guang Hua [HGT2015].
Muteness-based Approach
Another approach was presented by Kaabneh et al. It slightly modifies the duration of silent
(muted) sections in an audio. It is well suited for voice recordings in which such speech pauses
are usually available for embedding [KY2001]. It can not be well categorized into the notation
explained so far and is mentioned for the sake of completeness.
Bitstream Embedding
In many commercial applications, the audio data to be protected is available or will be dis-
tributed in compressed file formats. For this, there exist embedding approaches by modifying
the encoded bitstream directly. Approaches were presented
• for MP3 data by Arnold, Schmucker et al. [ASW2003, pp. 99],
• for AAC data by Allemanche, Siebenhaar, Neubauer and Herre [AH2000, SH2001],
• for MP2 data by Nahrstedt [NQ1998], by Steinebach and Dittmann [SD2003a] or by
Quan [QZ2006],
• for AC-3 data by Xiao-Ming Chen, Arnold [CABD2012], and
• for GSM data by Yuan and Huss [YH2004].
For a more detailed description of the latter work by Yuan see Section 2.5.
Bitstream embedding has the obvious advantage that computationally intensive calculations for
spectral transforms, decoding etc. can be avoided if the input audio is available in compressed
formats anyway. This allowed providing fast on-the-fly watermarking solutions a few dozen
times faster than real-time already in the early 2000s.
2.3.4.3 Security of Watermarking
This Section discusses the state of the art in watermarking in light of its security aspects. The
term security here refers in particular to the aspects of confidentiality, integrity and availability
of the embedded watermark message.
This discussion is important because the (rather provocative) statement
”watermarking is not cryptography”
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by Cox, Doërr and Furon in their paper of same name [CDF2006] is true in many ways. For
example, the authors distinguish the term key length in watermarking from its meaning in
cryptanalysis. From a technical point of view the authors explain that the ”key-space” anal-
ogy as in cryptography does not fully apply to watermarking: Very often, the watermark key is
used as the seed to a pseudo-random number generator. Its output is then used for controlling
essential processing steps in the course of embedding/detection.
One example is pseudo-randomly ”picking” a subset of cover data features used for embedding
(as explained in the example in Section 2.3.5). Here an attacker does not necessarily require
to disclose the secret key completely for recovering the pseudo-random sequence. Instead,
recovering the picked subsets directly (or even a sub-subset thereof) is sufficient.
This discussion was resumed by Bas and Furon [BF2012] by raising the question:
”Are 128 bits long keys possible in watermarking?”
in their publication of same name. The same authors conclude [BF2013, p. 3] that in watermark
detection – unlike in symmetric cryptography – the symmetric key as a shared ”secret” is not
unique. In other words, although not identical, a number of those shared secrets are in effect
equivalent as all of them allow detection and retrieval of the watermark message. Note that this
concept is different for example from standard encryption technologies in cryptography in which
usually the one and only private or public key grants access to the plain text. This observation led
to Bas’ and Furon’s formal definition of the ”effective key length” of a watermarking system. Its
size describes the actual difficulty for an adversary to get access to the watermarking message.
The elaboration in Chapter 4 discusses the consequences for the example of the Patchwork
watermarking algorithm as technically proposed this thesis work.
Note that beyond the pure technical aspects, Cox’ provocative statement is also true from a more
general perspective: It reflects well that the security of watermarking algorithms and protocols
has always been of minor interest in the research community on watermarking. It has never
been investigated as thoroughly (in terms of man power) as for example in cryptanalysis. By
far most watermarking publications present a cursory, and sometimes even negligent, view on
the security against targeted attacks. Instead, many authors focus on the robustness and on
application scenarios. Occasional exceptions were the security analysis on the core algorithms
or protocols in different works over time, as for example by Craver/Felten, Cayre, Fridrich and
Venturini [PAK1998, CMYY1998, CK2001, CWL+2001, Fri2002, Ven2004, CFF2005]; or the
work by Petitcolas [PAK1998] which is recalled in the following Section.
What adds to the security aspects of watermarking is that the term ”key” is frequently and
ambiguously used in a different manner in the watermarking research community. Some
authors propose applying whatever encryption of the watermark message M using a secret
”key” [DDPP2013, FM2015, NK2016, TLMA2016]. This shall not be confused with the true
watermarking key that defines where and how the message is embedded into the cover media.
General Security Attacks
In many application scenarios the watermarked media and the embedded message can be sub-
ject to the following security attacks by an adversary [PAK1998, VPP+2001].
Removal / Replacement Attack: One obvious attack on the availability of the watermark mes-
sage is given by applying strong global distortions on the watermarked media. This could
allow removing the embedded watermark message before detection time. Attacks can aim
at information leakage about the watermark key K1 for localizing / estimating the data
subsets that are actually watermarked inside the media. Then, targeted distortions can be
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applied there to remove the message. Even more, the message can be retrieved or even
forged which means an attack on confidentiality and integrity of the message as well.
De-Synchronization Attack: Many watermarking algorithms use synchronization approaches
that at first indicate to the detector the presence and the start of an embedded water-
mark message. Thus, an attacker can try to prevent watermark detection and retrieval by
attacking the synchronization pattern rather than attacking the message itself. This attack
is mainly aimed at the availability of the message detection.
Oracle Attack / Sensitivity Attack: An adversary can implement attacks systematically on the
embedded message by introducing distortions, adding noise, re-encoding etc. If the de-
tector of a watermarking algorithm is available to the public, it can serve as an oracle: the
detector then indicates the success or the failure of the attack and hence the sensitivity of
the algorithm to certain attacks [CL1997]. Oracle attacks can assist in estimating the data
subsets that are actually watermarked. An early example for successfully attacking copy
control watermarks was published by Craver, Felten et al. in 2001 [CWL+2001] and was
under heavy debate those days in the course of the so-called SDMI competition.
Copy Attack: Security also includes the behavior of the algorithm when the watermark is some-
how separated and copied to a different media file. This is especially relevant if the un-
marked cover data is available to an adversary. In this case, the difference signal (obtained
from subtracting the PCM audio data sets of the cover data minus the marked data, sample
by sample) often allows separating the ”watermark” and copying it to another file.
Collusion Attack: Collusion attacks exploit vulnerabilities of transaction watermarking. Here
usually different watermarked copies of the same cover with different embedded message
are available. Such attacks can be implemented by mixing the different copies. Collusion
attacks are only little relevant on pure integrity watermarking as it requires many differ-
ently watermarked copies as in the transaction watermarking scenario. It is not further
elaborated upon in the remainder of this document.
Beyond the scope of this thesis own publications on collusion resistance [SZ2006a,
SBH+2010, SBZS2010, BZSS2011, SBZS2012] were published in co-authorship, see
commented publication list at pp. 157.
Ambiguity Attack/Invertibility Attacks: This protocol attacks aim at finding the presence of an
ostensible watermark in the media that appears as a valid watermark message but that
had never been actually embedded before [CMYY1997, CMYY1998]. Such ”virtual” wa-
termarks could cause confusion by ambiguous claims of ownership. The confusion can
eventually render a watermarking based protection useless. Hence, no apparently correct
watermark message should be detectable from actually unmarked media data. This can
be rephrased into the requirement that the detection needs to feature a very low false
positive rate [AKS2003].
These security challenges exist in watermarking for any media type. The mentioned attacks
also mean a threat to watermarking research and technology in general: proven successful
attacks have the potential to make watermarking appear as futile or even compromising. When
watermarks can be deleted easily, innocent users are accused by forged watermark messages,
or false detection are triggered too often, the trust in watermarking-based security mechanisms
as a whole can get lost.
Security challenges often overlap with robustness challenges from a technical point of view. For
example, lossy MP3 transcoding of an audio can be applied by a user both in the course of
everyday fair use and as a malicious act.
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Attacks on Integrity Watermarking
Specific kind of attacks apply to watermarking systems for integrity protection. Adversaries
can exploit weaknesses in both the watermark embedding/detection and (if applicable) in
the perceptual hashing involved. The most important attack models were explained by
Fridrich [Fri2002] and are recalled in the following:
Undetected Modification: Obviously, an adversary can attempt to apply tampering to the pro-
tected media that – by itself – is little enough to remain undetected in the verification
stage. Examples are deletions of content that are too short in an audio or too small in
an image file. As in any feature based classification mechanism, a reasonable trade-off
between missed detections and false alarms must be identified. If a metrics for the degree
of modification can be defined, a suitable numerical decision threshold for the detector’s
response can be chosen.
In addition, attacks are defined that can fool the detector by causing misinterpretation of
the detection result. For example, Holliman and Memon discussed [HM2000] an attack
by exchanging independently protected units inside or between protected media. Without
further ado, such exchanging of units might remain undetected.
Oracle Attack/Sensitivity Attack: One example of allowing undetected integrity breaches are or-
acle attacks (as described in the previous Section for watermark embedding). If unlimited
access to the verification stage is available, the sensitivity of the approach can be studied
by systematic and gradual attacks. Hence vulnerabilities could be identified.
Information Leakage: Another kind of attacks attempt to obtain information about the secret
authentication key (e.g. if a key-dependent perceptual hash is used) or the placement of
the perceptual hash extraction. The same applies for the security of the watermark key.
This information leakage can assist attempts to apply undetected modifications in a very
targeted manner and/or subsequently overwriting the original watermark message.
Protocol Weakness: In combination with oracle/sensitivity attacks, authentication watermark-
ing can be circumvented on a protocol level as well. For example, an adversary can
attempt to modify a protected audio media so that it sounds similar but its correspondent
hash becomes significantly different. This intended violation of the robustness require-
ment will introduce many false alarms which eventually renders the complete scheme
unreliable and useless.
One such attack on an existent audio hashing algorithm was developed as a minor
research activity and published by the thesis author in co-authorship [SZN2011].
Research activities in the course of this PhD thesis address some of the above security aspects,
as explained in Chapter 4.
2.3.4.4 Other Works in the Field
Publications on Watermarking Benchmarking (by Lang / Petitcolas / IHC Committee)
Beyond the description of concrete audio watermarking algorithms and their security, research
was conducted on benchmarking of audio watermarking. One research project on this was the
Stirmark Benchmark Audio (SMBA) project31 driven by Lang [SDS+2001, LDS2003, DSLZ2004].
It was inspired by Stirmark for image watermarking by Petitcolas [Pet2000]. It offers a set of
31 Stirmark Benchmark Audio (SMBA) website: http://omen.cs.uni-magdeburg.de/alang/smba.php#smba_get
49
standardized robustness and security attacks on marked audio content. Although very promis-
ing and respected in peer-reviewed publications, SMBA never got widely accepted as a standard
tool in the research community or industry. If being used by other authors at all, only subsets of
SMBA attacks are tested in publications. The project is not pursued anymore32.
Another benchmarking activity has been promoted in recent years by the Information Hiding
Criteria (IHC) Committee33. Suggested evaluation criteria are published by the IHC Comittee as
an ”Evaluation Procedure” [IHC2016].
Overview Publications, Textbooks, Non-Academic White Papers (edited by Cvejic or He)
Apart from detailed algorithms in journals and conferences, a few textbooks or elaborate
overview/introductory publications on watermarking were published by Bender [BGML1996],
Hartung and Kutter [HK1999], Cox, Miller, and Bloom [CMBM2001], Katzenbeisser [KP2000],
Dittmann [Dit2000a], or Arnold et al. [ASW2003]. These early works (and their respective later
editions like [CMB+2007]) can be regarded as valuable standard references for this research
subject.
Also a small number of reviews especially on audio watermarking were published in the past
years, for example by Cvejic et al. [CS2007b], by He [He2008] or recently by Hua et al. on
”twenty years of digital audio watermarking” [HHS+2016].
For completeness it should be mentioned that many use cases are presented and compared
in White Papers or meta studies by non-academic business organizations, for example by the
European Broadcasting Unit [EBU2004] or repeatedly by the Digital Watermarking Alliance34,
the 2nd Screen Society35 or the Movie Labs36.
2.3.5 Example: Fourier-based Patchwork Audio Watermarking by Steinebach
A well-known embedding principle in watermarking is the Patchwork embedding which will be
used in the course of this PhD thesis. It was originally introduced by Bender et al. as a statistical
embedding and detection approach [BGML1996]. Here, the embedding of a message bit relies
on enforcing statistical signal properties of the data to "abnormal" values that unmarked cover
data usually does not show.
2.3.5.1 Patchwork Embedding and Detection Principle
Generally spoken, the Patchwork embedding/detection is performed in the following processing
steps: At first, for embedding each single message bit two disjoint subsets
A := {ai} B := {b j} , A∩ B = {} , i, j = 1 . . .N
32 The SMBA project website states that it was ”last modified” in Dec. 2007 and ”free download of this tool is
closed”. Access to the original SMBA audio software is discontinued and was denied to the thesis author.
33 Information Hiding Criteria (IHC) Committee, chaired by Tokyo University of Science.
IHC Comittee website: http://www.ieice.org/iss/emm/ihc/en.
Note: IHC Comittee not to be confused with Information Hiding conference (IH).
34 The Digital Watermarking Alliance: http://www.digitalwatermarkingalliance.org
35 2nd Screen Society: http://www.2ndscreensociety.com
36 Movie Labs: http://www.movielabs.com
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of data samples are pseudo-randomly selected from the given cover data. It can be picked from
the Fourier magnitude spectrum of an audio frame, as in this thesis approach.
For the following, these sample values are regarded as random variables. Under the reasonable
assumption that the N data sample values are identically distributed, sufficiently independent
and that the subsets contain sufficiently many data samples the respective mean values
a¯ := 1/N
N∑
i=1
ai b¯ := 1/N
N∑
j=1
b j
will be approximately identical which can be derived from the Central Limit Theorem by
Lindeberg-Lévy, see [Stö1995, p. 743]. Hence, the random variable
s := a¯− b¯
shows an expectation value close to zero. In practice, for a skillful selection of the cover data
representation, this assumption is sufficiently true.
Then, for embedding a message bit symbol m= ”1” each sample value in A is slightly increased
while each sample value in B is decreased slightly; and vice versa if m = ”0”, respectively. As a
result, the mean values will differ and quantity s is enforced to deviate from its zero expectation.
This property robustly withstands many kinds of signal transformations for multimedia data.
The modified coefficients are finally written back to the cover data by replacing the original
values in-place.
The name of the algorithm was inspired by the original design of the approach by Bender et al.
[BGML1996] for digital images. There, the areas of modified pixel subsets A and B represent
the shape of a patchwork pattern.
Patchwork Detection
For the detection, the same subsets A′ = {a′i} and B′ = {b′j} (now being watermarked) are
selected from the marked data again. Then the correspondent mean value among those subsets
a¯′ and b¯′ are compared to get an estimator of the embedded message bit. For this, the quantity
s′ := a¯′ − b¯′ = 1/N∑
i
a′i − 1/N
∑
j
b′j (2.5)
is evaluated against a decision threshold d0, again, which allows separating marked from un-
marked content:
s′ > d0 ⇒ mˆ= ”1”
s′ < −d0 ⇒ mˆ= ”0” . (2.6)
The comparison in the previous equation is done based on data from the watermarked con-
tent only. As no cover data is involved here, the Patchwork approach allows blind detection.
However, a non-blind extension of the algorithm can be constructed as well.
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2.3.5.2 Patchwork Embedding/Detection Algorithm in the DFT Domain
An audio Patchwork approach for watermarking absolute values of FFT coefficients was origi-
nally proposed by Steinebach [Ste2003]. It will be applied on the approach in this PhD thesis as
presented in Chapter 3.
It was investigated [SZSL2003] and further developed with regards to robustness and trans-
parency as a research activity of this thesis and results were eventually published in co-
authorship [SZ2008a, SZ2008b].
Simplified, the embedding and detection is carried out as follows:
1. Input: The input audio data is expected as PCM samples in the time domain. The PCM
file or stream is divided in frames of L=2048 samples. At a sample rate of 44.1 kHz this
represents 46 milliseconds of duration. In practice, the total number of modified frames T
is a few hundred (which represents a few seconds).
2. Windowing: The frame samples are multiplied element-wise with a Hamming window
for reducing spectral leakage effects, as explained in Appendix A.1.3.3.
3. Fourier Transform: The windowed frame data is transformed to the spectral domain
using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), obtaining L/2 absolute value coefficients (rk) and
phase coefficients (φk).
4. Selection of Patchwork Pattern: Then, in each frame’s spectrum two disjoint sub-
sets A= {ai} := {ain} and B = {b j} := {b jn} of N Fourier absolute coefficients each are
”picked” pseudo-randomly from the spectrum of the {rk}. Formally, such picking of co-
efficients is done by pseudo-randomly picking the respective N indices in and jn from the
possible range in, jn ∈ {1...L/2} ∈ IN and assigning them to the sets37 of indices A andB:
A := {in} B := { jn} , |A |= |B|= N , A ∩ B = ; , n= 1 . . .N .
Figure 2.10.: Example: Simplified Patchwork embedding example in time-frequency domain:
every 9+9 correspondent coefficients Wn contribute to the n-th message bit ac-
cording to Equation (2.6). Coefficients for the first watermarking bit W1 are
highlighted for demonstration purpose. Note: in practice, the number available
frequencies (the ”height” of the above area) reaches a few hundred indices in-
stead of 10.
37 The notation |S| about a set S shall denote its cardinality i.e. the total number of elements in S.
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Figure 2.10 gives a simplified visualization of the embedding approach: For increasing the
robustness furthermore, a number of consecutive frames is used to embed the n-th mes-
sage bit repeatedly. That is, the set of picked coefficients defines a pseudo random pattern
across different time steps. The sequence of picked frequency indices varies over time, i.e.
from frame to frame. This increases the transparency and the efforts for an adversary for
unauthorized access to the watermark message. The pseudo-random selection is usually
done dependent on the watermark secret key K which is used as a seed.
5. Patchwork Embedding: For embedding a message bit, the Fourier coefficients are mod-
ified according to the Patchwork principle explained above in Section 2.3.5.1. The in-
Figure 2.11.: Example: Patchwork embedding principle in Fourier spectrum; horizontal axis: fre-
quency index, vertical axis: power (in dB ); arrows: increase/decrease of selected
spectral coefficients
crease/decrease is analytically carried out in an exponential representation for technical
reasons:
m= ”1” ⇒ a′in = a1+din b′jm = b1−djm ∀n= 1 . . .N , d ≥ 0 (2.7)
m= ”0” ⇒ a′in = a1−din b′jm = b1+djm ∀n= 1 . . .N , d ≥ 0 (2.8)
The modified coefficients are written back to the magnitude spectrum by replacing the
original values in-place and the watermarked spectrum (r ′n) is obtained.
6. Perceptual Modeling: The degree of increase/decrease of coefficients in the previous step
is controlled by an implementation of the ISO MPEG-1 psycho acoustic model [ISO1993b,
Appendix D], see explanation in Section 2.4.1. That is, the exponents are actually indi-
vidually calculated for the n-th spectral coefficient, i.e. d = dn. In practice, the range of
the exponents (1 ± dn) is typically in the range of 0.9 to 1.1 for reasonable embedding
distortion. The left plot in Figure 3.11 in the next Chapter shows the distribution of |d| of
an empirical example.
7. Inverse Fourier Transform: Finally, the modified audio spectrum (r ′n,φn) is transformed
back to the spectral domain using the inverse FFT. Recall that the phase information (φn)
needs to be available for this. Unlike in ”phase coding” embedding schemes [DBI2004,
ABV2009, ACB+2014] (see Section 2.3.4.2), the Fourier phase is not modified. It is just
copied from the FFT output in Step 3.
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8. Fading Watermarked Data with Cover Data: Recall that the cover data was multiplied
with a windowing function for avoiding spectral leakage effects. For avoiding ”ripple”
artifacts because of the windowing, the watermarked data is cross-faded with the cover
data at the frame bounds.
Figure 2.12.: Example: Patchwork detection scores: distribution of (apparent) detection scores
in example content. For simplification purposes, the absolute values |s| are dis-
played;
Left Figure: result in actually unmarked content;
Right Figure: result in marked content after MP3 compression at 256 kbit/s in
joint-stereo
On the detector side, the steps 1 to 4 will be carried out again. Then the quantity
s := a¯′ − b¯′ := 1/N ∑
in∈A
a′in − 1/N
∑
jm∈B
b′jm
will be evaluated as a test statistic according to the Patchwork detection principle. The quantity s
can be regarded as the detector’s response or detection score. Positive values of the score indicate
a detected bit symbol m=”1”. Negative scores indicate a bit symbol m=”0”.
As an example, the detection score s for typical audio content (e.g. music, voice) is shown in
Figure 2.12. For typical technical settings of the approach described in [SZ2008a], the distribu-
tion of |s| is shown prior and after embedding a watermark and subsequent lossy MP3 encoding.
For unmarked content the detection score is close to zero. Significantly higher absolute values
are enforced in the course of watermark embedding. As will be shown in the experimental
results in Chapter 5, this approach provides an acceptable trade-off between robustness and
transparency of the watermark.
2.3.5.3 Corollary – Analytical Interpretations of Patchwork Embedding
Patchwork watermarking in the state of the art of watermarking is one of the often-cited basic
embedding principles. In the following it will be shown that it is equivalent to the fundamental
principle of correlation-based detection or spread-spectrum watermarking.
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Correlation-based Interpretation
The detector response/score can formally be expressed as a correlation of the cover data with
a suitable selection pattern. For this, the notation with so-called indicator functions is used.
The indicator function, denoted as ”1S (o)” is a common auxiliary function in stochastic for
indicating if an object o is element of a set S or not38:
1S (o) =
§
1 ∀o ∈ S
0 else . (2.9)
In the context of Patchwork detection, the objects o are the frequency indices bk ∈ IN. For the
following explanation, a modified indicator function 1′S∞,S∈(o) for the frequency indices k is
defined as:
1′A ,B(k) =
 1 ∀k ∈A−1 ∀k ∈B0 else
to indicate if the respective index is inA orB . Then, the calculation of the detection score can
be expressed as
s := 1/N
∑
in∈A
ain − 1/N
∑
jm∈B
b jm = 1/N
∑
k∈IN
rk · 1′A,B(k) .
Regardless of the scaling factor 1/N , this is formally the cross-correlation between the spectral
coefficients (rk) and the watermark ”selection pattern” 1′A,B(k). The score s describes if the
watermark is correlating with the union of all pattern for the message bit ”0” or with the inverse
pattern for message bit ”1” or with neither of the two (”unmarked”). That means that the
Patchwork approach can be seen as an example of the general correlation-based watermarking
principle.
Spread-spectrum Interpretation
In addition, the approach described in the previous Section can also be seen as a kind of an
spread-spectrum approach (see Section 2.3.4): The indices of the watermarked frequency in-
dices are picked pseudo-randomly and do vary over time. The detector needs to know the
pseudo-random sequence in order to retrieve the watermark, Thus, the transmission is per-
formed similarly to so-called frequency hopping approaches as one standard implementation of
spread-spectrum techniques. This also means that some watermarking techniques as listed in
Section 2.3.4 are not strictly disjoint.
To summarize, the wording in the research community on this field sometimes distinguishes
algorithm classes which are actually more or less equivalent, as was also discussed by
Hua [HHS+2016]. As was shown Spread spectrum and Patchwork watermarking share com-
mon principles and show analytical equivalence. Distinct denotation is still common for histor-
ical reasons.
38 For the avoidance of confusion: here, the symbol ”1” is a common convention which denotes the function
name like the letter ” f ” in ” f (x) = ...”. This function symbol shall not be confused with the numerical value
1.0
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2.3.6 Summary, Discussion and Current Research Trends
Summarizing the state of the art in audio watermarking a number of observations is becoming
apparent.
Technical Maturity
Audio watermarking can be considered as a mature technology nowadays. Here a suitable
trade-off between watermarking robustness, transparency, and capacity is available for differ-
ent scenarios. Even commercial solutions for copyright protection/anti-piracy activities and
miscellaneous multimedia interaction services are available. This is also reflected by the obser-
vation that watermarking algorithms from academic research (and commercial products too)
in recent years still follow the same fundamental principles like correlation-based approaches,
QIM or phase coding as introduced in the 1990s. Published works in recent years differ in the
technical detail of implementing. For example, most works currently vary in which spectral
transforms and coding techniques are used and (very often) combined rather than in proposing
new fundamental principles or presenting major breakthroughs.
Of course, watermarking still is a topic of academic research. The most important observa-
tions on technical and general aspects from this watermarking research are outlined in the
following39.
Cursory Transparency Evaluation
Note: the following remarks expect the reader to be familiar with objective sound quality as-
sessment as explained in Section 2.4.2).
Other works show a lack of thorough experimental evaluation e.g. on the transparency. Exam-
ples of frequently cited works from recent years are the following:
• Works by Khaldi [KB2013] or Neethu [NK2016] conduct the evaluation on very few audio
examples and/or very few human test persons as test basis.
• In a work by Xinkai Wang [WWZ+2013], the transparency was even evaluated on a single
example audio file of 10 seconds length only.
• In a work by Lei [LST2013], the transparency was expressed in terms of (neverthe-
less promising) PSNR values instead of more significant assessments using the objective
ODG scale (as explained in Section 2.4.2).
Although these works appear to be notable contributions, the lack of technical detail or experi-
mental evidence make it difficult to understand if and how the major watermarking challenges
are successfully solved by these works, unfortunately.
Commercial Exploitation
Current research has become conducted and driven by commercial suppliers of watermarking
solutions. Beyond academic research, watermarking algorithms are being developed and pro-
vided commercially by suppliers of watermarking solutions like Civolution B.V., Digimarc Corp.,
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft e. V., Microsoft Inc., Musictrace GmbH, Technicolor S.A., Verance Corp. or
Verimatrix Inc., to name a few examples. Preliminary results are often treated as trade secrets
instead of being made available to the public in scientific publications. Sometimes the patents
39 Note that common features about the security aspects of watermarking publications were already discussed in
Section 2.3.4.3
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are more informative about new approaches than the scientific papers by the same engineers, if
available at all.
Declining Research Activities
As was explained before, research on audio watermarking sparked at the beginning of the 2000s
and reached its peak of published research publications around the year 2010 (see Figure 2.8
before). Since then the total attention for watermarking technology has declined in the aca-
demic community. One reason for the declining number of research publications may be the
increased commercial exploitation of the technology.
Furthermore, watermarking research has become more intense in Far Eastern research commu-
nities, mainly in China but also in Korea and Japan to some extent. What has also become
apparent in this context is a significant separation of the research communities in the ”Western”
world (i.e. Europe and the USA) from those in Far East countries. Especially Far Eastern con-
ferences and journals present mainly works by Eastern authors who, in turn; almost only cite
other Eastern authors in their references. A significant number of works were published in the
local language and hence could not be analyzed in this thesis work.
To summarize, progress in watermarking has become more and more an engineering challenge
instead of an academic research challenge over time. In addition, the techniques of steganalysis
and multimedia forensics have come into focus in media security research.
Recent High-capacity Embedding Algorithms
Despite the declining intensity of research in recent years, some progress is being published
especially with respect to embedding capacity: While commercial robust watermarking solu-
tions offer an embedding capacity up to a few bits per seconds, some of the publications listed
above introduce algorithms that permit embedding robustly up to few hundred bits per sec-
onds as claimed by the authors [UM2011, WHT2011, LSZ+2012, DS2013, HHC2014, NU2015,
KA2015].
Especially the very recent works by Hwai-Tsu Hu et al. and by Fallahpour et al. appear to be
outstanding progress on achieving a feasible compromise between high embedding capacitym
transparency and robustness:
• Fallahpour proposes a high-capacity QIM approach in the Fourier domain [FM2012,
FM2015]. Authors claim that an embedding rate of at least 600 bit/s can be achieved
while, at the same time, the watermark is robust against moderate lossy compression
(MP3 128 kbit/s) at a bit error rate smaller 0.0-0.1 (which can be coped with by modern
error correction techniques to a large extent). A ”good” sound quality (ODG range -1.0
to -0.3, see Table 2.5 for definition on ODG’s) can be achieved which might be applicable
in a number of scenarios.
• The latter work even appears to be outperformed by a work by Hu. Authors claim that
an embedding capacity of 300-600 kbit/s can be achieved. At the same time, the bit error
rate is as low as 0.0002 in the presence of an MP3 attack at 128 kbit/s (0.03 for MP3 at
64 kbit/s, resp.) and a good transparency of at least ODG=-0.15 can be achieved.
• Another work by Hu proposes a QIM approach in the DCT domain [HH2015]. Authors
claim that an embedding capacity of 80-500 kbit/s can be achieved. At the same time,
the bit error rate is as low as 0.0003 in the presence of an MP3 attack at 128 kbit/s.
The transparency remains ”better” than ODG=-0.12 which makes the embedding scheme
suitable for a number of applications, including authentication watermarking.
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Kindly note: Unfortunately, most of these high capacity embedding schemes above were not
available as inspiration during the main working period for this thesis work (2007-2012). In or-
der to meet the increased capacity requirements for authentication watermarking, own research
on this became advisable.
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2.4 Perceptual Modeling for Audio
In the course of this research work making use of psycho-acoustic modeling became advisable.
Hence this Section explains mathematical models for human audio perception. This facilitates
the description of the proposed enhancements to the audio watermarking algorithm as proposed
in this thesis and the sound quality metrics used in its experimental evaluation.
Note: The following explanation relies on the technical basics of audio data (like PCM coding,
spectral transforms, sound pressure levels etc.) and the fundamental properties of psychoa-
coustics (like masking or critical bands) as recalled in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 for the
interested reader.
2.4.1 MPEG Psychoacoustic Modeling and Audio Coding
In the late 1980s, it became obvious that personal computers and multimedia entertainment
devices and services will become more and more powerful and popular. However, storage space
and network bandwidth were very limited at that time. For overcoming this, lossy compression
algorithms for audio, video and image data were developed.
The most popular compression approaches for audio are the coding standards of MPEG Au-
dio. For more than twenty years, they have been in use in the MP3 and MP4/AAC for-
mats for consumer music devices and services or in the MP2 standard for soundtracks on
Video DVDs [ISO1993b, ISO1993b, ISO2000]. Detailed explanations of the MPEG psychoa-
coustic model can be found in the comprehensible report by Lanciani [Lan1995] and, of course,
in the ISO MPEG specifications. The latter [ISO1993b, Appendix D, pp. 5] describes it as follows:
1. Calculation of the audio spectrum: The digital PCM input signal is divided in frames of
L = 1024 samples. To reduce spectral leakage effects the PCM signal is multiplied sample
by sample with a sampled Hanning window function. Then, the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) is calculated from the PCM signal. The linear FFT absolute values are converted on
the logarithmic dB-scale obtaining the sound pressure levels denoted as Xk.
Note: As a convention, frequency indices will be denoted as i, j or k with
i, j, k ∈ {1, ..., 512} ⊂ IN.
2. Identifying the tone-like components: Then tonal maskers are searched by identifying
local maxima in the instantaneous audio spectrum. Only sufficiently dominant peaks are
”picked” (7 dB higher sound pressure than its neighbors).
3. Identifying the noise-like components: The noise maskers are calculated by summing up
the sound pressure levels of the remaining spectral components among the same critical
band. Distinguishing ”tonals” from noise maskers is important because human perception
of sounds is different for the two cases.
4. Decimating the tone-like and noise-like masking components: Only the most relevant
components shall be used for estimation of the global masking threshold. For this, all
tone-like and noise-like maskers below the absolute hearing threshold are discarded at
first. Then, the critical band characteristic is made use of again: in every critical band, all
tone and noise maskers except for the one with highest energy are discarded too.
Note: As a convention, critical band indices are counted by the quantity z(k) in the fol-
lowing: it denotes the critical band value (in Bark) that corresponds to the (integer) FFT
frequency index k.
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5. Calculation of the individual masking thresholds: Note that, as a convention, the in-
dex j denotes the fixed frequency index of one of the maskers while i denotes the inde-
pendent, continuous index for modeling the shape of the masking curve. Then, the exact
shape of the masking curve of each individual masker is denoted as LT (i, j) and calculated
as follows 40:
LTtonal(i, j) = X j + avtonal( j) + vf(i, j) ,
LTnoise(i, j) = X j + avnoise( j) + vf(i, j) .
These three terms have the following meaning:
• Masker, X: The quantity X j is the sound pressure level of the tonal or noise masker at
fixed frequency index j.
• Masking index, av: In the MPEG specification the quantity av is defined as a slightly
declining linear function in z( j) of the form
av( j) = −p z( j)− q .
Detail on the values of p,q can be found in [ISO1993b, Appendix D, pp. 5] (values
omitted for simplicity). The masking index essentially means some sort of ”fine-
tuning” by adding a little skewness to the curve. It is of little relevance for this thesis
work and it is mentioned only briefly for completeness.
• Masking function, vf: The quantity vf dominantly defines the shape of
the masking curves. It is expressed as being dependent on the quan-
tity z′(i, j) := z( j)− z(i) ∈ IR [in Bark] which is the distance of the independent,
continuous index i from the masker at index j measured in Bark. Then the masking
function is modeled as a piece-wise linear function in z′(i, j), i.e. relatively to z( j),
of the respective masker as
vf(i, j) =

17 (z′(i, j) + 1)− (0.4 X j + 6) for − 3<= z′(i, j)< −1
(0.4 X j + 6) z′(i, j) for − 1<= z′(i, j)< 0−17 z′(i, j) for 0<= z′(i, j)< 1
−(z′(i, j)− 1) (17− 0.15 X j)− 17 for 1<= z′(i, j)< 8
(2.10)
Roughly spoken, the shape of the plots of the partial functions is a steep peak with
”shoulders” in the domain of the critical band scale (as can be seen from the plot in
Figure 2.13 from the numerical example below). Here, the partial function definition
assures that discontinuities do not occur. As can be seen from this partial definition,
the influence of each masker can be up to 8 Bark towards higher frequencies.
All values of the ”magic numbers” in Equation (2.10) were obtained by the MPEG
consortium from elaborate listening tests with human test subjects in the 1990s.
6. Determination of the global masking threshold: All maskers are combined by summing
up the content-dependent masking thresholds from the previous step and adding the static
threshold in quiet LTsilence. The adding is done according to the Decibel scale:
LTglobal(i) = 10 lg(LTtonal(i)/10) + 10 lg(LTnoise(i)/10) + 10 lg(LTsilence(i)/10) (2.11)
40 The denotation of the original MPEG specification is used in the remainder of this Section
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Figure 2.13.: Example: Psychoacoustic modeling; Thin line: input audio spectrum; Thick line:
estimated masking curve;”TM” : tonal maskers; ”NM” : noise maskers
In software implementations of the MPEG model, the quantity LTsilence(i) is usually avail-
able as a static look-up table.
In this thesis work, this MPEG psychoacoustic model will be enhanced for controlling the em-
bedding strength of the watermark distortion and improving the watermark detection.
Numerical Example
The psychoacoustic modeling as described before can be studied from the following descriptive
example: an input audio signal was defined in which
• white noise at average sound pressure level of 50 dB is mixed with
• three sine-wave tones at 1 kHz, 2 kHz and 4 kHz at 50 or 60 dB.
Figure 2.13 shows the estimated masking curve obtained from the psychoacoustic model de-
scribed above:
• On the left side, the three slopes of maskers can clearly be noticed at 1 kHz, 2 kHz and
4 kHz. These maskers are obviously caused by the sine components in the input signal,
i.e. they are tonal maskers (denoted as ”TM”).
• Six local maxima at frequencies beyond 4 kHz in the masking curve can be explained by
the noise maskers identified (”NM”).
• The steep slope of the masking curve at high frequencies (beyond 12 kHz) is dominated
by the shape of the absolute hearing threshold in silence.
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2.4.2 Perceptive Audio Quality Measures (PEAQ)
For sound quality comparison of audio content, researchers and engineers use automated per-
ceptual analysis systems. It helps reducing efforts on elaborate (and costly) listening tests with
human test subjects and it provides reproducible results. Such assessment tools are commonly
used in evaluation of audio processing software or hardware equipment – so it is in this thesis
too: in the experimental evaluation such tools will allow
• the transparency evaluation of the proposed watermarking approach,
• measuring the effect of a breach of integrity with regards to the human perception.
For hi-fi audio content like music or audio books an accepted standard for quality assessment is
the perceptive audio quality (PEAQ) model by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
see [ITU1998, TTB+1998]. It expresses sound quality differences between the input reference
file and the correspondent input test file in terms of so-called objective difference grades (ODG).
The ODG scale is defined from -4.0 to 0.0 (see Table 2.5) and, in simple words, it expresses how
much ”worse” a test signal sounds to an average listener than the respective reference signal.
Example: According to the test results in Chapter 5, MP3 compression at declining bitrates of
256, 160 and 128 kbit/s corresponds to declining ODG values of -0.05, -0.60, and -1.20,
resp. (median value across various music, audio book and voice reference stereo files).
This thesis work uses the commercial OPERA assessment tool41 which implements the PEAQ
model. Other, free, implementations were developed in the PEAQB project42, the PQevalAudio
project43 and the EAQUAL project44.
ODG Perceived difference
0 ”inaudible”
-1 ”audible but not annoying”
-2 ”slightly annoying”
-3 ”annoying”
-4 ”very annoying”
Table 2.5.: Definition of objective difference grades (ODG ) describing sound quality difference
between reference and test signal
For the remainder of this work such tools are regarded as ”black boxes” that objectively measure
the influence of watermark embedding or arbitrary attacks on watermarked audio on the sound
quality. They are used in the empirical evaluation of this thesis work.
41 OPERA Audio Quality Analysis software by OPTICOM GmbH, Erlangen, Germany, http://www.opticom.de
42 PEAQB project by G. Gottardi: http://sourceforge.net/projects/peaqb (2003)
43 PQevalAudio project by P. Kabal, TSP Lab, McGill University, Montreal, Canada:
http://www-mmsp.ece.mcgill.ca/Documents/Downloads/AFsp (2010)
44 EAQUAL toolbox by Alexander Lerch, Heinrich-Hertz-Institut, Berlin, Germany (2002). Note: Project discontin-
ued, no official sources available
62
2.5 Related Work in Authentication Watermarking
The following overview presents and discusses the Related Work in the field of authentication
watermarking. It motivates the technical approach that is investigated in this thesis work by
listing valuable sources of inspiration.
2.5.1 Categorization of Approaches
The existent mechanisms can be characterized according to the following criteria:
• Content of the Embedded Watermark Message: Different kinds of embedded authenti-
cation codes can be observed in audio authentication watermarking literature, namely:
– Perceptual hashes derived from quantities that are closely related to human percep-
tion like loudness, masking etc.,
– content dependent meta data which are derived from otherwise signal depending
quantities,
– time codes,
– static watermark messages which are time and content independent,
and concatenations thereof. Of course, only the first two categories can be regarded as
truly content-fragile approaches as defined above. The latter two are nevertheless worth
discussing because the majority of the related works on authentication watermarking be-
long to these categories.
• Robustness of the Embedded Authentication Code: The related work covers all kinds
of integrity watermarking approaches as explained in the introduction of watermarking
(see Section 2.3.3). Hence, all levels of robustness of the embedded messages itself can
be observed, i.e. fragile, semi-fragile, and robust embedding.
2.5.2 Publications on Authentication Watermarking Algorithms
In the following overview, the respective headings reflect briefly
• the technical basis for deriving the authentication code, and
• the technical approach for consecutive embedding.
Note that not only works on content-fragile watermarking but also other authentication water-
marking approaches for audio are listed. This allows placing the proposed approach(es) in the
narrow field of watermarking-based integrity protection research.
Time Domain Volume Feature & LSB Watermarking (by Fan Chen / Cvejic and Seppänen)
A fragile audio watermarking approach was described by Fan Chen and He [CHW2008]. At first,
the input data is expected as 16 bit PCM samples i.e. as short integers. For the following de-
scription, the very least significant bit (LSB) of these short integers is denoted with bit index ”0”
while the very most significant bit then has index ”15”. The PCM samples are first grouped in
so-called ”segments” of four samples each. As content-describing feature of each segment, the
sum over the squares of those four PCM sample values is calculated. Here, bit indices 0 to 3 are
”ignored” during feature extraction by temporarily setting these bits to zero. Finally, this 16 bit
audio volume descriptor is embedded by replacing the 4·4=16 LSBs with the 16 bit feature.
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This embedding and feature extraction approach is rather simple and can easily be circumvented
because no key-dependent feature extraction or watermark embedding is implemented. The
embedded message can easily be forged and replaced. The publication is interesting for some
reasons, though:
• It proposes a linked chain of feature extraction and feature embedding: the audio features
of one segment are embedded into the following segment, and so on.
• Even more, before linking as described before, the sequence of the segments is permuted
dependent on a secret key.
• By design it offers a very high temporal resolution of tampering (if successful) of 4 samples
duration, i.e. less than 1/10,000 second.
Because of the permutation it is obscure to an adversary in the first place which audio segments
are linked: for example, without access to the detector software as an oracle, the adversary
cannot reconstruct which audio descriptor is kept in which frame. Linking of frames is one way
to achieve the security with respect to security attacks by removing or flipping of segments as
proposed in the Holiman Attack [HM2000].
Time Code Pattern & Patchwork Embedding (by Park et al.)
Park, Thapa and Gi-Nam Wang describe an approach that embeds a simplified time code by
means of spread spectrum watermarking in the Fourier domain [PTW2007]. A pseudo-random
noise sequence (which depends on the secret watermark key) is added to the DFT spectrum.
The algorithm allows embedding one out of five different message symbols from the ”alphabet”
from ”0” to ”4”. This is carried out by using the same noise sequence with five different settings
of cyclical time shift/offset. The authors intend to identify tampering of audio data by detecting
offsets or missing parts in the cyclic time code pattern. The temporal resolution of the time code
is 0.6 sec. It is not discussed if the approach is secure against Holiman Attacks by deliberate
replacement of an audio section that contains the same time code state or a complete time
code sequence. The interested reader of the original work should note that the terminology
in the title of the publication is somewhat misleading: the term ”pattern recovery” shall not be
confused with pattern recognition / matching techniques from machine learning or computer
vision.
Time and Spectral Domain ”Feature Checksum” & Patchwork Embedding (by Steinebach
and Dittmann)
In a work by Steinebach [SD2003b, pp. 1005], an approach based on the extraction of check-
sums derived from the FFT-power spectrum, the root-mean-square (RMS), and the zero-
crossing-rate (ZCR) from each protected audio frame was presented for general audio data
(music, speech etc. ).
• The DFT magnitude spectrum is evaluated in different sub bands in the low to mid fre-
quencies e.g. 0.5-4.0 or 2.0-6.0 kHz. Authors argue that this covers most of the relevant
sub band to protect integrity of voice and music data. Higher frequencies are discarded.
• The RMS is basically a numerical feature derived from the sum of the squared PCM sample
values and corresponds to the loudness/volume of the audio.
• The ZCR counts the number of sign changes of the PCM signal in a given frame. This
correlates with the amount of high frequency components contained in the audio because
high frequency signal obviously show more sign changes per time unit than low frequency
signals.
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In colloquial words, RMS and ZCR describe in a simplified manner how ”loud” and how ”bright”
an audio section appears. From these features, a so-called feature checksum is derived by first
(coarsely) quantizing the ZCR, RMS, and DFT values and then taking the quantized features as
input to a crypto hash (like SHA-1 or MD5), or to an CRC or to simple XOR checksums.
The feature checksum is finally embedded as a robust watermark message using the Patchwork
embedding technique in the Fourier domain as described in Section 2.3.5.2. An actual finger-
print data rate (i.e. embedding rate) of approximately 10 bit/s is achieved which reflects the
capacity limitation of audio watermarking at that time. An interference of the feature checksum
with its embedding as a watermark message is avoided by using different frequency ranges for
extracting the feature checksum and the consecutive embedding.
Note that no apparent key-dependent feature selection was described by the authors which
limits the security of the approach with regards to collision or second pre-image attacks: The
length of the feature checksum can be set as small as 4 bit which causes a false negative rate of
at least 2−4 ≈ 0.06 and allows birthday attack extremely easily.
Note also that SHA-1 and MD5 algorithms utilized in the approach by themselves were found
to have certain vulnerabilities against collision attacks in the meanwhile (see Xiaoyun Wang or
Hoffman, Schneier [WYY2005, HS2005, SBK+2017] for an overview on ”attacks on cryptographic
hashes in Internet protocols”).
Masking Threshold Feature & Spread Spectrum (by Radhakrishnan et al.)
In an inspiring publication by Radhakrishnan and Memon [RM2002], a robust hashing approach
based on psycho acoustic modeling from MPEG-1 audio coding (see Section 2.4) is used. It
uses the shape of the instantaneous masking threshold as a robust feature. It also reflects the
dynamics of the audio signal in terms of its respective masking characteristics over time as
explained in Appendix A.2.5.
The work also applies an interesting randomization approach by Fridrich and Goljan [FG2000]
to audio hashing in order to reduce the hash length, i.e. the required watermarking capacity: At
first, all 43 measurements of masking curves (in frequency resolution of 32 sub bands) in one
second are interpreted as one measurement in a 32 · 43-dimensional space V . Then, a set of
32 pseudo-random vectors in V is defined dependent on a secret key. Finally, the measurement
is projected onto this pseudo-random basis of the 32-dimensional subspace. The signs of the
32 projections are used as the hash bits. Here, the projection is an elegant approach of mapping
the continuous masking curve feature to a binary feature. The extracted audio hash is eventually
embedded as a robust watermark using a spread spectrum embedding algorithm in the spectral
domain developed earlier by Li et al. [LY2000].
Note that the audio hash is 32 bit long which means that it is very vulnerable to birthday attacks.
The approach is interesting though as it is one of the few that utilizes psychoacoustic modeling.
The (very few) empirical test results show that the audio hash allows a significant assessment
of the degree of modification of the audio. For example, drastic modifications like cropping can
be separated from minor sound modifications like moderate MP3 compression.
Loudness Feature & QIM Embedding in hybrid DCT/Wavelet Domain (by Hong-Xia Wang,
Ming-Quan Fan et al.)
In a work by Hong-Xia Wang and Ming-Quan Fan, the centroid (i.e. center of mass) among
the loudness of a sequence of short audio sections is used as a major authentication fea-
ture [WF2010]. It is utilized for deriving a robust authentication feature for determining
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watermark embedding positions in the first place. The following explanation is rather sim-
plified and shall outline the overall idea(s) of the algorithm and the main contribution.
At first, a longer section of PCM audio input data of L PCM samples is processed in a block-based
manner. In the experimental section of the publication, such section represents for example
approximately 95 s of duration. It is divided in M so-called frames of shorter length L1 (e.g.
approx. 100 ms) without overlapping. Each frame is further split into N much shorter sub-
frames45 of length L2 = L1/N (e.g. approx. 3 msec). Then, the n-th sub frame’s sample data
x (n)t (t = 1....L2) is transformed to the Fourier domain (x
(n)
t ) −→ (X (n)k ). The DFT representation
of the n-th sub frame allows deriving some sort of weighted ”sub frame loudness” measure Dm,n.
for the m-th sub-frame inf the n-th frame. The mathematical detail are skipped for simplicity.
This allows calculating the time index Cm of the particular sub frame that represents the centroid
with respect to sub frame loudness D. Subsequently, the embedded watermark messages are
constructed by post-processing the sequence of Cm by means of crypto hashing, concatenation
and encryption by an XOR operation with a key-dependent pseudo-random sequence (the detail
can be found in the original publication). For skill full selection of L, L1, L2, the centroids can be
regarded as robust to many post-processing operations. Conversely, tampering is expected to be
detectable as insertion or deletions of audio will likely change the time dependent characteristics
of the total loudness (in terms of the D measure defined above) and, hence, the positions of the
centroids.
The message embedding is eventually done in the sub frames by means of QIM embedding in
the hybrid DCT and Wavelet domain. Interestingly, only sub-frames that represent the frame
centroid of the respective frame are used for embedding. This is motivated by the fact that
significant tampering will significantly change the positions of the centroids. This will cause the
watermark detector to fail which is a strong indicator for tampering.
In the experimental chapter of the publication, a watermark message of only 4 bit only is con-
structed from the centroid feature(s) and eventually embedded as authentication code. It is
quite doubtful that this is secure with respect to deliberate attacks.
Fourier Spectrum Feature & Infrasound Embedding (by Ching-Te Wang and Ming-Quan Fan
A different Fourier-based approach domain was presented by Ching-Te Wang and Ming-
Quan Fan [WLC2007]. Unfortunately the relevance of this work cannot be assessed completely
because the technical description in that work is not fully precise: authors define the extracted
authentication feature as ”the maximal frequency” in the spectrum obtained from audio sections
of five sections. In contrast, according to a secondary source by Gulbis [Gul2013] ”the frequency
with highest amplitude” is said to be actually intended (which in the thesis author’s opinion ap-
pears more feasible in light of other works). No matter which of the ”interpretations” is true,
any of these mean a very imprecise simplification of the audio content. It is doubtful if minor
modifications to the protected audio become detectable. Test results with regards to sensitivity
to malicious attacks were not given in that work.
Another issue is the following: According to the original authors the embedding of the (RSA-
encrypted) audio feature shall be carried out in the very low frequency range of 1-20 Hz. For
this, the original spectrum shall be erased first and then be deliberately replaced by sinusoids in
that frequency range which represent the watermark. The authors claim that this is a transpar-
ent operation because the human ear is insensitive to sound in this infrasound frequency range
45 The interested reader who intends to reproduce the calculations in the original publication should note that
the sub-frames are denoted as ”sub-bands” by the authors. This is a rather misleading denotation as the term
”bands” commonly reminds of a spectral data representation, not a temporal/spatial one.
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anyway – which is correct (as explained in Appendix A.2.4). But following the authors’ argu-
ment, the watermark can easily be destroyed without quality loss by erasing the low frequency
range again. Hence the approach cannot be regarded as reliable or secure to targeted attacks
on the watermark.
On the other hand, the approach is notable at least in principle as it proposes to use an asym-
metric encryption of the audio authentication feature. The proposed usage of RSA encryption
allows for the public verification of the embedded (but actually insecure) authentication code at
a later date.
HMM Modeling of MFCCs & Spread Spectrum Embedding (by Gomez, Cano et al.)
Gomez, Cano et al. present an extraction of an alphabet of representative sounds that are present
in the audio [GCdG+2002]. The alphabet of so-called ”audio descriptor units (ADU)” is mod-
eled by means of MFCCs and hidden Markov modeling. That is, the approach is analogous to
common automated speech recognition techniques (ASR) in which the phonemes are identified
as basic units. Here, the presented fingerprint approach covers general sound data like music,
noises and voice, as well. The consecutive embedding of the ADU feature is only vaguely de-
scribed. Apparently this is done by a spread spectrum approach in a spectral domain which was
not specified in detail by the authors.
In the test setup, the representative sounds are classified into 16 different ADUs represented
as 4 bit integers. The output rate is approximately 100 ADUs per minute. Thus, the total
fingerprint bitrate is 4 · 100/60≈ 7 bit/s which is compliant with the capacity limitations of
robust audio watermarking at that time. Experimental results (based on little test material)
show that the approach is capable of indicating malicious inserting and deletion attacks on the
audio.
Although an interesting approach, also this approach lacks an analysis of the security to targeted
attacks. For example, it is doubtful how fingerprint collisions can be avoided as each ADU is
only 4 bit long, i.e. the ”alphabet” has only 16 different possible states (similar to the approach
by Hong-Xia Wang explained in this overview [WF2010]).
Time Code Feature & Spread-Spectrum Embedding (by Petrovic et al.)
Petrovic proposes using spread-spectrum embedding in the time domain [Pet2005]. An algo-
rithm from an earlier (patent) publication [LMW1998] is used for embedding a fixed ”Embed-
der ID” (20 bit) and a dynamic time-code (20 bit) into the audio data every eight seconds. On
the detector side, inconsistent time-code data or low detection response (correlation coefficient)
are used for indicating the tampering with the audio data. Embedding such time code robustly
as authentication meta data is a very promising approach for localizing tampering and avoid-
ing targeted attacks. Time codes are an alternative to key-dependent permutation of protected
audio section as proposed by Fan Chen, see above [CHW2008].
DCT and Critical Band Features & Patchwork Embedding (by Gulbis et al.)
The research work by Gulbis focuses on content-fragile watermarking in the spectral do-
main [GMS2008a, Gul2013]. A robust feature is extracted from the DCT transform: at first,
the DCT spectrum is non-uniformly mapped on the critical band scale (see Appendix A.2.6) to
reflect the human auditory perception. Then, a binary feature is extracted by analyzing the sign
of the difference between DCT coefficients in consecutive time-steps. This feature is used as a
robust hash and finally embedded by means of Patchwork watermarking.
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It is shown that the proposed audio hash can well distinguish modifications causing little sound
quality degradation from stronger modifications. Compared to other peer-reviewed publications
or theses on this topic, the set of test data (more than approximately two hours) is rather large.
Hence the empirical evaluation provides rather significant results.
Static Semi-Fragile Message Approaches (various authors)
All approaches explained in this paragraph are typical semi-fragile approaches. Hence, the em-
bedded watermark message is static and not content-dependent. Nevertheless, because of the
significant number of publications (even in recent years) they are listed here for completeness.
An approach for tamper detection was presented by Ning Chen which embeds both, a robust
copyright watermark and a fragile integrity watermark [CZ2008, CZL2010]. The embedding
is done in the domain of detail Wavelet coefficients (Haar wavelet basis). A pseudo-random
”chaotic sequence” is used as a fixed watermark message. Confusingly, the authors denote the
embedded watermark message as a ”key” that is later used for identifying tampering. The
message shall not be confused with watermark or encryption keys. The security of the scheme
is doubtful because no dependency from a watermarking key (as defined in Section 2.3.1) is
implemented in the algorithm. That is, it is likely that tampering can be obscured by creating a
seemingly correct watermark message again and overwriting the pre-existent fragile watermark
with the forged watermark.
Zhao and Shen propose similar QIM approaches in the Wavelet domain. Here, a fixed bit pattern,
namely a binary image of a rose is used the watermark message. Embedding is done either
on the coarse Wavelet coefficients directly [ZS2009a] or on the DCT coefficients of the coarse
Wavelet coefficients [ZS2010]. Again, it is not clear in this publication how the fixed watermark
message is protected against unauthorized write access by an adversary.
Another approach for the Wavelet domain was presented by Cvejic, Seppänen [CS2004]. From
every frame of 512 PCM samples, the so-called Haar wavelet spectrum of 512 samples is cal-
culated. A larger subset of 384 samples is used for embedding a fragile LSB authentication
watermark. Unfortunately, it is not fully clear from the technical description if the authentica-
tion watermark is content-dependent or a fixed message.
A similar work by Ma uses, again, a fixed watermark message. Before embedding in the
Wavelet domain, the message which is encrypted by XOR composition with a pseudo-random
sequence [MLL2008].
Unoki proposes [UM2012] to adapt an own earlier copyright watermarking ap-
proach [UM2011]. The approach is an interesting echo hiding algorithm in extension to
the explanation in Section 2.3.4. It exploits certain ”cochlear delay characteristics” of the human
perception that allow to use different echo delays at different frequencies. Similar to the
approach by Zhao mentioned before, a fixed watermark message sequence is embedded for
data authentication.
Ming-Quan Fan proposed an approach [FLWL2013] based on an earlier work (which was ex-
plained above [WF2010]). It uses the hybrid DCT/Wavelet transform for embedding a semi-
fragile watermark in the low-frequency sub-band.
Dhavale proposes a semi-fragile watermarking scheme in the concatenated Wavelet-DCT do-
main [DDPP2013]. For integrity verification, a fixed message is embedded, namely an alternat-
ing bit series of 1024 bit length. Unfortunately, it is not clear how the approach is made secure
against replacement attacks as no true watermark key is introduced. Interestingly, the authors
propose using ”synchronization codes” along with the watermarking payload for overcoming
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de-synchronization attacks. That is, this approach is to some extent similar to the contribution
in this thesis work. The approach appears to be well capable for detecting significant amounts
of cropping caused by deletion of audio content.
In a recent work by Jinquan Zhang [Zha2015], a pseudo-random sequence is embedded as a
semi-fragile watermark in the DCT domain by means of QIM embedding. It allows for temporal
localization of malicious tampering and appears to be invariant under admissible signal trans-
formations like resampling, re-quantization, adding moderate noise etc. Unfortunately, lossy
compression was not tested and the effectiveness was evaluated on the basis of only three music
file examples.
Finally, the work by Haiyan Liu [LZ2016] does not introduce new audio authentication algo-
rithms by itself. But it reviews a number of existent QIM approaches from the state of art in
(seim-) fragile watermarking. The focus is exclusively on journals and proceedings from the
Chinese and Japanese research community from the years 2008-2015.
LSB feature in GSM Data & Bitstream Embedding (by Yuan and Huss)
A different approach for speech data by Yuan et al. is based on GSM 610 codecs for the pro-
tection of voice-over-IP transmission [YH2004]. It uses the least-significant bit (LSB) of the
sum over so-called log area ratio (LAR) coefficients as content-based feature. The LAR mod-
els the reflection coefficients of the shape of the vocal tract. One LSB per 20 milliseconds
is extracted and embedded into that frame as a bitstream watermark (see Section 2.3.4 for
bitstream watermarking) in the GSM stream.
Note that the authentication code is defined on GSM coded data only. In the authors opinion,
it is very unlikely that the independent extraction of a sub-fingerprint of only 1 bit length per
frame can provide security against targeted collision attacks. It is also unclear if LAR coefficients
as principal speech features are secure in general: the authors themselves state that LARs are
very commonly-used in speaker recognition techniques. That is, LARs are not only specific about
the particular speech content (phonemes, words etc ) but also about the speaker’s voice – no
matter what he/she is saying. It should be further investigated if the latter property increases
the vulnerability to collision attacks even more.
G.723.1 Speech Codec Features & Header Attaching (by Wu et al.)
Different approaches for audio data in lossy compression formats for speech data are presented,
as well. An publication by Chung-Ping Wu et al. is based on the extraction of speech coding
coefficients [WK2001]. Here, the G.723.1 speech codec from VoIP communication is used to
derive a representative audio descriptor from modeling parameters of the shape of the vocal
tract are extracted. The volume and the pitch of the speech signal are also analyzed. Finally,
one 27 bit fingerprint is extracted per frame of 30 milliseconds. That is, the fingerprint bitrate
is 900 bit/s (which is approximately 14% of the speech signal’s payload).
Note that the authentication code is defined on G.723.1 coded data only. Even more, the finger-
print is not embedded as a truly fragile watermark message but as meta data ”attached at the
header information”, instead. The attached message will not have any robustness to any format
conversion, obviously. Hence, this work is beyond the scope of the research of this thesis and is
only mentioned for completeness.
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Fragile QIM Watermarking for Audio-Visual Content (by Rigoni )
In a recent work by Rigoni et al. a watermark is embedded by means of QIM embed-
ding [RFF2016]. Although not stated explicitly by the authors, the embedding appears to
be applied on the PCM signal in the time domain. Robustness can not be expected by this
approach (and is not evaluated by the authors, anyway). The approach is interesting, though,
as it discusses protection of audio-visual content featuring a video part and an audio part. As a
general proposal, using both media types can increase the redundancy of the approach.
Kindly note that the opportunities of joint audio-video authentication will be further discussed
in the outlook in Section 6.4.4.
Reversible Embedding of Crypto Hashes in the DCT Domain (by Huang)
A family of approaches of fragile audio authentication algorithms was presented by Huang,
Echizen et al. [HEN2010, HEN2011, HOEN2014]. An MD5 or SHA-1 hash (128 bit) serves as
authentication code for the integrity verification. It is embedded in the DCT domain by means of
LSB embedding. Interestingly, the authors propose a simple but effective method for providing
a reversible scheme. Hence the embedding process can be fully/lossless inverted on the detector
side. This avoids false positives on the very sensitive crypto hashes on the detector side which
might be caused by the embedding process.
It should be noted that the hashing functions in the intermediate processing step were found to
be insecure in the meanwhile [WYY2005, SSA+2008, SBK+2017].
Image Authentication with Localization (by Liu)
A notable source of inspiration can be seen in a work on authentication watermarking by Hua-
jian Liu [LS2006a, LS2006b]. Although being an algorithm for the image domain, it is men-
tioned because its general approach of identifying potentially doctored locations is independent
of the protected media type.
It is a semi-fragile QIM watermark algorithm in the Wavelet domain. The watermark message
is a pseudo random sequence as a (content-independent) authentication code. Due to an in-
termediate permutation step, each of these watermark message bits is embedded into Wavelet
coefficients from image areas that are spatially scattered all over the image. The message bits
are virtually scattered all over the image. In reverse, a particular fixed area in an image can
contain Wavelet coefficients that contribute to a number of different watermark message bits.
Hence, if such area was subject to integrity breaches, several message bits would be affected.
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Figure 2.14.: Example: Image authentication watermarking algorithm by Liu : Upper left: orig-
inal image, upper right: doctored image (circle marker: object removed), lower
left: raw authentication result (speckled white markers: detected ”candidates” of
doctoring), lower right: filtered authentication result
Source: [Liu2008, pp. 62-70]
The (spatial) localization is carried out in a two-step process. On the detector side, the identifi-
cation of a localized doctoring can only be carried out on the basis of these ”flagging” message
bits. Because of their scattered nature, many sub areas are in question about where the doctor-
ing took place. This is visualized in Figure 2.14: in the lower left figure, a large number of areas
are marked as ”candidates” for being unauthentic. But only in a certain area in the middle of
the image, these markers accumulate to a notable area. This idea will be applied to audio data
investigated in this thesis work.
2.5.3 Summary and Discussion
Note that the overview given so far is not an exhaustive collection of audio authentication water-
marking, perceptual hashing and general audio watermarking. Instead it shall give an overview
on publications that are frequenty cited and are representative with respect to the technical
aspects. Note that some more sources from the Related Work could not be included in the dis-
cussion due to a lack of clarity in the technical description provided by the authors for example
in [YWZ2009, GBYK2013].
An overview on the technical properties of the existent Related Work is given in Table 2.6.
From this overview a number of interesting observations become apparent. For example, most
approaches belong either to the class of content-fragile watermarking (upper right corner in
Table 2.6) or to semi-fragile watermarking with static watermark messages (lower middle col-
umn, resp.). Both classes of algorithms are still being investigated to some extent. Fully fragile
audio watermarking has remained of only of little interest in the research community due to its
limited advantages over crypto-based solutions.
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Scientific works on semi-fragile watermarking (i.e. using static watermark messages) has even
outnumbered the works on content-fragile watermarking (i.e. content-dependent authentica-
tion codes) over the years with respect to the number of publications and of active au-
thors/research teams. The resources in research on authentication watermarking for audio has
always lagged behind the research on copyright and transaction watermarking and support-
ing mechanisms. It has even slightly declined presumably when the technique audio forensics
became more and more into research focus in the field of audio authentication.
fragile
embedding
semi-fragile
embedding
robust
embedding
perception-based
message
[CHW2008] [WK2001] [RM2002]
[SD2003b]
[WF2010]
[YZLX2013]
[GMS2008a]
[Gul2013]
signal-dependent
message
[HEN2010]
[HEN2011]
[HOEN2014]
- [GCdG+2002]
[WLC2007]
time code
message
- - [Pet2005]
[PTW2007]
static message [YH2004]
[RFF2016]
[CS2004]
([LS2006b])
[MLL2008]
[ZS2009a]
[ZS2010]
[CZL2010]
[UM2012]
[FLWL2013]
[DDPP2013]
[Zha2015]
Table 2.6.: Categorization of authentication watermarking approaches in the literature
What becomes apparent from the works on content-fragile watermarking is that some important
security aspects of the approaches are not analyzed explicitly.
• A lot of the works use a rather short audio authentication of 4 to 32 bit only [RM2002,
SD2003b, GMS2008a, WF2010]. It is very unclear how severe the challenge of collusion
attacks or 2nd pre-image attacks on the authentication code is prevalent.
• In addition, most approaches listed above do not meet the security requirements on the
feature extraction in the course of audio hashing as defined by Fridrich et al. or discussed
by Nouri [FG2000] [NZAF2012]. Here no key-dependent selection of feature subsets is
implemented during the modeling of the output audio hash values.
• The same is true for the watermarking algorithm used for embedding the authentication
codes into the cover data. As already explained in this thesis above, this fact reflects that
watermarking security is often not thoroughly investigated either.
Exceptions to this are embedding time-codes into each protected audio segment as proposed
by Park [PTW2007] or Petrovic [Pet2005] or the key-dependent permutation and linking of
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protected audio segments as presented by Fan Chen [CHW2008]. This is an effective measure
to overcome attacks aiming at ”undetected modification” as defined in Section 2.3.4.3 above
or as discussed by Holliman and Memon [HM2000]. Such time indexing can and will also be
implemented in a simple but effective in this thesis work.
What can also be regarded as missing in a lot of works is a thorough / exhaustive analysis using
a larger test data set. Many works rather demonstrate than evaluate the notable performance
on a few audio examples of a few minutes duration only.
Most related works do investigate if admissible modifications can be separated from malicious
tampering. But most works do not explicitly investigate if such modifications are conducted
in sequence. With regards to a potentially long-lasting life-cycle, it can be expected that the
(rare) case of tampering will be conducted after the watermark-protected audio media was
legitimately trans-coded to a new lossy coded format in the meanwhile. Especially in long-term
archiving this could become relevant. The empirical investigation in this thesis will reflect this.
In extension to this, from the research on human hearing and lossy audio coding (as explained
in Section A.2 on psychoacoustics) it is well investigated which components of an instantaneous
audio spectrum are contributing to human perception by a listener and which are not. Inter-
esting works on this were already published by Mıçak or Radhakrishnan analyzing the masking
threshold [MV2001, RM2002]. Hence, it is feasible to investigate if such background can be
utilized in the audio hash extraction.
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2.6 Conclusion on Need for Further Research
As explained in the literature overview in this Chapter, the state of the art in audio water-
marking, perceptual hashing and their respective combination for audio authentication provides
valuable sources of inspiration for developing or improving technical approaches. Based on the
summary on the Related Work and the available hashing and watermarking technologies it is
concluded:
• In this thesis work, perceptual hashing approaches using the works by Kalker et al.
[HOK2001a, HOK2001b] and successors thereof are developed using audio fingerprint-
ing algorithms as starting point which are known to have good robustness and distinction
performance
• Psychoacoustic modeling might be included in order to improve the robustness of the au-
dio hashes and for providing a truly perception-based identification of audio data identity.
• In order to improve the security against targeted attacks a key-dependent feature ex-
traction processing step shall be implemented in the audio hashing. A sufficiently large
effective key length shall be realized (desirably at least 64 bit).
• As an additional metadata for verifying the integrity, time-odes or the like shall be used.
• The Patchwork audio watermarking core algorithm by Steinebach [Ste2003, SZSL2003]
shall be used as a starting point for embedding the audio hashes. Its good robustness and
transparency has been proven in many commercial applications for many years. Earlier
works on adapting it for integrity watermarking and its full availability to the thesis author
mean a good starting point for this thesis research.
• Nevertheless, the embedding capacity of the involved Patchwork audio watermarking shall
be increased to be able to embed authentication code and additional meta data.
• A theoretical analysis of the security of the involved Patchwork watermarking should be
conducted.
• Empirical results should be obtained from experiments on a sufficiently large and repre-
sentative test set of audio data.
An approach in light of the objectives and requirements listed in Section 1.2 and Section 3.1.2
that reflects this conclusion will be introduced in the following Chapter.
74
Chapter 3
Proposed Content-based Integrity
Watermarking System
In this Chapter the proposed approach is explained. It follows the general content-fragile wa-
termarking scheme as defined in Section 2.3.3 for verification of audio data integrity and also
authenticity.
3.1 Outline of Content-fragile Watermarking Approach
This Section explains the protection model in the proposed content-fragile watermarking system
and specific technical requirements.
3.1.1 Protection Model
The protection and verification is carried out in two stages (recall Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for a
visualization):
1. Embedding Stage: It is assumed that the input audio data can be trusted with regards to
integrity and authenticity. Now, the input audio is divided in shorter segments, typically 10
to 20 seconds. From every audio segment its perceptual hash is computed. The extracted
hash is then embedded as a robust digital watermark message into the audio data, see
Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1.: Content-fragile watermarking model – protection/embedding stage
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2. Detection Stage: At any future point in time, the watermark message, i.e. the perceptual hash
of the previous authentic state of the audio data, can be detected and retrieved from the
protected audio sections. Comparing the previous with the current state of the perceptual
hash allows indicating integrity breaches, see Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2.: Content-fragile watermarking model – verification/detection stage
For this, new or enhanced approaches for perceptual hashing, robust audio watermarking, per-
ceptual modeling and their respective combination thereof are proposed. Prior to this, a number
of technical requirements have to be introduced first.
3.1.2 Technical Requirements
In addition to the general objectives of this thesis work as defined in Section 1.2, a number of
rather technical requirements on perceptual hashing and digital watermarking by themselves
and on their combination in a content-fragile watermarking system have to be met:
1. Acceptable sound quality of the watermarked content: The watermark embedding
should be as imperceptible as possible, i.e. the degradation of acoustic quality caused by
embedding should be minimal. Furthermore, the embedding should be transparent for
the digital representation of the signal, i.e. the embedding has to be carried out without
changing the file format.
2. Compliance of perceptual hashing with watermarking (and vice versa): In a content-
fragile watermarking approach, the perceptual audio hashing has to reflect the technical
properties and limitations of the involved watermarking algorithm, and vice versa as fol-
lows:
• Invariance of audio hash against watermarking: As the robust hash is part of an
authentication watermarking system, obviously it must be robust also against the
distortions introduced by the watermarking to avoid immediate false alarms. An
appropriate alignment will be proposed in this thesis work so that watermarking and
perceptual hashing do not interfere with each other.
• Watermarking Capacity: Audio hashes, as any hash algorithm, necessarily need to
provide a sufficient length (in bits) in order to avoid false alarms and to be secure
against brute-force attacks or targeted birthday attacks. Most current robust water-
marking approaches typically offer very low embedding rates of a few message bits
approximately a dozen fdefinitionbit per second. On the other hand a payload of
minimum 150 bits must be embedded approximately every 10 seconds. Hence mod-
erate increase in embedding capabilities will be developed in the course of this thesis
work.
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• Audio Hash Compactness: Given by the mentioned capacity limitations the audio
hash must provide a content descriptor that, albeit separating admissible from mali-
cious acts of data modification, is compact enough. For comparison: 10.0 seconds of
raw audio in PCM format (stereo, 16 bit per sample, sample rate 44.1 kHz) represent
roughly 1.5 MB of input data. Nevertheless, this amount of data needs to be hashed
into a compact hash output of, say, 128 bit (i.e. 100,000 times shorter than the input)
that still allows separating admissible from malicious acts of data modification.
3. Availability: A meaningful requirement is that the watermark protection shall be provided
for all possible input audio data if possible. In the context of watermarking this can be
challenging as some kinds of audio material are not well suited for carrying an embedded
watermark in the first place. This is frequently the case when the input audio has only
little signal energy in some sections of its duration or in its spectrum. Examples are
given by voice content with very ”clean/dry” voice sound (like in audio books), content
with limited frequency bandwidth (like in telephony, radio communication), and some
examples of modern electronic and/or experimental music. Here, the (partial) absence of
signal energy makes it difficult to hide an audio watermark without becoming noticeable
or even annoying to the listener. At least limitations with respect to applicability shall be
identified.
Example: An obviously extreme example of critical audio content is the composition 4’ 33”
by the avantgarde experimental composer John Cage: it ”contains” pure silence for
a duration of 4:33 minutes. Recordings of live performances (by soloists or even
symphonic orchestras) feature complete silence except for the ambient acoustic ”at-
mosphere” of the concert hall and the virtual tension of the audience46.
4. Security: The watermark and the perceptual hash should withstand attacks aimed directly
at the respective algorithm. With respect to watermarking, it must be impossible for an
unauthorized user to read, change or delete the embedded message without rendering
the marked cover unusable. With respect to the perceptual hash, it is required that no
malicious tampering is possible that can circumvent the hash-based verification.
5. Efficiency: Finally, the proposed solution should provide sufficiently fast processing time.
The real-time capability may be an essential requirement especially in live recording de-
vices, for example a video camera or a PC-based recording unit.
46 John Milton Cage Jr., 4’33” (pronounced: ”Four thirty-three”), Composition in Three Movements, 1952
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3.2 Perceptual Hashing Approach (rMAC )
This Section describes the perceptual hashing approach which is developed for achieving the ob-
jectives in this thesis. It incorporates ideas from an existing and often-cited audio fingerprinting
scheme that was explained above in Section 2.2.3 [HOK2001b, HOK2001a].
Own work-in-progress and results on the hashing approach were published at several confer-
ences in multimedia security [ZS2007, ZS2008a, ZS2008b, ZS2008c].
3.2.1 Key-dependent DFT Feature Selection
The initial publication on the contribution explained in this Section can be found
in [ZS2007].
For a better understanding of the following explanation, the hash bit calculation definition
from the original ”Phillips Hash” approach by Haitsma, Kalker et al. shall be recalled from
Equation (2.4):
dk,t := ek,t − ek,t+1 −

ek+1,t − ek+1,t+1

.
That is, for every hash bit four energy coefficients from adjoining frequency indices k and k+1,
and consecutive time-steps t and t + 1 are evaluated47.
Example: See Figure 3.3 (left Figure) for a visualization: Each ”cell” in the Figure corresponds
to one time-frequency index (k, t) in the virtual ”area” in the time-frequency domain. The
regular assignment of ”picked” indices48 along the time and frequency axis can clearly
be seen. Note that the Figure only gives a symbolic representation of the time-frequency
domain. The very limited frequency range of 10 indices is a simplified representation for
demonstration. In this thesis work the actual ”height” of the ”area” of possible frequency
indices can be up to 1024 which is given by (half of) the DFT frame length.
A security analysis of the ”Phillips Hash” algorithm under knowledge of the algorithm, was not
given by the original authors as the security is not a relevant requirement for audio retrieval
purposes in many scenarios. Even more, in an earlier research work being supervised and co-
authored by author of this thesis, it could be demonstrated that targeted attacks actually are
possible:
In [TNSZ2009], a targeted violation of the robustness requirement was implemented. It
was shown that given pieces of audio data can be deliberately modified so that the modified
data still sounds similar to the original data but their robust hash changes significantly. This
targeted attack indeed could not be utilized for masking targeted doctoring in terms of a
2nd pre-image attack or collision attack. Instead the attack is suited for protocol attacks as
explained in Section 2.3.4.3 by evoking false alarms: Such false alarms eventually can render
a content-fragile watermarking system useless.
For integrity protection, security must be provided with respect to the requirements given in sec-
tion 2.2.1 in a way that an adversary cannot generate a hash collision or violate the robustness
requirement as explained in the previous paragraph. On this Swaminathan or Fridrich pointed
out that this should be addressed by a key dependent feature selection [FG2000, SMW2005]
instead of a regular selection of coefficients as in the original work.
47 Note that, albeit not very elegant, in the previous Equation the the original authors’ notation is used in the
following. This is done for the sake of clarity when comparing this thesis work with the original works.
48 Note for the avoidance of confusion that the terms ”index” or ”’indices”, resp., correspond to the pair (k, t)
consisting of a frequency index k and time index t
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Figure 3.3.: Proposed rMAC feature selection scheme – Symbolic representation of DFT indices
in the time-frequency domain. Every set of four correspondent coefficients denoted
as ”Rm” contributes to the m-th hash bit. Coefficients R1 which are correspondent
to the first hash bit are highlighted for demonstration purpose;
Left Figure: picking of FFT coefficients in regular order according to Equation (2.4);
Right Figure: picking in pseudo-random order according to Equation (3.1).
Thus, it is introduced that each ”sub-fingerprint” (using the original denotation) will now be
extracted from an audio segment consisting of M consecutive frames from a few hundred times
steps, i.e. from a few of seconds audio. Stereo or multi-channel input PCM signals are down-
mixed to mono before the FFT spectrum is calculated.
Then it is proposed to derive the hash bits from four FFT coefficients at arbitrary time-steps
t1, t2, t3, t4 = 1...L, and band indices k1, k2, k3, k4 in the time-frequency domain:
d ′k,t := ek1,t1 − ek2,t2 −

ek3,t3 − ek4,t4

. (3.1)
The selection of time and frequency indices shall be performed pseudo-randomly dependent on
a secret key K2, instead of using adjoining time and frequency indices. This approach conceals
it to an adversary which frequency components contribute to a certain hash bit (and which are
not). See Figures 3.3 (right Figure) or Figure 3.6 for a visualization: the pseudo-random picking
of time-frequency indices can clearly be seen there.
Like in the original work, the value of the hash bits H ′i,t is defined as the sign of d ′:
H ′k,t =
§
1 if dk,t ≥ 0
0 if dk,t < 0
.
The reader should note that the definition in Equation (3.1) shows a certain formal similarity to
the definition of the Patchwork embedding scheme described in Section 2.3.5.1: The definition
in Equation (3.1) can obviously be rewritten as
d ′k,t := ek1,t1 − ek2,t2 −

ek3,t3 − ek4,t4

= ek1,t1 + ek4,t4︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
− ek2,t2 + ek3,t3︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
. (3.2)
Comparing this expression with Equation (2.5), the quantities α,β can be regarded as
the partial sums α' Na¯ =∑N/2i=1 a′i and β ' N b¯ =∑N/2i=1 b′i , respectively. That is, the ana-
lyzed/watermarked audio features d ′ and s′ show a formal similarity.
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Because the proposed audio hash is dependent on a shared secret K2 it can be regarded as
a message authentication code (MAC) rather than a hash. As will be shown in the following
Chapter, it withstands a number of signal transformations. To express its robustness property
the following terminology will be used in the remainder:
Proposal: The proposed algorithm for a robust message authentication code will be
denoted as ”rMAC” in the remainder of this thesis.
For completeness it should be noted that this denotation was later adopted by a different author
as e.g. in [YZLX2013].
In contrast to the algorithm by the original authors, the following significant modifications are
proposed:
• For the frequency band indices ki no sub-sampling on a logarithmic frequency scale is
carried out. In simple words: frequency bands are counted on a linear scale (with indices
ki from 1 to 512) instead of only 33 musical semi-tones. This provides a much larger
basic population of indices that can be pseudo-randomly picked. The larger size of the
population makes brute-force attacks much more difficult.
• No overlapping of the FFT framing was carried out. This shall avoid that the hash ex-
traction process is affected by the subsequent watermark embedding. This simplification
is a prerequisite for the alignment scheme as proposed in Section 3.4. Nevertheless, the
loss of temporal resolution is well compensated for by the fine synchronization in the
watermarking detector.
• The reader is also reminded that in the original approach by Haitsma et al. and in the
previous explanation, four coefficients contribute to each fingerprint/rMAC bit. But the
number of coefficients can be changed from four to any other even total number accord-
ingly for improving improve the hash coverage across the audio spectrum. This increases
the sensitivity and the computational efforts for a brute-force attack as will be shown in
the numerical examples in Section 4.2. Hence, a total number of eight coefficients per
hash bit will be used in the experiments to this thesis work.
The contribution of this Section is evaluated below in Sections 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4 about the
classification performance and in 5.4.8 about the security.
3.2.2 Standardization of DFT Spectrum
The work in this Section extends earlier works as published in [ZS2007]. Results were pub-
lished and used in [ZS2008a, ZS2008b, ZS2008c].
Closer analysis shows that for real-world audio data like music or speech recordings, the FFT
magnitude coefficients are neither equally distributed nor uncorrelated. For example, in most
speech recordings, the coefficients corresponding to lower frequencies (e.g. below 1000 Hz)
usually have a much greater mean energy than coefficients corresponding to higher frequen-
cies. Two examples are shown in Figure 3.4. Thus, the key dependent selection of bands for
fingerprint extraction raises problems with respect to the security requirements listed in Sec-
tion 2.2.1: If such low frequency coefficient is selected by the rMAC key as the first summand
in Equation (3.1) that coefficient will dominate the sum. Thus, the respective hash bit will be
more likely a "1" than a "0" which decreases the sensitivity to for any kind of integrity breaches
of the input voice data. The rMAC as a whole would not be equally distributed, and rMACs
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from different music segments would not be independent, allowing systematic security attacks
on the rMAC.
Example: In internal/unpublished experiments, an rMAC of length M=128 bit was extracted
from audio data units of 10 seconds (6.5 hours of total duration). The rMACs of the
original files were mutually compared to a time-shifted copy of the same file: For the
example of speech data this simulates malicious tampering by replacing parts of the audio
with other audio data that has the same voice or background noise.
One would expect that the rMAC bits should be identical only by chance, and the aver-
age Hamming distance should be close to 64 bit (i.e. at a bit error rate of 0.5). In fact,
the average Hamming distance was only approximately 39 bit, as can be seen from the
histogram in Figure 3.5. Closer analysis showed that the rMAC bits were not equally dis-
tributed, and some were even almost constantly one or zero. This reduces the Hamming
distance when comparing any audio data in term of the rMAC.
Therefore, a standardization of the FFT spectrum is proposed as follows: all FFT coefficients
e′k,t at fixed band index k at all time-steps t = {1, ..., L} in an audio segment are regarded as
a random variable with empirical mean mk and variance s
2
k. Then the standardized values are
defined as:
e′k,t :=
ek,t −mk
sk
. (3.3)
with
mk :=
1
L
∑
t∈T
ek,t sk :=
√√√1
L
∑
t∈T
 
ek,t −mk
2
.
Note that the mean and variance are not calculated across all time-steps. Instead, the
set T ⊂ {1, ..., L} denotes the subset of time indices that will not be used for watermark em-
bedding. This is done in anticipation of the subsequent watermark embedding step. Skipping
the watermarked time indices avoids an impact of the watermarking distortions on the rMAC
values. This is explained in detail in Section 3.4.1 about the feature alignment.
Because of the basic properties of the propagation of mean and the variance, all transformed
quantities e′k,t of a given band index k have zero mean and variance 1.0 and thus contribute
Figure 3.4.: Example: Distribution of average signal energy across frequencies from two audio
example files
Left plot: news anchorman in German TV newscast ”Tagesschau”, male voice;
Right plot: Rock song ”AC/DC: Touch too much” (duration 15 s each
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Figure 3.5.: Example: Histogram of rMAC Hamming hamming distance for time-shifted audio
data versus original audio data; Source: own experiments (unpublished)
equally to the hash bit calculation. Then, the sign comparison is done out on the standardized
FFT coefficients selected as described above:
d ′′ := e′k1,t1 − e′k2,t2 −

e′k3,t3 − e′k4,t4

. (3.4)
From the basic properties of the mean and the variance, it can be seen that this quantity d ′′
• also has zero mean,
• it has a variance of (s′′)2 = N as the standardized coefficients e′′k,t of different time-steps
and frequency indices across many seconds of duration can be regarded as sufficiently
uncorrelated.
As will be shown in the experimental results in Chapter 5 the related rMAC bits
H ′′i =
§
1 if d ′′i ≥ 0
0 if d ′′i < 0
i = 1...M (3.5)
will be equally distributed on {0,1} as required in Section 2.2.1 with the additional property of
key-dependence. In order to provide a sufficient degree of security against brute force attacks,
a minimum of M=128 rMAC bits will be extracted. Finally, the full rMAC H is constructed
straight-forward by concatenation of all rMAC bits as an M -tuple, i.e.
H = (H ′′1 ,H ′′2 , ...,H ′′M) .
Note again that more than four coefficients might be used for calculating a hash bit; any even
value N is permitted. For this, the Equation (3.4) would have to be extended accordingly.
The experimental evaluation of the standardization step can be found in Section 5.4.5.
3.2.3 Temporal Localization of Tampering – ”Scattered” Approach
The contributions in this Section were published in [ZS2008a, ZS2008b, ZS2008c].
One of the objectives of this thesis is the temporal localization of tampering. In order to facilitate
this, two approaches are proposed in this and the following Section.
For describing the first approach the pseudo-random assignment scheme for the rMAC time-
frequency indices proposed above is recalled: according to the description in Section 3.2.1 the
N time-frequency indices that contribute to a fixed rMAC bit index are scattered across the full
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Figure 3.6.: Example: rMAC coverage across time steps (”scattered” mode): As example, the
quadruples of coefficients which correspond to the 20th, 40th, and 60th hash bit
(denoted as ”R20”, ”R40”, and ”R60”) are highlighted for demonstration purpose;
dashed box: an attack at time index 8 is assumed. ”X” markers: time indices that
correspond to the attacked bits R40 and R60
area in the time-frequency domain (denoted as ”scattered mode” in the remainder). The exact
pseudo-random sequence is assumed to be known (given by the known secret key). It is very
likely that coefficients from different rMAC bits will fall into a certain time index. Hence it can
be expected that a breach of data integrity even with a short duration can have an impact on
more than one rMAC bit.
If on the detector side one of the audio hash bits is later found to ”flag” an attack, this has to be
explained by data modifications in any of the N correspondent coefficients. Their correspondent
time-indices in question are known. However, it is obscure which of the N coefficients were
modified. A best guess it is proposed by identifying those time indices for which the above
”rMAC flags” accumulate.
Example: A symbolic visualization is given in Figure 3.6: As an example it is assumed that a
very short attack is carried out at time index t0=8. This attack has a 50% chance to be
indicated by the rMAC bits with index 40 and 60 (the other indices ”31, 23, 51, ... etc.”
are omitted for simplicity). These two bits cover seven time indices (flagged with an
”X” marker in the Figure) which are ”candidates” for the correct location of the attack.
But the audio frame at time index t0=8 is the only in question which is flagged more
than once. It can be seen as a best guess for the correct temporal position of the integrity
breach.
Note that in Figure 3.6 each of the 24 time steps is covered by the same number of rMAC bits
(namely 10) which is a simplified visualization. In this thesis experiments the total number
counter will vary from time step to time step by a few times because of the pseudo-random
scattering. Realistic figures about this can be seen in the following...
...Example: In the experiments in Chapter 5 an rMAC of M=128 bit is extracted. N=8 different
FFT coefficients at a time contribute to each of the rMAC bits. With the technical settings
that were used for carrying out those experiments, the duration of each hash is 255 frames
(total duration: 11.8 seconds). Figure 3.7 shows how many rMAC bits ”in question” cover
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Figure 3.7.: Example: ”rMAC bit coverage” counter versus time
the respective frames (no matter if attacked or not). As can be seen, the total number
varies from 6 to 19. The respective median value across all non-zero entries is 12. For
audible data modifications it can be expected that a sufficiently large portion of these will
indicate and accumulate ”flagged” bits.
Note: In Figure 3.7 it can be seen that a majority of frames is not covered at all. This
is caused by the alignment of the rMAC feature extraction with watermark embedding as
explained below in Section 3.4.1. Only 33% of available audio frames are used for rMAC
extraction while the remaining are spared. Their total rMAC bit coverage is zero.
In order to reflect the varying total number of potentially indicating rMAC flags, the quantitative
analysis is carried out as follows:
1. For each frame, i.e. for each time index, it is counted how many rMAC bits in total cor-
respond to the rMAC coverage of that time index (”rMAC bit coverage per frame” ). For-
mally this can be expressed as follows: At first, let R be the union set of all picked
indices R := {(ki,n, t i,n)} ⊂ IN× IN that correspond to all M rMAC bits with each N spec-
tral coefficients (i = 1...M ,n= 1...N). Then, let Rt0 be the subset of those indices that
have a given/fixed time index t0, i.e.
Rt0 =

(ki,n, t i,n) : t i,n = t0
	 ⊂R ⊂ IN× IN ∀(i,n) ,
no matter if the i-th rMAC bit flags an attack or not.
2. Then it is counted how many ”rMAC flags” indicate a particular frame as being presumably
attacked. For this, letA = {a1, a2, ..., ah} denote the set of attacked rMAC bit indices that
are flagging an attack on the audio. For avoidance of confusion: its cardinality |A | is
equivalent to the Hamming distance h ≤ M between the authentic reference rMAC and
the test rMAC. Then, it is considered the subset of correspondent indices Ft0 that flag an
attack at a given time index t0. This subset of ”rMAC flags per frame” can be written as
Ft0 =

(ki,n, t i,n) ∀(i,n) : (t i,n = t0 ∧ i ∈A )
	 ⊂Rt0 ⊂ IN× IN .
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Figure 3.8.: Example: rMAC coverage across time steps (”serial” mode)
3. Finally it is proposed to consider the following quantity as a measure for the localization:
In each time step t, the ratio of the total number of rMAC flags per frame is divided by the
rMAC bit coverage of that frame, i.e. the quantity
αt :=
|Ft |
|Rt |
is used as criterion (denoted as ”rMAC flag ratio”).
Especially if non-zero rMAC flag ratios can be observed for a number of consecutive times indices
in sequence this should indicate a localized attack on the protected audio data.
This approach is somewhat in analogy to the image watermarking approach by Huajian
Liu [LS2006b, LS2006a] as outlined in Section 2.5.2. Independent of the media type (im-
age versus audio), the detection is carried out by analyzing for accumulations of ”flags” on a
whatsoever authentication code in a ”soft decision” manner. By contrast, the proposed approach
uses a content-dependent robust MAC instead of a pseudo-random but fixed but one.
3.2.4 Temporal Localization of Tampering – ”Serial” Approach
The thesis work described this Section was partly conducted in the course of the Master’s
thesis by Munir [Mun2011] (under supervision of the thesis author) and eventually pub-
lished [ZMS2012].
On the downside of the approach explained in the previous Section, a significant number of
false positive rMAC flags are identified in the first step which have to be ”filtered out” by setting
reasonable thresholds about the rMAC flag ratio. It is worth investigating if such false positives
can be avoided in the first place to further increase the sensitivity and specificity. To achieve
this, it is proposed:
Proposal: The set of the N coefficients contributing to an rMAC bit shall by placed
only in a limited period of time. For simplicity, rMAC bits are extracted in serial order
over time (denoted as ”serial mode”)
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In simple words: the hash bit with index zero (the ”first” bit) shall be placed rather at the
beginning of the hashed audio section (with a certain degree of freedom), the ”last” hash bit
shall be placed near the end of the hashed audio section. This should provide that the rMAC
flags accumulate quickly and in a limited range which avoids false detections off the true attack
positions.
Example: The Figure 3.8 visualizes this assignment principle symbolically: The ”degree of free-
dom” for the time indices of is now limited. Lower rMAC bit indices are placed near the
beginning while higher bit indices are placed near the end (the Figure shows it for the
20th, 40th, and 60th bit). That is, the bit index directly correlates to the time index. For
an assumed attack on the audio data at time step t0=8 all affected rMAC bits are scattered
only in a close temporal neighborhood of this time index.
Experimental Example
The empirical results as cited in the following were published in [ZMS2012] as ”work in
progress”.
Here, the modified algorithm was tested on audio files that contained speech and music with
approximately one hour total duration. The audio files were divided into segments of 10 sec.
playing time (360 total). From each segment a 128 bit audio hash was extracted according to
the explanation in this Section. The audio hash was embedded as a robust watermark and later
verified. A secret key was chosen for creating pseudo-randomly picked time-frequency indices
for feature extraction and watermark embedding.
Figure 3.9.: Test result: rMAC with temporal localization;
left plot: Copy and move attack from time code 0:05 min to 0:06 min
right plot: Noise adding attack from time code 0:05 min to 0:07 min
dashed boxes: the actual duration xof the audio attacks
Source: own publication [ZMS2012]
After embedding but prior to the rMAC verification the following attacks were applied to the
audio content (and hence the embedded watermark):
• Copy-and-move attack: In each audio segment, one second of audio starting at time code
0:05 min. was replaced with one second of audio from the same file at time code 0:08 min.
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This should simulate that audio content is maliciously ”removed” by replacing it with other
content from the same context.
• Noise adding attack: Into each audio segment, a 2-second white noise file was mixed into
the audio data starting at time code 0:05 min. The noise power level was tuned so that the
original content in the middle became rarely intelligible. This should simulate that audio
content is maliciously ”removed” by masking with noise instead of deleting/erasing it.
That is, the attack on the audio affects the respective middle section of the hashed audio segment
in an audible way.
The earlier empirical results in Figures 3.9 show the average bit error rate (BER) for each hash
bit index between the originally embedded audio hashes before the attacks versus after the
attacks. As can be expected the BERs are significantly higher in the ”middle” sections of the
audio hashes than in the other sections. That is, modifications can be correctly indicated and
also localized implicitly by the bit index. It must be admitted that the BERs in the actually
unmodified audio sections do not vanish as ought to be expected, see Figures 3.9. This is caused
by general shortcomings in the watermark detection as discussed in Section 5.4.1.
Results from more elaborate tests of the major contribution of this Section can be found in
Section 5.4.7.
3.2.5 Discontinued approaches
A number of further ideas for enhancements of the feature extraction of this audio hash had
been investigated. But preliminary experimental evaluation eventually showed that they were
not capable to improve the distinction performance any further. The main ideas of those dis-
continued approaches are listed only briefly in the following for completeness:
1. Psychoacoustic Model-based Adaptive Quantization / Feature Extraction It was also investi-
gated if the robustness can be improved by quantization of the DFT coefficients prior to
hash modeling. Special attention was paid to both uniform quantization and non-uniform
quantization based on psycho-acoustic modeling. The former means to represent the FFT
absolute values or the respective sound pressure levels in a resolution of ± a few Deci-
bel for example. About the latter case the idea was investigated to represent inaudible
spectral components in lower resolution than audible components or the like. Preliminary
result showed that in total the overall robustness does not benefit from either quantization
processing.
On the one hand, more coarsely quantized coefficients do benefit from their lower sensi-
tivity to noise. But on the downside, occasional quantization errors cannot be avoided in
principle and would have an even greater effect now. Eventually, both effects annihilate
and error rates and accuracy did not improve even further, at best. Hence, a uniform
and fine quantization of ± 0.01 Decibel was used in the experiments in Chapter 5. For
the same reason, key-dependent feature quantization as proposed by Nouri [NZAF2012]
could not be adapted either.
Thus, quantization approaches as published by the author as part of [ZS2009b, ZS2008b]
have not been not pursued in this thesis work. The same is true for an approach of
using the frequency indices of tone-like or noise-like components of the audio spectrum.
Preliminary research results were published in [ZSN2005].
2. Avalanche Effect Another idea was to introduce an algorithmic avalanche effect for the rMAC:
The classification accuracy was investigated when a particular DFT coefficient contributed
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to more than one rMAC bit. In simple words, the edges of the ”polygon” in the symbolic
visualization in Figure 3.3 should not be fully disjoint.
Closer analysis showed that the true positives (i.e. the sensitivity) to actual tampering
would successfully increase. But, simplified, the false positives would increase even more
which in total would provide a lower accuracy.
Hence research activities in these directions were discontinued in the meanwhile.
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3.3 Enhancements to Patchwork Audio Watermarking
This Section describes the proposed adaptations to the audio watermarking algorithm that
became necessary for this thesis work in order to achieve better watermarking capacity and
robustness.
3.3.1 Pseudo-random Patchwork Assignment in Time-Frequency Domain
The following contribution was outlined in a joint publication in [BZSS2011]. The publica-
tion explains the overall algorithm idea and applies it in a context different from this thesis
objectives, namely collusion-security in transaction watermarking.
For embedding the perceptual audio hash as a watermark message, an existent blind spread
spectrum watermarking approach [Ste2003, SZSL2003] as explained in detail in Section 2.3.5.2
is used as the technical basis. Here, the embedding is basically done in the Fourier domain
according to the Patchwork watermarking approach.
In the original approach, each frame carries one bit of the watermark message. Typically a
few dozen out of a few hundred total possible FFT coefficients are pseudo-randomly picked
per frame. In order to increase the robustness, each message bit is embedded redundantly in
a group of consecutive frames (typically two to ten frames). This increases the population of
the Patchwork detection statistics in Equation (2.5). It allows detecting the message bits more
significantly, even in the presence of distortions of the marked signal. Finally, subsequent bits
of the watermark message are embedded into subsequent frame groups in sequential order.
Example: Figure 3.10, left, demonstrates the embedding of message bits in sequential order.
For simplification purposes in the visualization, the total message length is only M=4 bit,
and only 2N=6 frequency indices out of W=10 total (the bandwidth) are picked per
frame. Each message bit is embedded redundantly three times i.e. in three consecutive
frames. That is, the total duration is 3 · 4 Frames = 12 Frames, and for each message bit
3 · 6 coefficients = 18 coefficients are used. The virtual area in the time-frequency domain
covers 12 · 10= 120 possible coefficients total.
For a sufficiently fine-granular detection of doctoring, protected units of a few seconds are
desired. Thus, a sufficient embedding capacity of the audio watermarking is vital with regards
to the requirements listed in Section 3.1.2. So far, the existent approach as explained previously
has been insufficient due to its rather inflexible assignment of watermarked Fourier coefficients
to message bit indices. Closer analysis shows that a capacity improvement by a factor of 5 to 10
is required. More detail can be found in the numerical example given below.
Hence, it is proposed to implement a more flexible mapping:
Proposal: All coefficients correspondent to a certain message bit index shall be
pseudo-randomly distributed across the complete available virtual area in the time-
frequency domain, instead of a fixed mapping.
The fixed mapping is given up for the sake of higher flexibility and coverage as it is visualized
in Figure 3.10, right. The ”cloud-like” scattering of the embedding location easily allows in-
creasing the embedding capacity compared to the fixed mapping by increasing the width of the
watermarked sub-band (vertical axis).
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Figure 3.10.: Proposed watermark embedding schemes – Message bits embedded in sequential
temporal order (left Figure) and in pseudo-random temporal order (right Figure).
Every 9+9 correspondent coefficients Wn contribute to the n-th message bit ac-
cording to Equation (2.6). The respective coefficients of the first message bit W1
are highlighted for demonstration purpose.
This contribution is experimentally evaluated in Section 5.3.1 and affects all results in Sec-
tion 5.4.
Numerical Example
As a realistic figure, it can be assumed that the actual gross message length is roughly 450 bit.
This includes the rMAC itself, additional meta data, a short CRC code and that forward error
correction is used. For achieving a reasonable robustness a total number of 180 coefficients
shall be used for embedding each of the bits into the spectrum. The frequency range of 1 kHz
to 9 kHz (i.e. bandwidth 8 kHz) shall be used for embedding. This bandwidth corresponds to
W = 8kHz · 2048/44.1 kHz = 371 frequency indices. This is visualized as the ”height” of the
virtual ”area” in the time-frequency domain as visualized in Figure 3.10.
The area of all 450 message bits requires to hold 450 · 180= 81000 coefficients. Hence, the
”length” of the area along the time axis should be 81000/371 ≈ 219 frames. This represents
approximately 219 · 2048/44.1kHz ≈ 10 seconds. That is, the flexible implementation allows
for shortening the duration by using more coefficients per frame i.e. increasing the frequency
bandwidth. Note that with a fixed mapping of time indices to watermark such embedding
capacity can not be increased by just using more coefficients per frame.
The contribution of this Section is evaluated in Section 5.3.1 and contributes to all test results
in Section 5.4.
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3.3.2 Psychoacoustic-enhanced Watermarking Detection
The work described in this Section was conducted in a student thesis by Merlé [Mer2007]
under supervision of the thesis author and eventually published in co-authorship [SZ2008b].
For a better understanding of the following explanation, the Patchwork detection algorithm
investigated closely in this thesis shall be recalled. According to the ”detection model” in Equa-
tion (2.5), the detection and retrieval of a watermark message bit is performed by evaluating
the quantity S′ := a¯′ − b¯′ = 1/N∑i a′i − 1/N∑i b′i . Remember that each summand a′i and b′i is
a Fourier coefficient from a spectrum that potentially was being modified before according to
the definition in the ”embedding model” in Equation (2.7):
m= ”0” ⇒ a′i = ai1−di b′i = bi1+di , 0≤ d ≤ 1 ∀ i = 1 . . .N ,
m= ”1” ⇒ a′i = ai1+di b′i = bi1−di , 0≤ d ≤ 1 ∀ i = 1 . . .N , .
Obviously, the greater the value of |di|, the greater the increase/decrease of the Fourier original
coefficients ai, bi.
For completeness note that in the software implementation in this thesis work, coefficient values
a and b are smaller than 1.0 due to the normalization coefficients during the FFT spectrum
calculation. Hence taking a and b to the power of 1+ d ≥ 1.0 in fact decreases the coefficient.
However this is irrelevant as long as embedder and detector software both correspond to this
convention.
For now, all summands contribute equally to the quantity S in the above detection equation. But
this does not reflect well that the di were controlled by a psychoacoustic model and are content-
adaptive and frequency-dependent: for real-world audio content some coefficients probably
underwent stronger modifications and contribute more to the quantity S than others. This can
be utilized on the detector side as described in the following.
Effects of Multiple Embedding on Psychoacoustic Characteristics
At first it was investigated if and how the embedding process changes the psychoacoustic proper-
ties of the audio. For this the behavior of the exponents in the embedding model was evaluated.
This was done by simulating that the watermarked audio was watermarked again. Then the
correspondent exponents for the first embedding step (1±d) and the virtual second embedding
step (1± d ′) were compared.
Close analysis in [Mer2007] showed that the psychoacoustic characteristics are maintained in
the course of embedding. This means that the psychoacoustic properties of the original cover
data can be reconstructed from the watermarked content at detection time. Based on this
result, several approaches were implemented that utilize this obtained knowledge. The two
most important methods are:
Method 1 – Static Prioritization of Sub-bands
It was found that Fourier coefficients that correspond to frequencies smaller than 2 to 3 kHz
in practice undergo much less modifications than at higher frequencies for many kinds of input
audio data. That was verified for one hundred test files with different music data, voice data,
and few other synthetic test files (noise, seesaw signals etc.). It was learned that under 2.0 kHz
the values of di typically are in the range ±10−2. The range at higher frequencies is at least ten
times greater, see Figure 3.11 (tested for the range 1.0-5.0 kHz).
91
Figure 3.11.: Left figure: test results of median value of “embedding exponents” (1−|d|) across
100 test files; right figure: test results of robustness test at different MP3 bit rates,
bright bars: detection success without psychoacoustic modeling; dark bars: psy-
choacoustic modeling enabled in detector
Source: own works [SZ2008b]
.
Thus it is proposed that Fourier coefficients correspondent to frequencies greater than 2 kHz
are picked with a higher priority than those at smaller frequencies. Different prioritization can
be realized by ignoring less relevant coefficients or using them with a lower weight. Note that
this prioritization is done statically for any kind of input data in every time-step and is not
content-dependent.
Method 2 – Dynamic Frequency-dependent Weighting
Another approach utilizes the instantaneous psychoacoustic properties in a watermarked audio
frame. As explained above, the unknown psychoacoustic properties at embedding time in terms
of exponents (1± di) can be approximated by those (1± d ′i ) available at detection time. Then,
those reconstructed exponents are used to implement an adequate weighting of the Fourier
coefficients in the detection model in Equation (2.5).
For this, it is defined that the measured Fourier coefficients are taken to the power of the
estimated exponents again:
a′′i := (a′i)
1−d′i , b′′i := (b′i)
1−d′i . (3.6)
Finally, the detection model is applied to these re-transformed spectral coefficients
S′′ := a¯′′ − b¯′′ = 1/N∑
i
a′′i − 1/N
∑
i
b′′i = 1/N
∑
i
(a′i)
1−d′i − 1/N∑
i
(b′i)
1−d′i . (3.7)
This non-linear weighting reflects exactly the non-linear behavior of the earlier embedding
process. Each coefficient is weighted according to the modification it probably underwent at
embedding time, earlier. Note that this method is truly dynamic as the time-varying, content-
dependent psychoacoustic model parameters of the respective audio frame are used.
Note that this approach is somewhat similar to one of the (rare) related works published by
Kirovski [KM2003] that reflect perceptual modeling in the detection. The authors propose
that the ”detector should correlate [i.e. evaluate] only the audible frequency magnitudes”. In
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contrast, the approach investigated in this thesis does evaluate such inaudible frequency com-
ponents, but downgraded by weighted by their distance to the masking threshold.
Implementation in the Detector
Both methods were implemented and integrated in the watermarking algorithm used in this the-
sis. Test results showed that the proposed approach can improve the watermarking robustness
for any kind of watermark message. An example of test results for MP3 robustness as published
in [Mer2007, SZ2008b] is shown in Figure 3.11. It shows that using the psychoacoustic-based
detector can improve the detection success rate.
More elaborate test results can be found in Section 5.3.5.
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3.4 Combined Perceptual Hashing/Watermarking Approach
3.4.1 Alignment of Hashing and Watermark Embedding
Own work-in-progress and results about the contribution in this Section contribute to the
following own publications at conferences in multimedia security: [ZS2008c, ZS2009b,
ZMS2012].
This Section explains how the proposed audio hashing and the enhanced audio watermarking
approaches as explained in the previous Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1. are combined so that the thesis
objectives can be met.
As pointed out in Section 2.2.1, in a content-fragile watermarking system it is essential that the
audio data distortions caused by embedding whatever watermark message do not significantly
change the values of the rMAC. For an rMAC algorithm that is perfectly insensitive to consecutive
watermark embedding, one would expect the Hamming distance of the rMAC before and after
applying the protection to be zero. In fact, at an earlier stage of the research as published
in [ZS2008c, ZS2009b], the Hamming distances did not vanish completely49. This can be seen
from the following...
...Example: For the experiments published in [ZS2008c] an rMAC of length M=128 bit was
extracted from audio data units of 10 seconds (6.5 hours of total duration). At reasonable
embedding strength, the distortions of the watermark embedding process did caused some
of the rMAC bits to flag a change of the bit value, as can be seen from the histogram in
Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12.: Example: Histogram of rMAC Hamming distance for watermarked audio data ver-
sus original audio data;
Source: [ZS2008c]
Intensive analysis in the previous analysis showed that the rMAC extraction and the watermark
embedding inside a particular audio frame were not completely separated due to spectral leak-
age effects (as explained in Appendix A.1.3.3): embedding a watermarking into a certain Fourier
coefficient does have an influence on neighboring coefficients in the spectrum too. If such co-
efficient is picked by the rMAC feature selection, the rMAC which the coefficient contributes to
might flip. This is often observed for said ”weak” bits for which the continuous measure d ′ as in
Equation (3.1) has an absolute value close to zero. Therefore, the process of rMAC feature ex-
49 In the reviewers’ comments of the paper submission to [ZS2009b] the notable false-positive rate was requested
for improvement.
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Figure 3.13.: Proposed alignment scheme for time-frequency indices for rMAC bits Rm and wa-
termark message bits Wn embedding. For simplification purposes, coefficients are
separated in ”odd/even order” along the time axis.
traction and the robust watermarking scheme involved are proposed to be appropriately aligned
as follows:
Proposal: rMAC feature selection and watermark embedding are carried out on dis-
joint sets of audio frames (denoted as ”alignment” in the following).
For achieving this, the audio data is separated internally along the time axis by first partitioning
the audio frames in every protected audio section into two classes:
• The majority of audio frames is used exclusively for embedding the watermark message.
• The minority of audio frames is used exclusively for the rMAC extraction.
The multiplexing along the time axis helps avoiding undesired leakage effects in the course of
watermark embedding. The multiplexing is facilitated by the convention that no overlapping of
the FFT frames was carried out in the previous rMAC computation.
This is also the major contribution beyond an earlier work by the thesis author: in [ZS2009b]
it was only defined that spectral coefficients ek0,t0 at given time-frequency index must not be
assigned for both, hashing and watermarking; nevertheless it was permitted to assign different
spectral coefficients ek0,t0 and ek1,t0 from the same time time index t0 to either hashing or
watermarking. Thus, the proposed alignment is unlike other works for example by Steinebach
or Gulbis [SD2003b, GMS2008a, Gul2013].
Example: Figure 3.13 shows a visualization of the alignment scheme: the Figure virtually com-
bines the pseudo-random assignments as shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.10 above. For
simplification purposes, coefficients are multiplexed in ”odd/even order” along the time
axis.
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In the implementation of this thesis work, the time indices of the rMAC extraction will be
pseudo-randomly scattered but dense enough to detect even short sections of tampering. As a
consequence, the detection algorithm is formally not only dependent on the secret rMAC key
K2 but also on the given secret watermarking key K1.
The proposed alignment not only has an impact on robustness and embedding rate/payload. It
also affects the transparency: for achieving a dense coverage of the rMAC, the rMAC’ed audio
frames must be placed dense enough along the time axis. This is vital to avoid that the algorithm
misses tampering with the audio data that has a very short duration of less than a second for
example. By the multiplexing the watermark embedder is, in effect, switched off and on again
many times per second. This adds a second source of quality loss because an interrupted (virtu-
ally stuttering) watermarking distortion sounds more annoying than a constant one. Hence, the
contribution of this Section has an impact on all test results in the Section 5 after all. An explicit
”sanity check” of the alignment scheme can be found in its Subsection 5.4.1.
3.4.2 Embedded Message Payload
The embedded watermark message is determined by the following elements:
rMAC
Obviously, the rMAC is an important part of the embedded watermark message payload.
An rMAC of M=128 bit is used which means the main portion of the total payload.
Time Code
The work in progress described in this paragraph was published initially in [ZS2009b].
As discussed in Section 2.3.4.3, targeted attacks have to be prevented that allow undetected
modification by deleting or exchanging complete audio segments (see [HM2000]). For this, as
a minor enhancement, a time code is embedded in addition to the rMAC of each audio segment.
For simplicity, the index of the audio segment is used: the first segment is labeled with the
integer time code ”0”, the next one with ”1”, and so on. This allows future verification that
the order of the audio section is correct and no sections are missing. Attacks by deleting or
exchanging complete audio segments in terms of a ”Holliman attack” can be detected. A time
code of 8 to 10 bit is prefixed to the watermark message.
This quite obvious, simple but indeed effective enhancement can also be found in the works
of Holiman, Petrovic or Park [HM2000, Pet2005, PTW2007]. It is different from the work by
Chen Fan et al. [CHW2008] which proposes to implement a linked chain of feature extraction
and feature embedding: the authors describe that the audio features of a given audio segment
are embedded into the following segment, and so on. By contrast, this thesis work embeds the
time code in its correspondent segment. This has the advantage that every segment inside an
audio file is self-contained with regards to all meta data required for its authentication, even if
only file fragments are available.
CRC Check
A CRC-16 is appended to the watermark message. It allows verifying if the watermark was
retrieved correctly.
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Forward Error Correction (FEC)
For improving the robustness of the embedded watermark message, forward error correction
techniques (FEC) from communication theory are used in this thesis work. Unlike CRC coding,
FEC not only allows for detection but even for correcting bit errors in the watermark mes-
sage with a certain probability. Such transmission errors can be caused by distortions due to
admissible post-processing (like lossy encoding, analog recording etc.) or malicious acts of tam-
pering with the watermarked audio data. See Section 2.1.2.8 for an explanation and standard
references on FEC.
Here, the software implementation uses an adaptation of the standard Turbo coding algorithm
which was introduced originally in [BGT1993].
The adaptations and improvements to Turbo coding for watermarking applications were de-
veloped in a thesis work by Berchtold [Ber2008] under supervision of the thesis author.
In this thesis work Turbo encoding increases the input message length N (net) to the output
length of 3N + 4 (gross). This is caused by internal stages of redundant convolutional coding,
interleaving, and puncturing in the Turbo encoder. Its details are not elaborated upon in this
thesis and the interested reader is referred to [Ber2008].
Synchronization Pattern
Each audio segment carrying the watermark message is prefixed by a watermarking synchro-
nization sequence. Formally, this is also a watermark message but it is of fixed value, like a start
code. The watermark detector at first tries to find and to lock/engage in the known(!) ”Sync” se-
quence. If the detection score exceeds a predefined threshold, the subsequent message retrieval
and rMAC verification is triggered. In the investigated approach a temporal synchronization
accuracy on the detector side as precise as ±1 PCM sample(s) can be regularly achieved. This
outperforms the accuracy of the original algorithm by Steinebach which synchronizes at an
accuracy of ± 10 PCM samples. The details are not elaborated upon in this thesis.
Message Payload
Hence the embedded message payload eventually can be written50 as
{ Sync + Message_1 } { Sync + Message_2 } { Sync + Message_3 } ...
with
Message_i = TurboCoding
 
rMAC_i + TimeCode_i + CRC( rMAC_i + TimeCode_i )

.
In the experimental evaluation in this thesis work the approximate duration of the ”Sync” se-
quence typically is 2 seconds while the watermark message requires 10 to 15 seconds of duration
each.
50 The ”+” symbol shall denote the concatenation of binary strings
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3.4.3 Implementation Details
In the following, the software implementation of the algorithm will be outlined briefly. The
extraction of the rMAC and consecutive embedding is conducted as follows (see Figure 3.14 for
a simplified flowchart).
1. Input to the software implementation are the cover data file and a text file containing the
secret keys (denoted as ”Cover Audio Data” and ”Secret Key” in Figure 3.14).
2. In addition, a configuration file controlling technical settings for both rMAC extraction
and watermarking has to be passed to the input (denoted as ”Technical Config Data”).
The most important technical settings are
• the frequency bandwidth used for rMAC extraction and watermark embedding
in Hertz (which symbolically defines the ”height” of the virtual ”area” in the time-
frequency domain as visualized in Figure 3.13),
• the number of frequency coefficients that is used per message bit (which influences
the robustness of the watermark and the total duration required for embedding),
• the percentage of time-indices from which the extraction of the rMAC is allowed
(which controls how dense the rMAC extraction is carried out),
• the percentage of frequency coefficients at each time-step in the ”area” that are al-
lowed to be utilized for embedding (which influences the transparency and the total
duration required for embedding),
• the intended length of the rMAC and the time code in bit etc.
From these settings, it can be calculated by simple arithmetic how many frames are re-
quired for embedding the complete watermark message (which symbolically defines the
”length” of the ”area” in the time-frequency domain).
Figure 3.14.: Proposed implementation of rMAC extraction during watermark embedding.
Thick lines: data flow of audio data; dashed lines: data flow of meta data; dot-
ted boxes: components that were developed or enhanced in this thesis work
3. Dependent on the secret key, the pseudo-random assignment ”Assignment of Time-
Frequency Indices” is calculated. For this, an array is allocated first which stores the
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status of each time-frequency index. In simple words it serves as a ”map” about the status
the time-frequency indices (”Index Map’’). The ”length” and ”height” of the map is allo-
cated according to the ”Technical Config Data”. Its entries are initialized by setting each
entry as ”undefined”.
4. The pre-defined number/percentage of frames (i.e. their time indices) used for rMAC
extraction is pseudo-randomly picked first: in the index map they are marked as ”reserved”
for rMAC extraction and hence will be skipped during for watermark embedding. All
spectral coefficients at these reserved time-steps are marked as potential rMAC extraction
indices in the index map. In practice, 10 to 40 percent of the total time indices are
assigned for rMAC computation.
5. For each rMAC bit index, the respective set of N indices is pseudo-randomly picked and
the rMAC bit index is entered into the index map (denoted as ”Rm” in Figure 3.13). In the
rMAC ”serial mode”, as proposed in Section 3.2.4), only the frequency indices are chosen
pseudo-randomly while correspondent time indices are set in regularly increasing order
in sequence according to the rMAC bit index.
6. For the majority of leftover time indices, the scattered ”cloud” of watermarking coefficients
is pseudo-randomly picked and entered into the index map. For each gross message bit
(denoted as ”Wm” in Figure 3.13) a number of indices is reserved for the Patchwork
embedding, according to the Technical Config Data. No time-frequency index is used
twice for watermarking and rMAC extraction. Eventually, valid states of every entry in
the index map represent, in turn, ”rMAC’ed”, ”watermarked”, or ”unmodified” (or, in fact,
remain ”undefined” which can indicate program errors at runtime). The index map is then
passed as an input to the software libraries for the rMAC computation and the watermark
embedding.
7. Then the rMAC computation is carried on the input audio data in the spectral domain
out while respecting the index map. Its output is the input to the watermark embedding
algorithm (denoted as ”rMAC as Watermark Message”).
8. The gross message payload is constructed according to the explanation in Section 3.4.2:
The rMAC and the time code are concatenated with their correspondent CRC code, error
correction coding is carried out, and the sync pattern is prefixed. This gross message pay-
load is ”translated” into correspondent index map entries that control which coefficients
have to be increased or decreased in the course of Patchwork embedding.
9. The Patchwork embedding is carried out. It has to respect the dynamic psychoacoustic
model about the permitted degree of modulation of the DFT absolute coefficients and
the static index map and ”Technical Config Data”. The DFT phase coefficients remain
unmodified by this algorithm.
10. Finally, the modified DFT spectrum is transformed back to the time domain using the
inverted Fourier transform. Final output is the watermarked PCM data which is eventually
wrapped into an output WAVE file.
The overall software architecture was realized in C/C++ as follows: An executable implement-
ing the design described above was implemented as a command line tool. It serves as a testbed
for the different algorithms developed in this thesis work. It imports the developed rMAC func-
tionality and the MPEG psychoacoustic model as a linked software library. The tool also serves
as a parser for the input and output WAVE files, the configuration files and the key files. The
tool relies on the following external functionality:
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• The commercial watermarking software SITMark Audio, developed at the Fraunhofer In-
stitute SIT51: The proposed embedding algorithm uses the ”Patchwork WM embedding”
library of the SITMark suite. The same is true for implementing the rMAC verification
into the SITMark detector software (not shown here). The handling of the index map and
the ”Assignment of Time-Frequency Indices” were implemented/added into the separate
SITMark source code for handling repeating utility functions which are used in both wa-
termarking embedding and detection. This includes auxiliary software libraries for WAVE
file read/write access and pseudo-random number generation (as source code).
• The 3rd party tool TooLAME52: This MPEG Audio Layer II encoder internally implements
the perceptual model according to [ISO1993b, Appendix D, pp. 5].
• The 3rd party library FFTW53 for performance optimized computation of the Fast Fourier
Transform [FJ2005].
• The 3rd party library Math Kernel Library (MKL)54 for performance optimized computa-
tion of elementary mathematical operations. In the software this is very useful for the
numerous and parallel computations of exponential functions or log functions (during
Patchwork embedding or for handling of Decibel values).
Using these external optimization toolsets at embedding time, a processing speed of 5x to 10x
times faster than real-time playback speed can be achieved. That is, five to ten minutes of input
audio data (stereo, 44.1 kHz) require one minute of processing (Standard PC workstation, at
present: CPU Intel Core i5@3Ghz).
51 SITMark Audio system, version ”AP 2013/06”, source code provided free of charge for academic re-
search by courtesy of Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Darmstadt, Germany,
https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/en/mediasecurity
52 TooLAME encoder project by Mike Cheng under LGPL, http://sourceforge.net/projects/toolame
53 FFTW (”...the fastest Fourier transform in the West”), by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
USA, under commercial license as part of SITMark Audio, http://www.fftw.org
54 Math Kernel Library (MKL) by Intel Corp., under commercial license as part of SITMark Audio,
https://software.intel.com/en-us/intel-mkl
100
Chapter 4
Security of the Proposed Approach against
Brute-Force Attacks
This Chapter discusses theoretical security aspects of the proposed audio hashing and audio
watermarking algorithms.
An obvious objective for an attacker in integrity and authentication watermarking applications
is carrying out data modifications without being detected. Different attack scenarios have to be
distinguished
1. With regards to data integrity this could be realized by applying the intended integrity
breaches in way that they are not detected by the rMAC algorithm in the first place. It we
assume that the secret rMAC key remains undisclosed, this implies:
• Reconstructing the coverage of the rMAC’ed spectral components, especially which
time-frequency indices are not covered in the rMAC calculation anyway. There, data
modifications can not be detected on the basis of the rMAC value (but maybe on their
impact on the watermark message), or
• Reconstruction how the indeed covered spectral components contribute to the rMAC
bits, especially which coefficients contribute to a particular rMAC bit and how. At-
tacks on these covered components could be masked by sparing/skipping them dur-
ing the attack Or slight modifications could be applied to other components so that
they compensate for the attack in the calculation of an given rMAC bit (like the sums
in Equation (3.1) .
The latter would put the attack in a position as if he/she had direct access to the rMAC
key.
2. An alternative integrity attack on given, previously protected content could be realized by
attacking the watermark message instead of the rMAC calculation. After applying mali-
cious doctoring, the watermark message could be replaced so that it appears to match the
rMAC of the doctored content again. If we assume that the secret watermark key remains
undisclosed this implies, again, reconstructing which and how spectral components are
involved in the regular process. This would put the attack in a position as if he/she had
access to the watermark key directly.
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3. With regards to data authentication, this knowledge could even be used for creating a
forged audio data set, i.e. to make it up completely from scratch. The forgery can be
prepared so that it contains an embedded watermark message that appears to match the
current state of the rMAC of the forged data.
Note that the first aspect in the previous list corresponds to the challenges on integrity water-
marking described Section 2.3.4.3, especially to the aspects of undetected modification (sup-
ported by information leakage and oracle attacks). The second and third aspect correspond to
the attacks as described in Section 2.3.4.3, especially removal, de-syncing and oracle/sensitivity
attacks.
To summarize, vulnerabilities by targeted attacks on the watermark embedding and rMAC ex-
traction, especially the involved pseudo-random feature selection processes should be analyzed.
Both will be carried out in the following.
4.1 Brute Force Attack on the Watermark Embedding/Detection
This Section describes the security of the Patchwork embedding approach used in this thesis
with respect to brute force attacks. This is done in analogy to the related works by Cox or
Bas/Furon [CDF2006] or [BF2013]. It discusses the actual difficulty for an adversary to get
access to the watermarking message. This is expressed in terms of the effective key length as
outlined in Section 2.3.4.3.
Without knowledge of the secret key, the pseudo-random pattern of modified FFT coefficients
in the frequency-time domain is obscure to an adversary in the first place. Instead it has to be
guessed directly by an adversary. Formally this means to guess the respective time-frequency in-
dices (k, t) from the space of all possible indices55 {(kn, tn)} ∈ {1 . . .W} × {1 . . . T} to get access
to the hidden watermark message. The quantity T denotes the duration of the watermark mes-
sage (measured in frames or discrete time-steps). The value W is the frequency bandwidth that
is used for embedding. Usually, not the completely available band-width from zero up to the
Nyquist frequency is being utilized because very low and high frequencies are not well suited
for watermark embedding.
As explained in Section 2.3.5, for each of the M message bits, two disjoint sets
A := {ain} , B := {b jn} , n ∈ {1 . . .N} ⊂ IN .
of N FFT coefficients each are pseudo-randomly picked and then modified. The 2N coefficients
per bit are chosen pseudo-randomly without replacement from W · T possible positions in the
frequency-time domain. For the following, not the value of the FFT coefficients ain , bin are
relevant, but their respective indices
in := (k
(a)
n , t
(a)
n ) , jn := (k
(b)
n , t
(b)
n ) ∈ {1 . . .W} × {1 . . . T} ⊂ IN× IN .
The full set of all indices of coefficients that contribute to a message bit will be denoted as
A := {in}=
¦
(k(a)n , t
(a)
n )
©
, n ∈ {1 . . .N}
B := { jn}=
¦
(k(b)n , t
(b)
n )
©
, n ∈ {1 . . .N} .
55 Note for the avoidance of confusion that the terms ”index” or ”’indices”, resp., correspond to the time-
frequency index as a pair (k, t) ∈ IN× IN consisting of a frequency index k and time index t
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4.1.1 Combinatorial Analysis of Full Recovery
At first, it is assumed that a successful attack requires to guess correctly all N+N frequency-time
indices that are used for each message bit. Then, the attack space Ω for the m-th message bit
contains all possible sets of combinations of 2N frequency-time indices
Ω=
¦
(Ap,Bq) :
Ap= Bq= N , Ap ∩Bq = ; , ∀p,q© .
Each single of the 2N indices could have been assigned to set A , or to set B or to neither
of the two. Thus, the above problem can be expressed as the standard combinatorial mental
experiment of finding the total number of combinations for
”depositing W ·T objects in three boxes, with a small number N of objects in ’Box A ′,
another N objects in ’Box B ′ box, and all remaining W ·T − 2N objects in the ’third’
box”.
For the above standard problem, the total number of elementary events is given by the so-called
multinomial coefficient from basic combinatorics:
|Ω|=

W ·T
N ; N ; W ·T − 2N

:=
W ·T !
N ! N ! (W ·T − 2N)! .
Corollary
The previous expression can be rewritten as
|Ω|=

W ·T
N ;N ;W ·T − 2N

=
(W ·T )!
N ! N ! (W ·T − 2N)! =
(W ·T )!
N ! N ! (W ·T − 2N)! ·
(W ·T − N)!
(W ·T − N)!
=
(W ·T )!
N ! (W ·T − N)! ·
(W ·T − N)!
N ! (W ·T − 2N)! =

W ·T
N

·

W ·T − N
N

. (4.1)
The last expression corresponds to the mental experiment of the urn problem that
”N white balls out of total W ·T balls have to be drawn without replacement, then
another N black balls without replacement from the remaining W ·T − N”,
which is a standard problem in combinatorics for example for computing the odds in lotteries.
4.1.2 Combinatorial Analysis of Partial Recovery
In the previous Section, the assumption was that only one single combination corresponds to the
correct sets A and B , while all other |Ω|-1 are not. This true, but in practice an attacker does
not need to guess and recover the full sequence correctly. A small number of incorrectly assigned
coefficients will contribute to the detector response to Equation (2.5) as a distortion. Because
of the robustness of the Patchwork scheme, the detector can cope with such distortion anyway
as with any other distortion caused by lossy compression, analog recording etc. Obviously, that
significantly reduces the number of attempts for breaking the scheme. To overcome this security
challenge one could increase the total number N of coefficients per message bit. As a drawback
this will in return reduce the embedding data rate/capacity of the watermark transmission.
These considerations show that robustness, security, and capacity of the watermark are mutually
antagonistic.
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In the following, it is estimated, how many combinations exist for an event E that represents a
successful attack on the message bit i.e. a partial recovery of H out of N indices in A and B
for which N −H ”misses” can be tolerated by the adversary (with 0≤ H ≤ N) .
Upper Bound
An upper bound for the number of combinations that represent a successful attack can be ob-
tained from the following argument: By definition of the embedding/detection algorithm, N+N
coefficients’ indices are assigned to the two sets A ′ and B ′. Given by the assumption, the
event E1 has to be defined and analyzed that
• a number of H indices is correctly guessed and assigned toA without replacement; then
• another H indices are correctly assigned toB without replacement,
which implies that the remaining (N -H) ”slots” in A′ and the remaining (N -H) slots in B′, resp.,
are assumed to be filled-up by other indices ( j, t). The following cases have to be distinguished:
• Case 1: The filled-up coefficient can be picked from indices that are actually unmarked or
that belong to a different message bit m′ 6= m. This represents the event E1 = E and it
will be very likely, compared to the other cases: usually there are much more coefficients
unused for any message bit than for the m-th bit.
• Case 2: The filled-up coefficient can belong to the m-th bit but is assigned to the
wrong/opposite set. This case will decrease the detector response as coefficients from
the wrong/opposite set will cancel out the embedded spectral feature to some extent.
• Case 3: The filled-up coefficient can belong to the m-th bit and is – by chance – assigned
to the correct set, too (i.e. it correctly adds to the other H coefficients already in the set)
In contrast to Case 2, this case will even improve the detection response, which would be
fortunate from the attackers point of view.
• Case 4: ...any combination thereof.
Closer combinatorial analysis shows that the number of combinations |E1(H)| for this event can
be expressed as
|E1(H)|=

N
H

N
H

W ·T − 2H
N −H

W ·T −H − N
N −H

(4.2)
This becomes plausible by considering the following
• The first and second term reflect that a partition of H indices were correctly guessed and
assigned inA ′ and another H inB ′.
• The third term reflects that (N -H) indices have to be filled-up to A ′. For this, only
r1 :=W ·T − 2H are left from the previous steps (”first fill-up”).
• The fourth term reflects that a number of (N -H) indices have to be filled up to B ′ (”sec-
ond fill-up”). For this, only r2 := r1 − (N −H) =W ·T − 2H − (N −H) = W ·T − N −H
coefficients are available, still.
For plausibility it should be noted that for the case H = N it is
H = N ⇒ |E1(H)|=

N
N

N
N

W ·T − 2N
0

W ·T − 2N
0

= 1 · 1 · 1 · 1= 1 ,
i.e. there is only one combination for which all H ≡ N coefficients are correct, as already said.
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Lower Bound
A lower bound for the number of combinations that represent a successful attack is given by the
following argument: The previous Section described a case-by-case analysis of the ”filled-up’
coefficients. For estimating a lower bound, the event E2 is assumed that the filled-up indices are
all picked in Case 1, i.e. only at indices that actually neither belong to A nor B which is very
likely.
Example: From the figures in the example in Section 4.1.1, it can be seen that this restric-
tion is a feasible assumption: In the experimental evaluation, the frequency bandwidth
is approximately W = 500 indices (out of 1024) which represents approximately half of
the spectrum. The typical duration of the watermarked sequence is T = 200. That is,
W ·T ≈ 100,000.
If H=25 correct coefficients out of N=30 total are regarded as sufficient for detection,
another 5 + 5 coefficients have to be filled-up to A and B . It is much more likely that
these will be picked from the (100,000-60) indices that neither belong to A nor to B
than (by chance) from the 10 missing/remaining free slots that actually have belonged to
A orB .
The number of available coefficients for the first fill-up then reduces to W ·T -2N , the second
fill-up reduces to W ·T -2N -(N -H) = W ·T -3N+H. Thus, the following expression provides the
lower bound for the brute force attack:
|E2(H)|=

N
H

N
H

W ·T−2N
N−H

W ·T−3N+H
N−H

(4.3)
Result – Summary for Lower and Upper Bounds
If the pseudo-random patterns in the frequency-time domain are equally distributed, the ele-
mentary events in Ω are equally likely. Combining Equations (4.2) and (4.3), the probability pm
for a successful attack on the m-th message bit, if H out of the N coefficients in each group are
assumed to be guessed correctly, can be narrowed down to
|E2(H)|
|Ω| ≤ pm ≤
|E1(H)|
|Ω| N
H
 N
H
 W·T−2N
N−H
 W·T−3N+H
N−H
  W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N
 ≤ pm ≤  NH NH W·T−2HN−H  W·T−N−HN−H   W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N
 . (4.4)
Corollary – Asymptotic Behavior
For plausibility note that it one sets H = N , it is
H = N ⇒
 N
N
 N
N
 W·T−2N
0
 W·T−2N
0
  W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N
 ≤ pm ≤  NN NN W·T−2N0  W·T−2N0   W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N

⇒ 1|Ω| ≤ pm ≤
1
|Ω|
⇒ pm = 1|Ω| ,
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as can be expected: if it is demanded that all coefficients (H = N) need to be correctly guessed,
only one out of |Ω| combinations is correct.
For completeness note that for H = 0 it is found (using Equation (4.1)) that
H = 0 ⇒
 N
0
 N
0
 W·T−2N
N
 W·T−3N
N
  W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N
 ≤ pm ≤  N0 N0 W·TN  W·T−NN   W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N

⇒ 1 · 1 ·
 W·T−2N
N
 W·T−3N
N
  W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N
 ≤ pm ≤ 1 · 1 ·   W·TN ;N ;W·T−2N  W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N

⇒
 W·T−2N
N
 W·T−3N
N
  W·T
N ;N ;W·T−2N
 ≤ pm ≤ 1 . (4.5)
That would be the probability that the attacker guesses all coefficients wrong, by chance.
4.1.3 Numerical Examples
The success probability is calculated for typical settings of the proposed integrity watermark-
ing56. Assumed is that the frequency bandwidth is W = 500 which represents approximately
half of the spectrum if the sample rate is 44.1 kHz. It is furthermore assumed that the duration
of the watermarked sequence is T = 200 which represents approximately 9 seconds duration in
this case. The coefficient groups A and B are assumed of size N = 30 each.
Full Recovery
According to Equation (4.1) up to
  100,000
30;30;100,000−60
≈ 1.396 · 10235 attempts are required to guess
all N indices in A and B! This corresponds to the theoretical limit by the effective key length
of − log2(1/10235)∼= 781 [bit].
Partial Recovery
If only H=25 out of 30 coefficients are regarded as sufficient for detection, according to Equa-
tion (4.4) the success probability pm can be narrowed down to 30
25
 30
25
 99,940
5
 99,935
5
  100,000
30;30;99,940
 ≤ pm ≤  3025 3025 99,9505  99,9455   100,000
30;30;99,940
 .
The numerical result is
1.0035 · 10−179 ≤ pm ≤ 1.0045 · 10−179 .
The upper and lower bounds in this example are within margins of less than ± 1%. This shows
that the simplifying assumptions for obtaining the lower bounds for brute-force attacks are of
minor relevance only. In addition, using Equation (4.5) it can be shown that the probability of
missing all 2N slots is at least 0.964.
56 All numerical results in this Section calculated in WolframAlpha or Mathematica, by Wolfram Research
http://www.wolframalpha.com
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Finally, the maximum number of brute force attacks is 1/pm ≈ 9.955 · 10+178 ≈ 2594 combina-
tions. That corresponds to an effective key length as defined by Bas and Furon of
− log2(pm)∼= 594 [bit] .
This expresses the very high difficulty to get access to the watermark message if all time-
frequency indices of watermarked coefficients need to be estimated. Note that the figures can
be expected to be even better because the assumption about the bandwidth W and the duration
T are rather conservative. In the experimental evaluation as described in Section 5.1.2) the
actual figures are 5 to 20 percent greater than the above assumptions.
4.1.4 Additional Remarks
In addition, a few comments on the results of this results need to be made:
• Note that the distributions of detection scores for unmarked versus marked content do
not fully separate (recall Figure 2.12). Hence, if an attacker attempts to recover the
watermark, he will very likely be irritated by seemingly present message bits caused by
false alarms. This will even increase the efforts for an attacker.
• The previous calculation is only exactly true for the first of the M message bits. As every
coefficient (its time-frequency index, resp.) is used only once for embedding, the number
of available indices for consecutive message bit indices is increasingly reduced.
• The latter is especially significant if the coverage of watermarked time-frequency indices
is very high. For example, in the empirical evaluation of this thesis work, a common
coverage is 99%: Assume that M − 1 message bits could be recovered for what ever
reason, i.e. all message bits except the last one. Then, the coefficients for this very last
message bit needs to be estimated only from the remaining 1%. Nevertheless, according
to the numerical example, the value of N2 := 0.01 ·WT=1,000 is still a large number.
In this case, the success probability for N ′2=1000 and H=5 can be narrowed down to
3.1007 · 10−17 ≤ p ≤ 3.4486 · 10−17 which represents an effective key length of at least
260 bit.
• The previous elaborations apply to the attack scenario that the unmarked cover audio is
not available. In the opposite case, an attacker can identify the 99% watermarked indices
by comparison of the cover with the watermarked content (e.g. subtraction in the Fourier
spectrum). Nevertheless, this would ”only” allow sorting out the 1% unmarked indices
and excluding them from the attack calculations. The attacker still would need to face
0.99 ·WT possible indices for estimating the location of the first message bit.
107
4.2 Brute Force Attack on the rMAC Extraction
According to Equation (3.1) in the proposed robust hashing approach, each hash bit depends
on N quantized and standardized Fourier coefficients e′′i1 , ..., e
′′
i′N
where N ′ is an even number,
N ′ = 2 · k , k ∈ IN. Their respective indices will be denoted again as
in := (kn, tn) ∈ {1...W} × {1...T} , n= 1...N ′ .
4.2.1 Combinatorial Analysis
As was pointed out in Section 3.2.1, the construction of the feature selection in the rMAC
algorithm and the Patchwork embedding are formally quite similar. This is can be seen from the
expression in Equation (3.2) which can be generalized (while renaming the indices57) as
d ′k,t =
N ′/2∑
i=1
eki ,ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼Ap
−
N ′∑
j=N ′/2+1
ek j ,t j︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼Bq
(4.6)
As a result, the estimation of the effort of brute force attack efforts on the rMAC will share similar
properties to those on the watermark message. Especially, the estimates as in Equation (4.4)
apply for the calculation of brute force attacks on rMAC as well.
Nevertheless, in practice there is a big difference in the technical settings of the watermarking
embedding versus rMAC extraction: Preliminary results show that for embedding, each of the
groups has to hold a few dozen coefficients each (typically N ≥ 50 per group). By contrast of the
watermark embedding, the analyzed rMAC quantity depends on a small number of coefficients.
Preliminary results show that rather N ′ ≤ 8 coefficients per group provide sufficient sensitivity
to integrity breaches.
For analyzing the consequences, the above considerations have to be refined: if it is assumed
that a number of H1 indices is picked correctly in the first set of coefficients and H2 in the other.
Then it can easily be shown that the estimates of upper and lower bounds from Equations (4.2)
and (4.3) can be be generalized to
E ′1(H1,H2)= N ′/2H1

N ′/2
H2

W ·T −H1 −H2
N ′/2−H1

W ·T − N ′/2−H1
N ′/2−H2

(4.7)E ′2(H1,H2)= N ′/2H1

N ′/2
H2

W ·T−2N ′/2
N ′/2−H1

W ·T−3N ′/2+H1
N ′/2−H2

(4.8)
57 Note: For the avoidance of confusion about the notation, rMAC-related counters are denoted as N ′
while watermarking-related counters have been denoted with N . For example, in the original algo-
rithm [HOK2001b] N ′=4 coefficients are processed. By contrast, in the original watermarking algo-
rithm [Ste2003] or its extension as proposed in Section 2.3.5.1 the quantity ”N” in Equation (2.5) denotes the
total number of coefficients per group (hence 2N coefficients total are processed in watermarking).
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As a result, this can be summarized toE ′2(H1,H2)
|Ω| ≤ pm ≤
E ′1(H1,H2)
|Ω| N ′/2
H1
 N ′/2
H2
  W·T−N ′
N ′/2−H1
 W·T−3N ′/2+H1
N ′/2−H2
  W·T
N ′/2 ; N ′/2 ; W·T−N ′
 ≤ pm ≤
 N ′/2
H1
 N ′/2
H2
 W·T−H1−H2
N ′/2−H1
 W·T−N ′/2−H1
N ′/2−H2
  W·T
N ′/2 ; N ′/2 ; W·T−N ′
 , (4.9)
which is an extension to Equation (4.4), while making an adaption of the notation about N and
N ′, resp.
4.2.2 Numerical Examples
The success probability of a brute force attack on the rMAC is calculated for typical settings
of the proposed integrity watermarking58. It is again assumed that the duration of the water-
marked sequence is T = 200 frames.
The following Examples 1-3 assume that the rMAC calculation is carried out in the rMAC
”scattered” operation mode. The reader is reminded that this means that time-indices can be
any random value between 1 and T . In light of the technical settings in the evaluation in
Chapter 5 it is assumed that roughly W = 300 out of 1024 coefficients are used and that each
rMAC bits is derived from N ′ = 8 coefficients.
Example 1 – Full Recovery
If we require that all N ′ indices of the m-th rMAC bit have to be guessed correctly, then only
one out of
|Ω|=

60,000
4;4;60,000− 8

= 2.9146 · 1035
permutations is the correct one. Hence, the expected success probability of such brute-force
attack on the m-th rMAC bit is
pm = 1/ |Ω|= 3.431 · 10−36
which corresponds to an effective key length of − log2(pm) = 117 [bit].
Example 2 – Partial Recovery
Then we demand that only seven out of eight rMAC coefficients have to be guessed correctly
(H1 = 4, H2 = 3). This allows studying the sensitivity of a particular rMAC bit dependent on
finding the last/eighth coefficient in a systematic manner. We find the following estimation: 4
4
 4
3
 60,000−8
4−4
 60,000−12+4
4−3
  60,000
4;4;60,000−8
 ≤ pm ≤  44 43 60,000−4−34−4  60,000−4−44−3   60,000
4;4;60,000−8

8.233 · 10−31 ≤ pm ≤ 8.233 · 10−31
58 All numerical results in this Section calculated in WolframAlpha or Mathematica, by Wolfram Research
http://www.wolframalpha.com
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⇒ pm = 8.233 · 10−31
This corresponds to an effective key length of
− log2(pm)∼= 99 [bit] .
Example 3 – Fewer indices per rMAC bit
This estimation demonstrates also that it is feasible to use more than four coefficients, in con-
trast to the original work in [HOK2001b]. If we assume that only N ′ = 4 coefficients are used
and that three out of the four correspondent indices need to be guessed (H1 = 2,H2 = 1) it is
found:  2
2
 2
1
 60,000−4
2−2
 60,000−6+3
2−1
  60,000
2;2;60,000−4
 ≤ pm ≤  22 21 60,000−2−12−2  60,000−2−22−1   60,000
2;2;60,000−4

3.704 · 10−14 ≤ pm ≤ 3.704 · 10−14
This corresponds to a much small effective key length of only − log2(pm)∼= 44 [bit].
The increased coverage by using a few more Fourier coefficients increases both the sensitivity
(true positives) and the brute-force efforts of an adversary. How this influences the specificity
(true negatives and false positives, resp.) at that same time is investigated empirically in the
following Chapter.
Example 4 – ”Serial Mode”
In example 4, the ”serial” mode is used: here, the time-indices of all N ′ FFT coefficients that
contribute to a given rMAC bit are concentrated within a very small range along the time axis. In
the worst case, that time index is deterministic and fixed. This significantly reduces the number
of possible time-frequency indices.
In light of the software implementation of the thesis work and the settings used in the evaluation
in Chapter 5 it is assumed that for a given rMAC bit index m, the time indices are expected to
be from a know small range of T ′=5. Hence, the number of possible indices reduces from
W · T = 300 · 200= 60,000 to W · T ′ = 300 · 5= 1,500.
According to Equation (4.4), the success probability for the attacker per brute-force at-
tempt increases to pm = 1.3666 · 10−14. This corresponds to an effective key length of− log2(pm)∼= 62 bit.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Evaluation
The earlier publications by the thesis author provided test results on particular aspects of
• the proposed rMAC approach [ZS2007, ZS2008a, ZS2008b, ZS2008c],
• its integration into authentication watermarking [ZS2009b, ZMS2012], or
• improving the general watermarking performance about robustness versus trans-
parency [SZ2008b].
The objective of this Chapter is to provide consolidated test results using the same (and larger)
base of test data across all different aspects investigated in this thesis.
The Chapter concludes with a summary of test results and identified guidelines for the practical
application of the findings in Section 5.5.
5.1 Test Setup
This Section describes the audio test data used, technical settings of the watermarking and
rMAC algorithms and the different simulated attacks.
5.1.1 Audio Test Data
The detection success was tested on a set of PCM audio files of different genre and sound qual-
ity like pop music, classical music, audio books, interview recordings, camera recording in the
field etc. (44.1 kHz, 16 bit, stereo, 90 test files of 3:00 minutes each, total duration 270 min-
utes). This covers a wide range of different audio content domains like music or voice recordings
at both hi-fidelity and low quality recording and production conditions and environments. The
intention is to use a wide test basis set of representative sounds for the evaluation:
• Obviously, using voice content (interviews, video sound tracks etc.) is motivated by the
discussion in Section 1.1 on protecting digital evidence and our cultural heritage against
deliberate doctoring as an intentional, malicious act.
• The motivation for using music content is twofold: breaches of integrity on music data
rather caused by unintended acts like data loss, mixing-up data or other careless post-
processing operation by mistake. In addition, different music genres allow evaluating the
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performance of the thesis result on a wide range of sound characteristics (much wider
than voice content provides).
An exhaustive listing of the audio content used can be found in the Appendix B.
For simplicity of the evaluation, in most test runs the audio files were divided into short snippets
of 30.0 seconds (i.e. six per test file) so that each can hold one complete watermark message
(i.e. ten to twenty seconds, depending on technical settings). The total number of the snippets
is 540.
5.1.2 Technical Settings
The following technical configuration settings were used:
• The FFT frame size for rMAC calculation and watermark embedding is 2048 samples
which provides a sufficient frequency resolution of 44,100 Hz/2048= 21.5 Hz.
• The watermark was embedded in the frequency range of 500 to 12,000 Hz. 99% of the
FFT coefficients available in this range were watermarked.
• Each watermark message bit is embedded ”into” N = 2 · 75 Fourier coefficients. From
preliminary tests this value was found to be a reasonable trade-off between robustness
and embedding rate.
• In contrast, the ”sync bits” of the prefixed synchronization watermark sequence are em-
bedded with much higher redundancy settings: for each of the four sync bits, approxi-
mately 2 ·2500 coefficients are watermarked in 10 consecutive frames. In total 40 frames
are used which represents approximately 2 seconds (at sample rate 44.1 kHz). This tuning
for high robustness shall allow at least the detection of sync bits if strong distortions or
attacks are applied on the audio material.
• An rMAC of 128 bit is extracted from each snippet and embedded as a robust watermark.
The frequency range selected for rMAC extraction is set to 100 to 6000 Hz (which by
fact turns into 86 to 5,986 Hz given by technical limitations of the discrete FFT frequency
resolution). The chosen frequency range is the most relevant with regards to perceptual
integrity.
• If not specified otherwise, the rMAC is extracted in the ”scattered mode” as defined above.
Each rMAC coefficient depends on N ′ = 8 pseudo-randomly picked Fourier coefficients.
This value was chosen in contrast to the original work by Haitsma, Kalker, and Oost-
veen [HOK2001a, HOK2001b]. The intention is to aggravate security attacks as it was
discussed in Section 4.2.
• A time code of 10 bit is included in the watermark message. This allows to distinguish
1024 different protected segments per audio file.
• The rMAC shall be extracted from a percentage of 33% of the available audio frames at
pseudo-random time indices. That means that two third are used for embedding the final
watermark message.
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5.1.3 Embedding payload
The embedded watermarking data is determined by the following aspects:
Watermark Message
The major part of the message consists of the rMAC. It is appended by the block index as a time
code. An appended CRC-16 allows verifying if the original rMAC value H0 was detected correctly
in the first place. Hence, an embedding payload of 154 bit is required for the experiments (see
Table 5.1):
Data length (in bit)
rMAC 128
Time code 10
CRC 16
Total M1=154
Table 5.1.: Test settings: net embedding payload
Error Correction
For improving the robustness of the embedded message forward error correction tech-
niques (FEC) as outlined in Section 2.1 were applied.
Here, the software implementation uses an advanced Turbo coder as developed in [Ber2008]
(Master thesis by Berchtold under supervision of the thesis author).
Given by its technical settings, the actual gross length M2 of the Turbo-encoded message be-
comes
M2 = 3M1 + 4= 466 bit .
This demonstrates that the embedding capacity requirements are much higher in integrity wa-
termarking than it is the case for copyright watermarking applications.
5.1.4 Simulated Attacks
The modifications to the audio content (”attacks”) were simulated using 3rd party software
for common audio processing operations. For example, the software tools SoX59, Lame60 or
Nero AAC codec61 were utilized.
Admissible Data Modifications
A number of attacks on the audio were tested which are relevant because they are legitimate
and common in audio processing:
59 SoX – Sound eXchange toolbox, version 14.4.1, under LGPL, http://sox.sourceforge.net
60 Lame MP3 codec, version 3.97, under LGPL, http://lame.sourceforge.net
61 Nero AAC Codec, version 1.5.4.0 (encoder) 1.5.1.0 (decoder), under free license for ”personal non-
commercial...purposes”: http://www.nero.com/deu/company/about-nero/nero-aac-codec.php (retrieved Jan-
uary 2016, now offline)
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• MP3/AAC compression: obviously, lossy compression is widely applied in multimedia
production, processing, distribution/broadcast and archiving. In the experimental evalu-
ation, MP3 and AAC compression at different bit rates were applied as legitimate actions.
Before watermark detection the data was decoded back to uncompressed PCM/WAV for-
mat.
• Requantization: increasing the bit resolution is a common task in professional sound
engineering studios or in media archives. In the experiments, the 16 bit input data was
converted to 24 and 32 bit resolution and eventually back to 16 bit before watermark
detection.
• Resampling: changing the temporal resolution is a common task in audio post-
processing too. Also in the course of lossy compression such resampling might be carried
out by an MP3/AAC encoder internally and automatically. Moderate resampling down
to 32 kHz or up to 48 kHz was carried out, followed by resampling back to the original
sample rate of 44.1 kHz. Note that 32 kHz resampling includes a low-pass filtering near
16 kHz for anti-aliasing i.e. it is a somewhat lossy operation.
• Soft noise: For simulating thermal and quantization noise in the course of DA/AD con-
version, very soft white noise at -80 dB and at -70 dB average power level was added.
For example, adding -80 dB noise is in accordance with the recommendation of the IHC
Committee for simulating DA/AD conversion [IHC2016], see Section 2.3.4.
Simulated Tampering
For simulating manipulations of the audio content that tamper with the semantic content that
one can imagine from an adversary, the following attacks were applied on the test data:
• Deletion: A short segment of each test snippet was deleted. The deletion was carried out
at fixed positions, for example 4.0, 8.0 or 12.0 seconds from the file beginning. Different
durations were tested (from 1/8 s up to 8.0 s). This simulates erasing of audio content
from a recording.
• Replacement: A short segment of the test snippet was copied first and then used for
replacing audio content of equal duration (up to 8.0 s). It was inserted in-place (i.e. total
snippet duration is maintained) in the same file but at different position, for example 4.0,
8.0 or 12.0 seconds off. Different durations were tested. This simulates a typical so-called
copy-and-move attack. For example, in voice content this represents assembling a forged
spoken statement re-using voice content of the same speaker.
• Audio Mixing: As an alternative to the previous attack, audio content was re-used by
mixing it into the same file but at different position, for example 4.0 seconds off (up
to 8.0 s). For example, this simulates adding a speaker into a conversation or adding
voice-over while maintaining a consistent background noise or room environment.
• Strong Noise: A short segment of the snippet was mixed with significantly audible noise
(at -20 dB) of different duration (up to 8.0 s). This simulates that parts of the content
are ”deleted” by rendering them intangible. This can be used for masking the deletion by
pretending a technical problem during recording or transmission.
Note that these attacks are quite synthetic as they do not reflect syntactic or semantic context.
For example, word boundaries in a voice recording or the bar structure in a music song are not
respected. Nevertheless, this can be tolerated for the experimental evaluation: the simulated
attacks should be equally detectable in a particular frame no matter if the attacked frames fits
into its context in a seamless manner or not.
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5.2 Quality Metrics
Apart from standard error metrics like false positive and false negative rates, the following
criteria are used to assess the performance of the proposed approach.
Watermark Message CRC Checks
About the integrity and availability of the detected watermark message, the following cases are
distinguished
1. The message is retrieved completely and its CRC code can be verified correctly, denoted
as ”CRC correct” in the results below.
2. The message is retrieved completely and its CRC check fails due to bit errors in the de-
tected message that even the Turbo coding cannot cope with (denoted as ”CRC failed”).
3. It can occur that no (complete) watermark can be detected. A self-evident reason for this
case could be that the attacks on the audio are so intense or that the file was truncated that
only the sync watermark is detectable but not the complete watermark message (denoted
as ”Watermark lost”).
For further study of this evaluation, also the bit error rates of the retrieved messages could be
evaluated (because in the simulations the actual values of the watermark messages are known).
rMAC Bit Error Rate
In the general content-fragile watermarking model, a potential forgery will be indicated by
comparing the rMAC value of the original and assumed true value H0 of the audio (as provided
by the watermark message) with the current value of the rMAC H1 at the detector side. As error
metric the bit error rate BER β is used, i.e. the Hamming distance between H0 and H1 divided
by the bit length M .
Note that the occurrence of the observation that the BER is non-zero can be caused by different
effects:
1. In case of ”CRC correct”, the attacks on the audio content could introduce distortions which
cause bit errors to the rMAC so that H1 6= H0.
2. In case of ”CRC failed” the observable watermark message is not H0 but a slightly different
value H ′0. Then, it is very likely that it can be observed that H1 6= H ′0 and the BER will
become non-zero too. It has to be admitted that false negatives can occur if the altered
rMAC matches the defective message again by accident.
3. In case of ”lost watermarks” there is no pair of rMAC’s available for comparison in terms
of BER. Hence, the following convention is proposed:
Proposal: A missing rMAC due to a lost watermark will be treated by setting
the BER manually to the value ”0.50”.
Albeit arbitrary, this convention is nevertheless reasonable: Any intense integrity breach
shall cause an BER of approximately 0.5 anyway. Hence a BER value of β=0.5 shall
reasonably be treated as an ”alarm” anyway. In addition, this convention enables a unified
representation of all three cases in the test results below.
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rMAC Flag Ratio
About localizing the temporal position of an attack, the rMAC flag ratio α as defined in 3.2.3 is
used.
Objective Difference Grade (ODG)
Automated sound quality assessment in terms of ODG vaules as described in Section 2.4.2
was carried out used in the experiments. The results were obtained using the commercial
OPERA62 system. According to its users manual, the OPERA system internally implements a
cognitive psycho-acoustic model in terms of masking or cochlear domain representations for
assessing sound quality degradations. At first, the model parameters are estimated from the
input reference file and the input test file. Then it rates the files by their parameters’ difference
using a 3rd party artificial neural network toolbox63. The neural network was trained with
results obtained from elaborate listening tests with human test subjects. The sound quality loss
is finally expressed in terms of ODG values ranging from -4.0 (”very annoying” sound difference)
to 0.0 (”no audible difference”), see Table 2.5.
Note that the PEAQ metric reflects human perception much more accurate than the widely used
”signal-to-noise” (PSNR). The latter is a purely numerical comparison of
• the energy of the difference signal caused by the watermark(ing) (i.e. original PCM signal
minus post-processed signal, sample-by-sample), versus
• the energy of the original input signal.
It takes none of the psychophysical properties of human perception into account. Hence,
a ”good” PSNR value is not a sufficient condition for the watermark being imperceptible.
Also the well accepted ITU standard of ”perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ)” cannot
be used as it is only suitable in the limited scope of band-limited speech data (sample rate:
16 kHz at most) as in telephony64. Here, intelligibility (i.e. tangibility of the spoken words) is
considered instead of fidelity (i.e. acoustic similarity of the ”sound”).
62 OPERA audio quality analysis system by Opticom GmbH, Erlangen, Germany, http://www.opticom.de
63 OPERA uses artificial intelligence toolbox ”Skynet” by Cyberdyne Systems Corp., Sunnyvale, CA, USA. See the
work by Cameron et al. for more detail [CH1983].
64 ITU Recommendation P.862, http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-P.862
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5.3 Evaluation of Watermarking Embedding/Detection
At first, extensions to the embedding/detection scheme as presented in Section 3.3 were evalu-
ated.
5.3.1 Embedding Capacity
From the technical configuration settings given above it can be derived by simple arithmetic that
255 frames in total are needed for embedding the net watermark message and its synchroniza-
tion prefix. This represents a duration of approximately T=11.8 s (at sample rate 44.1 kHz).
Hence, the net embedding data rate is M1/T ≈ 12.9 bit/s. The correspondent gross embedding
rate is M2/T ≈ 39.0 bit/s. This includes that 1/3 of the audio segment has to remain unmarked
because of the alignment/multiplexing scheme.
For comparison: the core algorithm as in [Ste2003], which was used as technical starting point,
provides a net embedding rate of nearly 2 bit/s if tuned for comparably robust copyright or
transactional/forensic watermarking.
The increased embedding data rate mainly benefits from the proposed mapping of FFT indices
to watermark message bits in the time-frequency domain allows making use of the increased
frequency bandwidth in a flexible manner. It also allows to cover the available sub band more
densely (up to 99% of available indices) than in the original algorithm without causing trans-
parency issues.
5.3.2 Watermarking Robustness
Robustness to admissible attacks
With the given settings, the watermark is very robust to the admissible data modifications ex-
plained before: approximately 98.5% of the watermarks can be detected correctly for the ”re-
quantization, re-sampling”, and ”soft noise” attack. Only one message out of 540 (i.e. 0.18%)
cannot be retrieved at all and is regarded as ”lost” for the verification. For only very few water-
marks (2%) the respective CRC verification failed unfortunately (see Figure 5.1, upper plot).
117
Figure 5.1.: Test result: watermark CRC results – robustness to different kinds of admissible post-
processing operations.
For the ”MP3” and ”AAC attack” at hi-quality encoding settings (minimum 192 kbit/s, stereo)
most of the watermark message can still be detected and retrieved correctly again (see Fig-
ure 5.1, lower plots). In the Section 5.3.5 below it will be shown that the watermark is robust
to MP3 encoding even at much lower bitrate and sound quality, resp., However, the rate of failed
CRC verifications increases to 3 to 7% dependent on the MP3/AAC bit rate (most CRC failures
obtained for MP3 attacks at 192 kbit/s)
Robustness to malicious attacks
The watermark is also capable to some extent for withstanding many of the malicious attacks
defined above. The attacks ”audio mixing”, ”noise mixing”, and ”replacement” up to one or two
seconds do not drastically reduce the detection success (see Figure 5.2, upper plot and lower
right plot). Only for longer duration an increasing portion of watermarked FFT coefficients, and
hence message bits is affected (which even the Turbo error coding cannot cope with). Finally, no
reliable detection can be expected for an attack duration of 8.0 seconds. This can be expected
because the majority of the watermarked audio frames of the 12-second watermark is affected.
It has to be admitted that no successful detection can be observed for the ”deletion” attack. This
can be explained as follows: for this attack, not only the audio data of the deleted section is
affected. In fact the whole remaining part of the audio file from the spot of deletion until the
end of the file is shifted to earlier time indices. For example when one second of audio data is
removed at position 0:04 min. from a file of 30.0 s total duration, the remaining 25 seconds will
show an offset of -1.0 s relative to their previous position. The detection will mostly fail then
118
Figure 5.2.: Test result: watermark CRC results – robustness to malicious attacks applied at
pos=4.0 s ; from upper left to lower right: ”mix noise”, ”mix audio”, ”deletion”,
”replacement” attack
(see Figure 5.2, lower left plot) because too many FFT coefficients will be out of their expected
temporal position. The same would be observed if audio data was inserted (which is omitted in
this simulations).
In another test run the malicious attack were not carried out 4.0s from the file start but right
at the file start instead (pos=0.0 s). This is relevant in view of the fact that the beginning of
the watermarked audio snippet carries the ”sync” watermark sequence. It consists of four sync
message bits and its duration is approximately 2.5 seconds. Here, the number of lost water-
marks increases as can be expected (see Figure 5.3). For example, the ”deletion” attack prevents
almost any detection of the watermark. For the other attacks, the percentage of lost watermarks
increases significantly from an attack duration of 0.50 s which is roughly the duration of each
sync bit.
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Figure 5.3.: Test result: watermark robustness to malicious attacks applied at pos=0.0 s ; from
upper left to lower right: ”mix noise”, ”mix audio”, ”deletion”, ”replacement” attack
As expected the audio watermark is much more vulnerable in the sync sequence than for attacks
applied at other file positions. This behavior is not optimal because missed detections do not
allow a precise assessment of the severity of the integrity breach in terms of BER (which will
be set manually to 0.5 anyway). Nevertheless, the result allows indicating the presence of an
integrity issue that should be investigated after all.
5.3.3 Synchronization Precision
What could also be observed is the very high precision of the temporal synchronization posi-
tion. In un-attacked files the starting sample position of the protected audio segment (namely
pos=0.0 s) was identified correctly except for three outliers. These outliers were observed from
the set of the critical snippets mentioned above in which watermarks were lost or CRC checks
failed. The same result could be observed for the admissible and malicious attacks. Synchro-
nizing precisely is vital for avoiding false discoveries due to a temporal misalignment of the
authentic rMAC with its current value.
Finally, recall that the results in this Section only describe the properties of the watermark
embedding. In principle, results could be applied for using the embedding algorithm beyond
integrity watermarking. The rMAC/watermark combination is investigated in Section 5.4.
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5.3.4 Transparency of Watermark Embedding
The results presented in this Section present an evaluation on the transparency of the proposed
audio watermarking approach.
The technical settings for embedding (and detection) were the same as for the robustness test
above. Then the sound quality degradation caused by the watermarking process was evaluated
using the OPERA sound quality assessment system. The test was carried out on a subset in the
test set that contained music files only. A number of 180 snippets (taken from thirty different
music files) were evaluated. Total duration represents 60:00 min. of duration.
The test had to be limited to music files for the following reason: assessment in terms of the
PEAQ sound quality model (see Section 2.4.2) only applies in a meaningful manner if the refer-
ence audio content is available in sufficiently hi-fi quality in the first place. In other words: an
assessment of sound quality on highly distorted, band limited or noisy content is not covered in
the PEAQ model. The model neither applies for assessment of the intelligibility of voice data.
Closer analysis showed that the OPERA system actually created very misleading and inplausible
results for low quality content like noisy microphone recordings.
The main results obtained using the OPERA sound quality assessment system show that a very
good sound quality could be achieved for most of the files: Apart from a few outliers, the sound
quality of the watermarked audio snippets was assessed as being ”better” than an ODG value
of −0.5 (see boxplot in Figure 5.4, left). This is in the transition of difference grades −1.0
(”audible difference, not annoying”) and 0.0 (”no audible difference”) which is close to the bound
of being perceivable at all. The respective median is 0.15 which is an acceptable result.
However, outliers in the results can be observed in which the ODG is ”worse” than −1.0 (see
Figure 5.4, right).
Figure 5.4.: Test results: watermark transparency; left: ODG boxplot65across all (music!) files;
right: ODG versus audio snippet index; dashed lines: each group of six snippets
correspond to the same test audio file
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Closer analysis shows that these outliers are observed in audio snippets from two particular
music files:
• One example is a music snippet (labeled as ”M10” in the list of test data, see Appendix B)
that has contained a lot of distortions already in the cover data. The distortions consist
of drop-outs, periodically repeating noise, and occasional click artifacts caused by earlier
faulty CD ripping. This seems to irritate the OPERA system.
• The other example is a music track (”M27”) which contains only very low frequency organ
sounds: no significant input energy can be observed in the mid and high frequencies.
Especially the second example causing outliers indicates that not all audio content is suitable
for watermark embedding with regards to transparency. The absence of sound energy in mid
and high frequencies does not allow for hiding the watermark by means of auditory masking
with reasonable availability, robustness, and transparency.
Surprisingly, a few watermarked audio snippets are assessed with an ODG value greater than
zero. According to the technical manual of the OPERA system such error of measurement has
to be expected and accepted. When its artificial neural network was trained by human test
subjects, inaccurate and, in effect, wrong assignments occurred. Put in simple words: positive
ODG values reflect that also human listeners would rate the watermarked audio a little ”better”
than the cover data by mistake.
Finally, for completeness note that the ODG results obtained were carried out in an early stage
of the experiments in which the watermarked frequency band had been set to 0.5-15 kHz. The
robustness results presented before were obtained with recommended settings of 0.5-12 kHz.
Hence, transparency results can be expected to even a little better as presented in this Section
because with the recommended smaller upper bound of 12 kHz, a greater portion of the full
spectrum remains untouched.
5.3.5 Psychoacoustic-enhanced Detection
The results presented in this Section refer to the proposal as presented in Section 3.3.2.
As a minor research activity, also the watermark detection was improved by utilizing psycho-
acoustic modeling not only in the embedder but in the detector algorithm too. In addition to
the MP3 encoding attacks at high quality so far, also encoding at stronger compression settings
was carried out at 80, 64 and 48 kbit/s, stereo. Especially the ”dynamic” approach as explained
in Section 3.3.2 was evaluated (denoted as ”Psy Detect: Mode 3”).
The comparison with results obtained without psychoacoustic functionality (denoted as ”Psy De-
tect: off”) shows that the detection significantly benefits from the proposed approach. This is
mainly true for medium-quality MP3 settings at 64 and 48 kbit/s. For these bitrates, the detec-
tion success of correct CRC increases from 30% to 80% (for 80 kbit/s) and from 10% to 60% (for
64 kbit/s), resp. The enhanced approach even allows for a non-zero detection success for MP3
65 Boxplots (introduced by Tukey [Tuk1977], a.k.a. ”box-and-whisker plots”): the lower and the upper 25 % quan-
tile of the data samples (denoted as quartiles q1 and q3, resp.) are visualized as the lower and the upper edge
of a (thin) rectangular ”box” in the samples’ domain. Their median value is indicated by a (bold) horizontal
center line. Outliers are marked with ”+”-markers. Such outliers are defined (as a convention) as any samples
greater than q3+ 1.5 ·∆q or smaller than q1− 1.5 ·∆q, resp., in which ∆q := (q3− q1) is the inter-quartile
width. The range of all presumed regular data samples (i.e. except for outliers) are visualized as whisker
markers.
All boxplots in this thesis created with the nan-Toolbox for the Scilab programming language
by T. Pettersen/H. Nahrstaedt, TU Berlin, Germany, https://atoms.scilab.org/toolboxes/nan
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attacks as strong as 48 kbit/s (which is not the case with disabled psycho-acoustic detector).
See Figure 5.5 for a visualization of these results.
The increased detection success of complete messages (no matter if ”CRC correct” or ”CRC
failed”) is a useful feature in authentication watermarking. It allows a better analysis of the
impact of audio distortions on the overall detection result: a completely retrieved watermark
message allows for the analysis steps described in this work. By contrast, a ”lost watermark”
only allows for treating it according to the ”fallback” convention by setting the BER to 0.50 as
defined above. True BER assessment or temporal localization of tampering as defined above
can not carried out in this case.
Figure 5.5.: Test results: watermark robustness: detection success after strong MP3 com-
pression at lower bitrates; left plot: psychoacoustics-based detection enabled;
right: ...disabled
In addition, other watermarking applications like copyright or transaction watermarking can
benefit even more from this robustness improvement: Complete and correct retrieval of the
message is vital in order to trace back copyright infringements or information leakage even
when the content undergoes very strong attacks. A fallback convention to a failed CRC or a lost
watermark does not exist and hence the trace to the dishonest user is eventually ”lost” too.
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5.4 Evaluation of rMAC -based Audio Authentication Watermark
This Section investigates the robustness and distinction performance of the rMAC extraction
and its integration into Patchwork audio watermarking. This represents the main contribution
of this thesis work.
5.4.1 Background level
The results presented in this Section refer to the proposal as presented in Section 3.4.1 in which
the alignment of rMAC extraction and watermark embedding is described.
At first it was investigated which detection results can be observed if the protected audio is not
a subject to any kind of attack. The authentication watermark is verified immediately after the
embedding stage in order to conduct a sort of ”sanity check”.
As a result, for most of the test files the rMAC shows no bit errors (see Figure 5.6). Nevertheless,
for a share of approx. 3.5% of the snippets (19 out of 540) the respective BER is non-zero,
namely 0.50 instead. The occasional occurrence of such false discoveries as ”background noise”
can be explained again by the fact that some audio snippets are rather unsuitable for embedding
a watermark in a reliable manner. From these snippets, the watermark message cannot be
retrieved correctly in terns of their CRC (or no watermarking message can be retrieved at all).
All critical files show (at least partially) a very low total sound volume or are extremely band-
limited in the spectrum.
Figure 5.6.: rMAC bit Error Rate (BER) – No attack upper plot: histogram of observed bit error
rates. lower plot: enlarged view (zoomed to small histogram entries)
One example is the same critical test file ”M27” that had to be discussed in Section 5.3.4 already:
this file shows CRC failures on the retrieved watermarks in all of its six snippets and hence bit
errors in the rMAC verification. Its lack of signal energy in mid and high frequencies does not
allow for reliable watermark detection.
65 Note: an equivalent visualization result is given as boxplot in the most left column in Figure 5.7
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Nevertheless, the test results demonstrate that earlier test results as published in [ZS2009b]
could be improved significantly. False discoveries caused by an interference of the watermarking
process and the rMAC extraction are avoided. For supporting this result a test run could be
carried out (for further study) that compares the false discoveries with the alignment switched
on versus off using the thesis test set.
Anyway, the remaining false alarms that are still observable are not caused by such interference
in the first place but rather by natural limitations of digital watermarking by itself in the case of
critical audio material.
5.4.2 Robustness to Admissible Modifications in Audio
BER for Different Technical Attack Settings
In the next stage of experiments the robustness of the approach to admissible attacks was inves-
tigated. Here, the results with regards to BER of the rMAC for the requantization or resampling
attacks are found as being similar to the background level without attacks. Apart from the
(same) outliers, the BER range remains below 0.02 (see Figure 5.7). The BER range for the
noise attack are significantly higher: the BER range reaches up to 0.08. Except for the MP3 at-
tack at 192 kbit/s for lossy MP3/AAC attacks the BER remains smaller than 0.08, too (see
Figure 5.7). Although the large majority of results turn out to be as expected, a number of
outliers/false discoveries propagated from the background BER level can be observed though.
Figure 5.7.: rMAC BER – admissible attacks: boxplots of bit error rate; numbers in braces66: total
count of BER results being exactly 0.5000
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BER versus Quality Loss
For a better interpretation of these results, also the perceived quality loss caused by the attacks
was considered. For this, the BER is compared against the attacks’ quality loss in terms of
ODG values. This allows better comparison across the different kinds of attacks and across the
different audio examples.
For example, it is not obvious to the reader which of the lossy attacks ”resampling to 32 kHz”
versus ”MP3 encoding at 192 kbit/s” has a stronger impact on the sound quality. But this test
setup is also reasonable because the same attack can have different influence on the sound
quality dependent on the given fidelity of the input audio or its total volume. For example,
adding a very soft noise at -70 dB average SPL to very silent audio content shall have a stronger
influence on the rMAC than for loud audio content.
The results for the different attacks are found to be as follows67:
• Firstly, for all ”admissible attacks” as defined above, the quality loss in terms of the ODG
is ”better” than -1.0 (except for one single outlier, see below). This means that the range
of attacks was designed in a reasonable manner, see upper plots in Figure 5.8.
• The ”soft noise” attack remains nearly inaudible for most of the test files. Only for ap-
proximately 5% (27 out of 540) of test snippets, the quality loss is worse than ODG=-0.2.
Here, the rMAC-watermarking approach behaves as desired: the more the quality loss of
the attack (i.e. the smaller its ODG value), the greater is the BER. The correspondent BER
remains smaller than 0.10, see Figure 5.8, upper left plot.
• The requantization to 24/32 bit (and then back to 16 bit) is in fact a lossless operation
except for numerical inaccuracies. This is correctly indicated by the OPERA system as it
does not reduce the perceived sound quality, see Figure 5.8, upper left plot: the ODG
values remain near 0.0 (or are even positive by mistake). However, the BER can reach up
to 0.10 for nearly 20 outliers. Most likely this is caused by numerical inaccuracies in the
audio processing tool which was used for requantization. This can influence rMAC bits
more likely that are ”weak” (as defined in Section 2.2.3) occasionally.
• The same is true for the lossy compression to MP3 and AAC as can be verified in Figure 5.8,
upper right. To elaborate further on this, also stronger MP3 compression attacks were
conducted. It can be seen clearly that the BER steadily increases with increasing quality
loss, see Figure 5.8, lower plot. For example, for attacks at ODG=-1.5 or worse (which
is at the transition from being ”not annoying” to ”slightly annoying”), all BER results are
0.10 or greater, as desired.
• For the resampling attack most attacks have an ODG at approximately 0.0, see Figure 5.8,
left. However, a few outliers suffer from a notable quality loss showing ODG values that
can be as ”poor” as -2.0. Closer analysis shows that these outliers were caused for re-
sampling at 32 kHz (mostly in test files labeled as ”M05” and ”M18”, see Appendix B).
Note that 32 kHz resampling in principle is a slightly lossy operation due to the low-pass
filtering near 16 kHz for anti-aliasing (as explained in Section A.1.2.1. However, the rMAC
watermarking is invariant to these effects resampling as the BER remains at a value of 0.0
which is a little inconsistent.
67 For technical reasons slightly different technical configuration settings were used in this experiment. This
”BER versus ODG” results are not fully compatible with the previous Section but nevertheless demonstrate the
sensitivity characteristics of the combined rMAC-watermarking approach.
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Figure 5.8.: rMAC bit error rate versus objective difference grade (ODG ):
upper Figures: graduated sensitivity for different admissible attacks; note: one single
outlier for 32 kHz resampling attack at (-2.0;0.0) not displayed;
lower Figure: graduated sensitivity for MP3 encoding
To summarize, data modifications that cause minor or even no change of the perceived audio
quality are causing only few bit errors in the RMAC up to BER=0.10 – if at all. A formal
inconsistency for 32 kHz resampling is caused by the fact that the upper frequency bound of
the rMAC extraction and the watermark embedding was intentionally set at small as 6 kHz and
12 kHz, resp.
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5.4.3 Sensitivity to Malicious Data Modification
In the next stage of experiments, the test data was subject to the malicious attacks as defined
above. The attacks were applied 4.0 seconds from the beginning of the audio snippets in in-
creasing duration (1/8 s to 8.0 s).
Figure 5.9.: rMAC BER – malicious attacks
The test results are found as follows:
• For the ”mix noise” attacks the rMAC shows a graduated sensitivity to the attacks (see
Figures 5.9, left): as desired the BER increases if the attack duration increases from 1/8
to 8.0 seconds. Apart from outliers (as defined in Tukey boxplots) the BER range increases
from [0.00;0.09] to [0.21;0.60]. Up to an attack duration of 1 second the lower bound
remains ”attached” to zero. Nevertheless, from an attack duration of 4 seconds, the BER
distribution clearly separates from the results obtained from admissible attacks.
• The BER results for the ”mix audio” attack (see Figures 5.9, right) are approximately
1/3 smaller than for the previous ”mix noise” attack. This is understandable because the
volume of the audio sections that are mixed into the audio can vary and can even be
zero. By contrast, the all mixed noise sections have constant equal (loud) volume at
average -20 Decibel.
• The results of the replacement are fairly similar as for the ”mix noise attack” (see Fig-
ure 5.9, right). The lower bound of the distribution ”detaches” from zero for an attack
duration of only 1 second.
• In all cases, a number of outliers can be observed for which the bit error rate (mostly)
is significantly higher than the ranges given before. Closer analysis showed that this is
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mainly caused by inaccurate retrieval of the watermark message (”CRC failed”, ”Water-
mark lost”)
• For the deletion attack the sensitivity to behave very differently. For all values of the du-
ration, the BER range is approximately 0.3 to 0.6 which strongly indicates the tampering.
The seemingly high sensitivity in this case can easily be explained in analogy to the detec-
tion results in Section 5.3.1: deletion of even only one second of audio causes a temporal
offset in the remaining audio content following the spot of deletion. This affects all audio
frames after the spot of tampering and hence the extracted rMAC bits. In addition. The
same result could be expected for a different attack by inserting audio content (which was
omitted in the simulations for simplicity).
• Closer analysis shows that results are more or less similar, no matter if the correspondent
rMAC are extracted in series or if they are randomly scattered in time
To summarize, for three out of the four attacks the presented approach does not show a suffi-
cient sensitivity to for an attack duration shorter than two seconds. This can be explained by
the fact that such short attacks affect too few Fourier coefficients and hence too few rMAC bits.
5.4.4 Optimization of BER Decision Thresholds
Results from the previous Section showed that reasonable decision thresholds are difficult to
define. This can be seen by looking at the correspondent histograms. For this, all BER results
from the different admissible attacks are concatenated first. The same is carried out for all
results malicious attacks. It can be seen that both distributions do not separate very well at
small BER values, see Figure 5.10 (upper plot).
As consequence, the objective of identifying malicious attacks of very short duration has to be
relaxed if only the BER is used as decision criterion:
Convention: For the remainder of this Section the attacks are regarded as malicious
only if they are applied for a duration of at least 2.0 seconds.
Under this concession, the correspondent BER distributions separate fairly well again, see Fig-
ures 5.10 (lower plot). In either case, a notable peak at BER=0.50 can be seen in the plots of the
malicious attacks. They are caused mostly by the particularly different outcome of the deletion
attack and some contributions by the hard-coded results from ”lost watermarks” as well.
An even more meaningful analysis can be obtained from the receiver operating characteris-
tic (ROC) curve68 Under the relaxed objective of identifying malicious of at least 2 seconds,
the ROC curve across all possible BER decision thresholds is well concentrated in the left and
upper area. The area under the curve69 is AUC=0.984 which is a good result (see Figure 5.11,
right) for a classifier. The best discrimination in terms of minimized sum of false positives and
68 ”Receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve)”: The ROC curve is a common plotting style for visualizing
the performance of a binary classifier. Defined as x y-plot in the unit square of the true positive rate (TPR)
versus false positive rate (FPR) in dependency on the samples’ decision threshold. In the terminology of de-
scriptive statistics: equivalent to plotting the sensitivity versus (1-specificity). For good classifiers, the ROC
curve should be concentrated in the far left and far upper section, resp.
69 ”Area under curve (AUC)”: The AUC is a relevant parameter of the ROC curve because it is equivalent to the
probability that the rMAC classifier will rank a randomly chosen malicious attack as an ”alarm” instead of a
randomly chosen measurement from an admissible attack or the background level, see [Faw2006]. For good
classifiers, the (AUC) should be close to 1.0.
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negatives is achieved if the BER threshold is set to thrmax = 0.078 (see Figure 5.11, left). This
means a Hamming distance of Hmax := 128 · 0.078 = 10 bit or more. In this case error rates
of approximately 4% false positive and negative at the same time have to be expected (values
obtained from Figure 5.11, right). If a true positive rate of 100% (i.e. false negative rate of 0%)
is desired, a Hamming distance of only 4 bit can be tolerated. Closer analysis shows that the
majority of false positives are caused by missed/failed detections with an incorrect CRC (BER is
set arbitrarily to 0.5 in this case).
Figure 5.10.: rMAC histograms: admissible vs. malicious attacks; upper right: all malicious at-
tacks (duration: 0.125-8 s), lower right: only malicious attacks of duration 2-8 s;
black dots: non-zero entries, dashed line: threshold for minimum error rates
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Figure 5.11.: left: ROC curve70, ×-marker: result for minimum sum error rates (maximum ac-
curacy), legend: note that the given accuracy values assume equal prevalence of
admissible and malicious attacks; right: error rates of admissible vs. malicious at-
tacks, dotted line: threshold for minimum error rates
5.4.5 rMAC Feature Standardization
The results presented here are referring to the proposal for feature standardization in Sec-
tion 3.2.2.
For the analysis of the randomness property of the audio hash it was analyzed how the individ-
ual rMAC bits are distributed. It is found that the relative frequency that a particular rMAC bit
has value ”1” is approximately 0.5 for all bits, as desired. The correspondent mean is 0.492, see
Figure 5.12.
For comparison, a second test run was carried out in which the standardization was disabled
intentionally. As expected, the rMAC bits are much more unequally distributed, see Figure 5.12.
This means that without the feature standardization many of the rMAC bits would be vulnerable
to targeted attacks. This can be seen from the following example: in this second test run the first
rMAC bit seems to have the value ”0” with a relative frequency of 0.90 (see most left bar in 5.12).
Recall that this value was obtained across all different audio snippets. The relative frequency
can serve as a reasonable estimator of the probability for any future rMAC computation from
arbitrary audio data – even audio that was tampered with. Hence, even after a malicious
data modification this rMAC bit will be ”0” with (same) high probability of 0.9. The attack
will finally be missed in most cases. This shows that the standardization is vital for obtaining
randomly distributed rMACs and for maximizing its sensitivity.
70 All ROC curve plots created with the nan-Toolbox for the Scilab programming language
by T. Pettersen/H. Nahrstaedt, TU Berlin, Germany, https://atoms.scilab.org/toolboxes/nan
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Figure 5.12.: Distribution of rMAC bit values (feature standardization enabled )
Figure 5.13.: Distribution of rMAC bit values (feature standardization disabled)
5.4.6 Distinction Performance
In another analysis it was compared how the system can distinguish audio data which are
completely distinct from one another instead of partially tampered. In this case it is required
that the hash values are different and are completely independent. For this, all 540 rMAC
values calculated at embedding time were mutually compared with one another in terms of
their Hamming distance, or BER, resp. Total number of comparisons is
 540
2

= 145,530.
As expected, the BER distribution is concentrated around the center: The average BER is 0.500
(see Figure 5.14). This result shows that rMAC bits in this case are identical only by accident
which is a necessary requirement for mutual independence.
Note that this very positive result was enabled not before the feature standardization step (as
evaluated in Section 5.4.5) was developed. Without it the BER distribution of actually distinct
content would not be centered around 0.50 but at a smaller value. An explicit evaluation of this
was not conducted for simplicity. The interested reader is referred to the explanation in Sec-
tion 3.2.2: Especially Figure 3.5 visualizes earlier preliminary results in which the average BER
drops to approximately 0.30 if standardization was disabled.
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Figure 5.14.: Test result: rMAC BER comparison for mutually distinct audio content
5.4.7 Temporal Localization of Tampering
This Section provides results about the capabilities of the approach with regards to localizing a
potential integrity breach.
Note that the temporal localization of audio data modification is implemented in two ways:
1. The pseudo-random assignment of rMAC bits to time indices can be evaluated so that the
position of the modification can be identified as described in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 The
theoretical lower bound of temporal resolution is by time index, i.e. by frame, which means
a split second.
2. The embedded time code as proposed in Section 3.4.2 allows indicating is a complete
watermark message was lost. Hence, the temporal resolution is given by the duration of
each watermark message, which means approximately 12 seconds in these experiments.
The experimental evaluation of both cases is given in the following.
5.4.7.1 Localization Approach in ”Scattered Mode”
This evaluation corresponds to the proposal in Section 3.2.3.
As a first result, the rMAC flag ratio for the admissible attacks is mostly zero, except for a few
outliers in every time step, see middle plot in Figure 5.15. This is in line with the results in
Section 5.4.2.
Then, an analysis is carried out for the ”mix audio” attack. This attack is considered for demon-
strating the performance because test results so far showed that the algorithm is least sensitive
to this attack. Hence results in this Section can be seen as the ”worst case” in terms of sensitivity.
For this attack, at the shortest duration (1/8 s) the difference between rMAC flag ratios in
the actually attacked versus un-attacked audio segments can be seen well, see middle plot
in Figure 5.15. In the correspondent ROC curve, the AUC is 0.780 which is still a fair result. If
the decision threshold is set to 0.01 (i.e. just above 0.00) a true positive rate of 0.70 and, at the
same time, a true negative rate of 1-0.17=0.83 can be achieved.
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Figure 5.15.: Test result: rMAC flag ratio versus time: one boxplot per protected time index;
bold center line: respective median value; dashed vertical lines: separator between
attacked and un-attacked portions (start: time index 86 = 4.0 seconds)
134
Figure 5.16.: Test result: rMAC flag ratio ROC curves; attack duration 0.125 s and 2.0 s (”scat-
tered mode”)
In contrast, for a longer attack duration of 2 seconds, the results are quite poor indeed. A lot
of false positives are flagged outside the attacked section attacks by mistake, see Figure 5.15,
lower plot. The correspondent AUC is only 0.615 and the ROC curve rather approaches the
diagonal of the unit square. The reason is that the rather long attack duration affects a notable
percentage of rMAC bits. Hence many time indices are flagged as potential candidates. Because
of the pseudo-random scattering, this can accumulate at time indices other than the actually
attacked ones by accident.
Attack duration ”mix noise” ”deletion” ”replacement” ”mix audio”
1/8 s 0.89 0.49 0.88 0.78
1/4 s 0.85 0.49 0.84 0.74
1/2 s 0.77 0.50 0.77 0.68
1 s 0.71 0.50 0.74 0.66
2 s 0.61 0.50 0.66 0.61
4 s 0.55 0.51 0.59 0.57
8 s 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.54
Table 5.2.: Test result: AUC measure; all attacks, all durations (”scattered mode”)
Closer analysis shows that the AUC measure for the ”mix noise” and ”replacement” attack behaves
more or less equally to the ”mix audio” attack, see Table 5.2. Again, results from the ”deletion”
attack are different. The very low AUC results for any attack duration near 0.5 mean that the
classification is carried out correctly only by coincidence.
The exhaustive collection of time plots and ROC curves across all attacks and all attacking
durations (up to 8 s) can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 5.17.: Test result: rMAC flags for noise mixing attack at 1/8 and 2.0 seconds (”serial
mode”)
5.4.7.2 Localization Approach in ”Serial Mode”
The results presented here refer to the proposal of modified rMAC extraction in Section 3.2.4.
For the plausibility of the ”serial mode” scheme it is at first analyzed which rMAC bits are flagging
the data modification. The ”noise adding” attack is carried out at different length. Output of
this experiment every detection is an array (of length 128) of ”rMAC flags” that indicates which
rMAC bit index is detected as being attacked. From the analysis of these flag array across all
540 test files, it can be seen that the flagging is according to the definition of the ”serial mode”.
For example, for the short audio attack of 1/8 s duration (only) two consecutive rMAC flags are
affected namely at bit index 44 and 45 (see Figure 5.17, left). These indices correspond well to
the correct temporal location of the attack at 44/128 · 11.8 s≈ 4.13 s. With increasing attack
duration, the number of consecutive rMAC flags increases accordingly.
Again for a few percent of files also outside the attacked section attacks are flagged by mistake.
Also in the ”serial mode” the individual standardized spectral coefficients depend on all other
spectral coefficients to a certain extent. With increasing duration of the attack, this effect can
build up. Closer analysis shows that for the attack duration of 8 seconds (i.e. two third of the
total duration), distinction performance is no better than coin flipping. Presumably, the effect
on the averages and standard deviations mk0 and sk0 is so intense that all rMAC bits are affected
with a notable probability. It should be noted that the duration of 8.0 s represents two third of
the total duration of the watermark.
Note that the ideal value for the relative frequency for rMAC flags being ”one” to indicate an
integrity breach is 0.5, not 1.0: even under an actual attack, the attacked rMAC bit can be
identical to its original/authentic value with probability 0.5 by chance. However, in the tests the
maximum relative frequency for the attacked rMAC bits was observed to be rather 0.4 than 0.5.
Now, as in the previous Section the rMAC flag ratios are analyzed ”translating” the rMAC bit
indices to time indices. As an example, the ”mix audio” is considered again. It can clearly
be seen that the attacked and un-attacked areas clearly separate: In the attacked areas, the
range of the rMAC flag ratio is varying between zero and 0.5, see Figure 5.19. In the remaining
sections the ratio is mostly zero, except for some outliers as ”background level”.
However, it must be noted that in a notable number of cases no successful detection is triggered.
As already said even under ideal conditions the rMAC bits indicate a malicious attack only with
50% probability. Hence, also the rMAC flag ratios as a derived quantity suffer from a notable
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false negative rate. This becomes more clear from looking at the ROC curves again. For the
attack durations of 1/2 and 2 seconds, a true positive rate of approximately 0.5 can be achieved
while the false positives remains smaller than 0.05, see Figure 5.19. It is very apparent that
the characteristic for both attack durations are very similar. Also the AUC measure is relatively
constant (approximately 0.75) across different attack lengths. Actually, closer analysis shows
that this behavior can also be observed across all attack durations up to 4 seconds and also
for the ”mix noise” and ”replacement” attack. Hence, the modified ”serial mode” assignment
provides an almost ideal classification performance over a large range of attack durations.
Only exception is again the ”deletion” attack, as it was observed for the ”scattered mode” scheme
already. Note that this is not a critical issue: although a temporal localization can not be carried
out with the presented algorithm, the large overall bit error rate is a significant indicator for
this attack, at least.
An exhaustive analysis of the AUC measure across all attacks is given in Table 5.3. The interested
reader can study the correspondent boxplots and ROC curves in Appendix C.
Figure 5.18.: Test result: rMAC flag ratio versus time: one boxplot per protected time index;
bold center line: respective median value; dashed vertical lines: separator between
attacked and un-attacked portions (start: time index 86 = 4.0 seconds)
Attack duration ”mix noise” ”deletion” ”replacement” ”mix audio”
1/8 s 0.79 0.51 0.83 0.72
1/4 s 0.80 0.52 0.86 0.77
1/2 s 0.81 0.51 0.87 0.78
1 s 0.80 0.52 0.86 0.77
2 s 0.78 0.52 0.85 0.76
4 s 0.75 0.52 0.82 0.75
8 s 0.59 0.52 0.56 0.70
Table 5.3.: Test result: AUC measure/ROC curve; all attacks, all durations (”serial mode”)
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Figure 5.19.: Test result: rMAC flag ratio ROC curves; attack duration 0.125 s and 2.0 s
5.4.7.3 Time-code Verification
This Section refers to the proposal in Section 3.4.2.
This rather trivial aspect of the protection scheme was not evaluated for this Chapter again.
Test results and execution examples were published the results as published in [ZS2009b]. In
that work the test files were prepared so that they contain a number of protected audio sections
in series. Each had a duration of 3.0 seconds including the respective block index as watermark
message. Then, a section of 9 second duration was deleted from the second half of the test
file(s). Finally, the series of differences between the detected value of the block index and
the respective expected value (denoted as ”block offset”) are evaluated. It was shown that the
deletion is indicated correctly by a block offset of -3 from the spot of deletion, as expected (see
Figure 5.20). This means that the embedded block index is suited for indicating data deletions
that have a duration longer than the duration of the individual watermarks.
Figure 5.20.: Example: detecting a replacement attack. Figure taken from [ZS2009b]
138
Note that the (known) information about the duration of the watermark (ergo the protected
audio segments) implicitly provides a very important information related to the integrity across
protected segments: for authentic content, the temporal offset between consecutive protected
segments must be constant. In the experiments described in this section, a watermarked seg-
ment indicated by its sync sequence) can be expected every 12 seconds. Breaches of integrity
for example by insertion of content in some cases can only be detected on the basis of this tim-
ing information. This is especially relevant if a malicious insertion attack is carried out exactly
between two protected segments. For simplicity, this aspect is not further investigated in this
work either.
5.4.8 rMAC Key-based Verification of Authenticity
In the last Section of this Chapter the key-dependency of the feature selection as described in
Section 3.2.1 is investigated. It is demonstrated how the correct verification result depends on
the knowledge of the correct rMAC key.
In the preparation for this experiment, all audio snippets were protected with the rMAC-
watermarking approach like in all experiments described above. For simplicity neither ad-
missible nor malicious attacks were applied afterwards. On the detector side the detection
of the watermark message was carried out using the correct watermark key as usual. The
subsequent verification of the rMAC is carried out using both the correct rMAC key and eight
randomly chosen wrong rMAC keys.
Figure 5.21.: Test result: BER for correct and wrong authentication key, dashed lines: BER thresh-
old correspondent to maximum decision accuracy
As a first result, almost all 540 watermark messages were retrieved correctly. A small num-
ber of CRC failures (20 in total) and one single lost watermark had again to be accepted as
”background level” though. The subsequent rMAC verification process behaves as expected:
• For the verification using the correct authentication key the BER distribution is accumu-
lating at the value 0.00 (Figure 5.21, left).
• For the verification using the wrong key(s) the BER distribution is accumulating at ap-
proximately 0.50 (Figure 5.21, right). Only very few false alarm or false acceptance can
be observed occasionally.
As a consequence the binary classification shows a very low error rates in terms of false negatives
and positives. The optimum can be achieved for the decision threshold of thrmax = 0.250. The
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correspondent ROC curve is almost perfectly concentrated in the far left and upper area. The
AUC area is 0.993 (see Figure 5.22, right).
Figure 5.22.: Test result: ROC curve for correct versus wrong authentication key
The almost ideal result can be explained by the characteristic of the feature extraction: the
rMAC keys are being used as a seed for a random number generator. This means for even
the slightest difference in the keys it can be expected that the pseudo-random patterns for the
rMAC extraction are independent. Thus rMAC bits are pairwise identical only by accident i.e.
with 50% probability. As a consequence the correspondent BER distribution is centered around
BER=0.50, as desired. As a consequence only authorized users are able to create the rMAC
code and verify it at a later date.
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5.5 Discussion of Test Results
At first, the rMAC approach shall be compared to the original audio fingerprinting work and
the original audio watermarking core algorithm by Haitsma, Kalker [HOK2001a, HOK2001b]
and Steinebach [Ste2003, SZ2006a] which were used as a technical starting point. Then in
the remainder of this Section the test results in light of the Related Work in authentication
watermarking are discussed.
5.5.1 Summary of Test Results
About the watermark embedding, significant improvements could be achieved: using the flexi-
ble, ”scattered” embedding pattern in the time-frequency domain, a sufficient capacity improve-
ment could be achieved. At the same time, robustness and transparency could be even improved
further by the proposed optimization or integration of enhanced psychoacoustic models in the
embedding and detection stage.
About the combined rMAC-watermarking approach, it can be said that it shows an acceptable
robustness to admissible transformations. It is significantly more sensitive to MP3 compression
than the original work by Haitsma et al. At the compression rate of 128 kbit/s the correspondent
BER of the proposed rMAC-watermarking system is nearly 0.20 in comparison to values nearly
0.10 as for the original works. The former value clearly separates from rather inaudible attacks
at BERs smaller than 0.10. This is a desired feature: albeit ”not annoying” in terms of the
PEAQ model, the compression level of 128 kbit/s is already assessed as being ”perceivable” to
an average listener. Hence the result is in line with the objective of separating perceivable from
imperceptible data modifications.
For the defined malicious attacks, the BER can be used as a criterion for detection if the at-
tack duration can be expected to be two seconds or more. Reasonable decision thresholds can
be identified for this. For example, if voice content is protected, this means a sensitivity to
doctoring on a sentence level.
If an even shorter attack duration can be expected, the rMAC flag ratio is found to be a feasible
criterion. This allows to indicate doctoring that has a duration as short as 1/8 s. For the example
of voice content this allows detecting modifications at a syllable level.
For such short attack durations, both ”serial mode” and ”scattered mode” in the rMAC extraction
allow true positive rates of 0.50 to 0.70 if a false positive rate of less than 0.05 is desired at the
same time. This is about the theoretical bound of the ideal classifier under the constraints of the
rMAC algorithm: each single rMAC bit indicates an actual attack only with 50% probability after
all. Because of the mostly uncorrelated extraction of the rMAC bits, no greater true positive rate
can be achieved. The internal ”avalanche effect” introduced by the standardization step seems
to be neglectable.
In the transition of attack durations from 1/4 to 2 s, the proposed ”serial mode” of operation
provides more a significant classification because it intrinsically avoids many false positives.
On the downside, it features a reduced security to targeted attacks because the time-indices of
evaluated Fourier coefficients is not fully random.
Like the original work, the proposed rMAC clearly separates distinct content by an BER of
approximately 0.50, as desired. These results mean that the key-dependent (hence pseudo-
random) assignment in the time-frequency domain or the discarded overlapping of FFT frames
does not reduce the distinction performance in principle. In addition, the experimental results
provide strong indication that that the authentication can only be carried out in a consistent
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manner, if the correct rMAC key is known. Without knowledge of this key, no successful verifi-
cation could be forged in the simulations.
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that a number of false positives have to accepted. This is
mainly caused by shortcomings of the enhanced embedding algorithm in the presence of ”crit-
ical” audio cover data. In 3 to 4 percent of the test snippets, no watermark message could be
embedded in reliable manner and the consecutive rMAC verification had to fail. This demon-
strates the limits of applicability of watermarking technology in general. Preliminary results on
the the sole rMAC verification [ZS2008a, ZS2008c] showed that the rMAC algorithm by itself is
not affected by such conditions.
5.5.2 Comparison to the Related Work in Authentication Watermarking
About the work by Radhakrishnan and Memon [RM2002] the comparison is difficult for dif-
ferent reasons: First of all, only very little empirical results were given by the authors (two
”audio clips” with unspecified total duration). Furthermore, the assessment of sound quality
loss caused by attacks the authors use the so-called perceptual entropy (see [Joh1988, PS2000]
for its definition) instead of the objective difference grades (ODG). This makes the comparison
of sensitivity and specificity difficult. Also some important technical settings for the attacks were
not given, for example the range of the cut-off frequencies of the low-pass filtering attack or if
the MP3 attacks at 64 kbit/s were carried out in stereo or mono. But qualitatively, the results
are at least resembling those in this thesis: the bit error rate gradually increases with increasing
intensity of attacks. Malicious attacks seem to cause higher BER than admissible attacks. Nev-
ertheless, notable false positives and negatives have to be accepted. Finally, it is important to
notice that the rMAC from this thesis work is much less vulnerable to birthday attacks in theory
because it is of length 128 bit instead of 32 bit as in the work by Radhakrishnan et al.
The same is true for the authentication watermarking approach by Steinebach [SD2003b]. It
defines so-called feature checksums as authentications codes which have a length of only 4 bit
in the experimental evaluation by the original author. However, as these feature checksums
are derived from perception-based properties like loudness and brightness features or directly
from a highly subsampled audio spectrum it can well tolerate a number of admissible attacks
on audio like lossy compression. Interestingly the work by Steinebach suffers from the same
issue like this thesis by the fact that watermarking detection cannot be carried out fully reliable:
a number of watermarking bit errors and hence incorrect or even missed detections have to be
accepted (see ”CRC failed” and ”Watermark lost” results above). But in comparison, the false
positive rate of the presented rMAC watermark (average BER: 0.004) is much smaller than in
the work by Steinebach (average BER of the ”Nothing” attack on the RMS feature: 0.07 at best,
see [SD2003b, Figure 9]).
The work by Hong-Xia Wang [WF2010] also presents an insecure modeling of the final authen-
tication code: In the experimental chapter of that publication, a watermark message of only
4 bit is constructed from the spectral centroid feature(s) and eventually embedded as authen-
tication code. Albeit a very innovative alternative approach, the same is true for the work by
Gomez/Cano [GCdG+2002]: Arbitrary audio data is mapped to an ”alphabet” of 16 different
audio descriptor units (ADU) which corresponds again to a key length of 4 bit.
Also the contribution by Gulbis [GMS2008a, Gul2013] shows a rather short length of the em-
bedded authentication code: the so-called feature vector has a length of 17 bit for every audio
section of 0.34 s. It is doubtful that this is truly secure with respect to deliberate collision or
even 2nd pre-image attacks.
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The approaches presented by Petrovic or Park [Pet2005, PTW2007] are only partly comparable
to this thesis work: The watermark message consists of a time-dependent time code instead of
a content-dependent authentication code. Hence if an attack is carried out in-place only very
intense modifications can be detected based on the detection score or failed/missed detections.
This is even more true because the robustness in the approach by Petrovic seems to be even
higher than in this thesis work.
For example, authors claim that the watermark survives a ”perceptual codec” at bitrates as low
as 4 kbit/s. At the same time, embedding rates are a little smaller than this thesis work as the
authors describe that the 40 bit message is embedded every 8 seconds. About the temporal
localization of deletions or insertions, the works by Petrovic, Park, and in this thesis seem to be
comparable. As said before, for this thesis work a successful synchronization precision up to
one PCM sample can be expected. Hence even short insertions of milliseconds of audio into a
file can be indicated (indirectly) by an offset between actual and expected temporal position.
A comparison with the work by Ching-Te Wang [WLC2007] cannot be given here because the
original work lacks a precise description of the algorithm and also test results about the sensi-
tivity to malicious attacks. Its security to targeted attacks on the availability is also doubtful as
the embedding is done in the infrasound frequencies at 1-20 Hz which can be attacked easily
without sound quality degradation. In comparison, this thesis work embeds the authentication
watermark in a wider range from 500-12,000 Hz which makes targeted removal attacks much
more difficult.
The approaches by Zhao [ZS2009a, ZS2010] are capable of identifying deletions or removal
but only if the protected audio undergoes no further acts of strong lossy compression attacks.
Being semi-fragile approaches the degree of data modification is not measured in terms of BER
but by the deviation of the detector’s correlation coefficient from its ideal value of 1.0. The
approaches can well indicate malicious acts of deletion or insertion of ”short” sections of audio
(of unspecified duration, unfortunately). About admissible attacks the results provided by the
authors are somewhat inconsistent with respect to the notion of perceptual identity: for example,
the requantization attacks at 8 bit resolution actually cause annoying quantization noise but are
not indicated by the Zhou approach (correlation coefficient reported as ”1.0000”). On the other
hand, MP3 compression attacks at 56 kbit/s (presumably stereo) are clearly audible too but only
causes little deviation of the correlation coefficient (”0.9918”) from 1.0. Unfortunately, rather
imperceptible attacks (like MP3 compression at higher bitrates) were not tested by the authors
so that it cannot be assessed if such moderate attacks can disguise malicious acts. In contrast,
the test results from this thesis suggest that such strong MP3 compression or the adding of
audible quantization noise would be indicated successfully by the proposed approach.
Finally, the comparison with the works by Fan, Wu or Yuan/Huss is omitted as these works
are beyond the scope of this thesis work due to their high fragility [CS2004, CHW2008,
CZL2010] or because they are bitstream solutions for voice-coded data in GSM [YH2004] or
G.723 [WK2001] format.
The same is true for the comparison with the recent fragile approaches by Huang, Echizen et al.
[HEN2010, HEN2011, HOEN2014] for audio content or by Rigoni et al. [RFF2016] for audio-
visual multimedia content.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusion
This final Chapter summarizes the major contributions of this work with regards to the thesis
challenges and objectives. Correspondent publications by the thesis author are recalled and
commented. This includes student theses that were conducted under supervision of the author.
Then the achievements shortcomings of the proposed approach are discussed and the overall
feasibility of the developed authentication mechanisms is concluded. Finally, potential impact
is outlined and possible future research work is suggested.
Please note that a list of publications by the author can be found on pp. 157.
6.1 Main Contributions and Correspondent Publications
Modern audio technologies provide numerous opportunities for for malicious doctoring, forg-
ing/disguising the origin, or inadvertent data modification of digital audio recordings. Common
crypto primitives for verifying the integrity and authenticity of digital media like crypto-hashes
and signatures offer secure means of protection in this case. However they feature a number
of shortcomings in the context of everyday handling of multimedia data: because of their ex-
tremely high sensitivity to any kind of data modification also common imperceptible, hence
benign, post-processing operations like format conversion of lossy encoding are flagged as a
”false alarm” with the standard primitives. This thesis work investigated alternatives from the
field of multimedia security for overcoming the shortcomings in crypto primitives.
With regards to data integrity this thesis work proposed a modified definition of the notion of
”integrity”: instead of an exact verification of data identity (i.e. bit-by-bit) the requirements were
relaxed in this work so that only perceptible data modifications have been in focus (”perceptual
identity”).
Based on that, it proposed and investigated an approach for authentication watermarking. For
this, research was conducted in audio hashing, audio watermarking, perceptual modeling, and
in combing these technologies by means of ”content-fragile watermarking” as summarized in
the following.
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6.1.1 Robust Message Authentication Code (rMAC ) for Audio Data
This contribution corresponds to the publications [ZS2007, ZS2008a, ZS2008b, ZS2008c,
ZMS2012] by the thesis author.
The approach of this thesis work was to investigate if and how audio hashing technology
can serve as a robust message authentication code (denoted as rMAC) to discriminate per-
ceivable data modifications from inaudible ones. The proposed rMAC algorithm is influenced
by one of the most frequently cited audio hashing algorithms by Haitsma, Kalker, and Oost-
veen [HOK2001a, HOK2001b]. The concept and its experimental evaluation were published
by the author in first or co-authorship [ZS2007, ZS2008a, ZS2008b, ZS2008c, ZMS2012]. The
experimental evaluation in these papers showed that the algorithm allows well to separate in-
audible from audible data modifications. The same is also true for distinguishing content which
is completely distinct from one another. Hence the proposed scheme allows integrity verification
on a perceptional level.
In addition, the work [TNSZ2009] motivated the proposed randomization of the feature se-
lection. Protection against protocol attacks by creating false positives is vital to avoid that the
perceptual hash appear useless. The secret key dependent feature selection provides that data
verification can be carried out by the authorized user only. That is, the scheme can be used for
data source authentication to a certain extent.
An intermediate standardization processing step of the input spectral data provides better sta-
tistical properties of the rMAC and hence a higher security to targeted attacks. By design the
rMAC algorithm also implicitly allows the temporal localization of tampering and assessing the
degree of data modification (if applicable).
6.1.2 Enhancement in Patchwork Audio Watermarking
The following contribution corresponds to the publications [SZ2008b, ZS2009b].
As another objective, the rMAC authentication codes should be kept ”inside” the protected audio
media without causing overhead by means of digital watermarking in a transparent manner.
An existent Patchwork watermarking [Ste2003] was used as a starting point for significant
enhancements to general Patchwork watermarking schemes. The focus was on improving the
overall capacity, transparency and robustness performance as recalled in the following. Finally
note that audio watermarking-based applications beyond this thesis work (like tracing copyright
infringements or 2nd screen services) could benefit from these results.
Capacity Enhancement in Patchwork watermarking: At first the embedding capacity of the
Patchwork scheme in the Fourier domain had to be increased. For this a flexible as-
signment of FFT coefficients to the watermark message bits across low, mid, and high
frequencies was developed. The capacity enhancement was published in [ZS2009b] and
successfully evaluated more elaborately in this thesis. In a few percent of the tested audio
material incorrect or even missed watermark detections had to be accepted though. The
overall idea was also presented in co-authorship in [BZSS2011] where it was applied to
collusion-secure anti-piracy watermarking beyond the context of this thesis work.
Robustness Enhancement by Psychoacoustic Modeling in the Detector: A minor research activ-
ity in the context of this thesis was a further improvement of watermarking robustness.
The detection success in the presence of strong attacks could be improved by utilizing
psychoacoustic modeling also in the watermark detection step. This was elaborated upon
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in a supervised student thesis [Mer2007], published in co-authorship [SZ2008b], and
evaluated again in this thesis on a larger test set.
Robustness Enhancement by Adaptations to Turbo Coding: In addition, forward error correc-
tion techniques known from communication theory could be adapted and ”tuned” for wa-
termarking application. Research on enhanced Turbo coding algorithms was conducted in
a student thesis [Ber2008] under supervision by the thesis author. The detail on improving
Turbo coding were used but not elaborated upon in this thesis.
6.1.3 rMAC -enabled Authentication Audio Watermarking
This contribution corresponds to the publications [ZS2009b, ZMS2012]
The above works on audio hashing and watermarking were eventually integrated as core com-
ponents into a ”content-fragile watermarking” system. An alignment mechanism was proposed
so that both components are compliant with each other. It was initially published in [ZS2009b],
and successfully evaluated in this thesis work. Its main capabilities are the following:
Classifying Tampered vs. Authentic Content – Assessment of the Degree of Data Modification:
The approach allows classifying doctored versus authentic content. Using the bit error
rate (BER) as criterion, a false positive and negative rate of 4% each at the same time can
be achieved. If a false negative rate of 0% is desired, the false positive rate at the same
time increases to 20%. Main cause for the notable error rates is that audio watermarking
algorithm sometimes fails when the protected audio content is unsuitable for carrying an
embedded watermark. It has to be admitted that these figures apply if the duration of
deliberate tampering is at least 2.0 seconds. Hence, this means that the goal of identifying
even very short sections of data modification (less than a second) cannot be achieved if
only the total BER is used as criterion.
Temporal Localization of Tampering: To overcome this shortcoming two approaches were pro-
posed and evaluated successfully. One approach (”scattered mode”) is based on a delib-
erate evaluation of the single rMAC bit results on the detector side. It provides a very
good sensitivity to data modifications of very short duration up to 1/2 second. For longer
durations of integrity breach, the second approach (”serial mode”) is more suitable: it
features a deliberate modification of the fully pseudo-random assignment to facilitate the
first approach. The latter was investigated in a supervised student thesis [Mun2011] and
presented in [ZMS2012].
Compared to the related work on audio authentication watermarking this work presents an
alternative approach which provides a key-based authentication code. It was evaluated on a
wider test base than many other works. Using a content-dependent authentication code means
a significant security improvement of authentication watermarking with regards to copy attacks
(as opposed to many works in the state of the art).
6.1.4 Security Analysis of Patchwork Watermarking and rMAC Approach
It was also investigated how secure the algorithms are in terms of ”effective key length”. For
this the combinatorial properties of the modified Patchwork and rMAC algorithm were analyzed.
The result is that computational needs for brute force attacks on the system can still be regarded
as very high: With realistic assumptions on the time-frequency patterns of picked coefficients,
147
the effective key length is approximately 100 bit for the rMAC in ”scattered mode” and 62 bit
in the (more suitable) ”serial mode”.
The effective key length of the proposed Patchwork audio watermarking is at least 260 bit for
reasonable technical settings and assumptions.
The analysis and the results have not been published explicitly but are elaborately documented
in this thesis in Chapter 4. These results can also be applied to the core algorithm as published
earlier by Steinebach et al. in application areas like copyright protection.
6.1.5 Benchmarking
This contribution corresponds to the publication [DSLZ2004]
In an early publication also benchmarking of authentication watermarking was investigated and
published in co-authorship [DSLZ2004]. On a conceptual level, it was proposed by the thesis
author to extend the (formerly) existent Stirmark Benchmark Audio system (SMBA) by Lang,
Dittmann and Steinebach [SDS+2001]. The objective is performance evaluation of integrity
watermarking. Like the earlier SMBM standards for robustness and security attacks, also the sets
of simulated tampering attacks and the set of audio test data was proposed to be standardized.
However the concept was never implemented as the overall SMBA project was discontinued
by the primary authors. Nevertheless, the inspiration for feasible simulations of attacks were
eventually utilized in the experimental evaluation in this thesis.
To summarize, the previous overview on publication shows that this thesis work covers different
fields in audio processing. Apart from the major research efforts in authentication watermark-
ing, also techniques of audio hashing, watermarking and perceptual modeling by themselves
were investigated and improved as the need arose.
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6.2 Conclusion on Limitations and Achievements
The previous section showed that most of the thesis objectives could be achieved – but not all
of them. The most important findings in this regard are listed in the following.
Availability of the rMAC Authentication Codes
First of all, it could be observed that not all audio test data is suitable for watermark embed-
ding. Here, issues were observed occasionally for audio content that contains a very narrow
audio spectrum or which at very low overall volume. However, this unfortunate characteristic
could have been expected in the first place: it is known from the different application areas of
watermarking that not every audio content is well suited for watermark embedding a priori. For
example in anti-piracy transaction watermarking this is much less relevant: Usually content like
music songs, audio books or main feature films offer at least a few file positions that are suitable
for embedding the (only) copyright notice or user ID a few times. But in integrity watermark-
ing, the whole file must be covered for a complete protection because the watermark messages
vary dynamically over the file’s duration.
Hence these rare critical data cannot be protected in a reliable way because false alarms have
to be expected. In fact, closer analysis in the experimental evaluation showed that most of the
observed false positive errors could be explained by deficiencies in the watermarking embed-
ding/detection scheme, not in the rMAC algorithm.
Life-cycle of Existent Content
Another limitation becomes obvious in light of the natural life-cycle of a media: Unlike au-
dio forensics (any) authentication watermarking protection, but also any cryptography-based
mechanism too, becomes effective not before the watermark is embedded. This means that it is
desired that the embedding is carried out at an early stage in the life-cycle of the audio media.
A natural realization to achieve this is to include the embedding step in a recording device like a
voice recorder or when audio content is initially imported to an audio archive. This would allow
to address the challenges in protecting digital evidence or for preserving the cultural heritage.
About the latter, the nature of digital watermarking to modify the protected content actively
can be of relevance. As a consequence, watermarking could require to conduct a transparency
approval by responsible parties, e.g. listening tests by sound engineers. Here, usually the
unmodified original versions are preserved and sometimes authenticated using crypto hashes
and signatures, resp. However, integrity watermarking is feasible for being used for working
copies that are distributed internally or to external users.
Error Rates
Another aspect to discuss are the error rates. It is notable that the binary classification of the
proposed approach in general provides a very good classification of admissible versus malicious
attacks. A decision threshold can be identified so that false positive and negatives can be re-
duced to 4% for both at the same time. This is mainly caused by shortcomings of the watermark
embedding/detection scheme: the rMAC authentication code cannot retrieved from every pro-
tected audio sample which – in doubt – has to be treated as an alarm. These figures mean that
the automated verification step might require some manual inspection afterwards.
To summarize, these figures also mean that the proposed solution cannot be seen as a universal
protection mechanism for any audio data under any circumstances. Compared to other protec-
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tion mechanisms like crypto hashes, crypto MACs, digital signatures or checksums this means a
notable shortcoming. Nevertheless the proposed scheme appears to be suitable to a wide range
of different kinds of common audio content though.
One way of overcoming the presence of false positives, false negatives, and missed verifications
by technical means could be implementing a verifying stage already during embedding. The
user should at least be notified that the content cannot be protected so that alternative actions
can be taken in advance.
Symmetric Security Primitive
The dependency of the rMAC extraction from a key provides a means for verification of both,
the integrity and the authenticity. This is facilitated by the key dependency of the consecutive
watermarking step. But the reader is reminded that that the investigated approach is a symmet-
ric security primitive: both the watermark key and the rMAC key are symmetric shared secrets.
This means that it has to be assumed that the verification step has to be carried out in a trusted
environment only. A truly public verification cannot be provided based on the proposed system.
As a consequence, a trusted access and distribution for the secret/private rMAC extraction and
watermarking key has to be provided.
It has to be noted that this is no particular property of the content-fragile watermarking ap-
proach as investigated in this thesis by itself. Instead it is a common property of real-world
watermarking systems in general. This includeds academic research as well as commercial
products and services. There, the watermarking key is expected to remain private to the entities
that have access to the watermark detector software.
The same is true for key-dependent crypto MAC functions. Note that the symmetric nature of
nowadays watermarking schemes were not in focus of this thesis. Nevertheless, the proposed
rMAC approach and the principles of rMAC/watermarking alignment might be extended to be
compatible to asymmetric watermarking schemes of the future.
Continuous Notion of ”Perceptual Integrity/Identity”
Not a true limitation but rather a new notion is the following: Regarding the security of the
investigated approach a more general conclusion arises: The overall concept of using bit error
rates (BER) in the output of a (whatsoever) hash function as a continuous measure for the
integrity of a media must appear odd if seen from a cryptographer’s perspective. In crypto-based
standard approaches (like crypto hashes/MACs or digital signatures) the verification essentially
provides an exact ”yes/no” criterion instead of a continuous measure.
An example: A BER bound of, for example, 0.10 in the presence of ”admissible audio file format
conversion” will never be observed using a crypto hash function, given by its algorithmic design.
Instead the expected BER in the output of a crypto hash function becomes 0.50 in the presence
of even the slightest, even lossless, modification to the input data.
Furthermore, it has to be admitted that also the concept of ”weak’ and ”strong” audio fin-
gerprint/hash bits as discussed in this thesis could appear curios compared to cryptographic
standard algorithms. For the latter all bits in a standard crypto hash contribute equally to the
overall significance of the hash value. Already the notion of ”perceptual identity” as defined in
the Introduction includes a certain degree of inexactness: The subjective sound quality loss due
to attacks are different from person to person.
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Conclusion
To overcome these contradictory perspectives, the reader is reminded that the presented ap-
proach can solve a classification challenge than a strict cryptographic security challenge. As long
as estimates for false negatives and positives are given reasonable decision thresholds can be
set. Additionally, the proposed approach shares common properties similar to those in cryp-
tography: examples are the observation that the rMAC correctly distinguishes totally different
content by an average BER of 0.5 again; or by the observation that successful verification re-
quires the correct and exact rMAC key; or by the analysis and estimation in terms of ”effective
key length”.
To conclude, the investigated approach shall not be seen as a mean to replace crypto-based
integrity authentication mechanisms in terms of the provided security level or, for example, as
in light of national digital signature acts regulating data integrity. It can rather serve as an
additional means of verification. Like the technique of audio forensics, watermarking serves
as an additional protection mechanism that provides indications of malicious activities instead
of court-proof evidence. Here, watermarking allows to keep the authentication codes virtually
inside the protected media which is an alternative to common storage and archiving standards.
Finally, the outstanding property of this thesis work is to verify the integrity if lossless post-
production operations or lossy compression can be expected. The rMAC authentication code
and the watermark protection are present even when the protected content is transmitted and
circulating even when transcoded to other file formats. In contrast, integrity and authenticity
protection using crypto hashes and digital signatures, resp., would fail: the transcoding would
cause false alarms even if the transcoded copy was perpetually identical to the original version.
This means that the proposed approach can even provide a protection in application scenarios
in which crypto-based techniques cannot be used in principle.
Such potential impacts are discussed in the following Section.
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6.3 Potential Impact on Applications
Since the invention of audio recording devices, a vast number of analog and digital audio media
has been created. The issue of the credibility and provenience of these media becomes apparent
for the examples that were given in the Motivation of this thesis (see Section 1.1), namely
content preserving the cultural heritage and digital evidence contained in audio. The thesis
result can have an impact as outlined in the following.
Preserving the Cultural Heritage
Many different kinds of audio media contribute to contemporary history. This includes fa-
mous historical speeches, oral history interviews, mass media like TV and the radio or the
variety in the music. These can be seen as ”exhibits” which are being preserved as histori-
cal archival records in public archives. The embedded authentication watermark can ”survive”
common post-processing operations in the archive (see [Ros2009]) like converting between
standard archiving formats like BWF and RF64 [Cha1997, EBU2009]. Unlike standard crypto-
based hashes and signatures, the rMACs value do not need to be refreshed after the transcoding.
In this case, for the existing historical archival records the proposed method cannot always
provide a complete chain of proof: authentication watermarking technique was not used or had
even been unavailable for existing media. But newly created content can be protected when it
is moved into a public archive for the first time. It can also be used when historical exhibits on
analog media (e.g. magnetic tape and records from the vinyl or even shellac era) are digitized.
This allows, at least, verifying that the digital copy has not been modified inadvertently or
maliciously inside the archive.
An alternative is protecting working copies when they are handed out to legitimate users, the
latest. In the latter case, 3rd party users could use the embedded watermark to verify that the
content was not modified by the user in the meanwhile.
Digital Evidence
Digital media can also be important evidence in different kinds of law enforcement actions. This
covers recordings of police interview, video surveillance content (if audio is captured too), or
eavesdropping in the course of lawful and strategic interception of any kind of voice communi-
cation. The audio contained in these sources can prove or at least indicate suspicious, accusing
or exonerating facts.
For content that has already existed in these archives, the proposed method cannot become
effective not before the watermark is embedded. Hence it is desired that the watermark em-
bedding is carried out as early as possible in the life-cycle of the audio media. This is done at
best inside the recording device like a voice recording units in interview rooms, mobile dicta-
phone devices (or apps) or in monitoring centers in lawful interception. The proposed approach
can provide the authentication codes even in the presence of (common) lossy compression and
across consecutive steps of transcoding / format conversion.
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6.4 Future Research Directions
The above summary also points at interesting aspects that are worthwhile for further investiga-
tion. Some ideas for Future Work are outlined in the following.
6.4.1 Fine-tuning of decision thresholds for particular audio content
The optimization of decision thresholds for bit error rates of rMAC flag ratios was carried out
under the assumption that a rather universal audio protection across hi-fi and low quality music
and voice content is desired. If it is known a priori that, for example, only voice content needs
to be protected, other technical settings could be used that provide even greater distinction
performance and robustness.
For example, from own research beyond this thesis work it is known that pure voice content like
in audio books or voice recordings can ’bear” greater watermarking distortions than hi-fi music
content. Watermarking modifications according to the Patchwork scheme can be applied by a
few Decibel stronger before they become a transparency issue. This gain in being ”markable”
could be used in voice content to overcoming the issues of occasional ”lost watermarks” and for
increasing the overall detection performance.
It would be worthwhile to carry out the experimental evaluation again on larger sets from a
certain audio data domain for further study. That will allow providing more representative
and significant estimates of error rates. It could also help identifying other examples of audio
material that is unexpectedly critical to process.
6.4.2 Confidence measure in rMAC verification
About the rMAC extraction itself, the assessment of bit errors on the detector side can be re-
fined further. The reader is reminded that the rMAC is a binary quantity. It is verified on the
detector side in terms of the Hamming distance or BER, resp. According to its definition in Equa-
tion (3.1), each rMAC bit H ′ ∈ {0,1} depends on the continuous zero-mean quantity d ′ ∈ IR.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3 or in the work by Coover [CH2014] some of these rMAC bit cor-
respond to a d ′ value with smaller absolute value |d ′| (so-called ”weak bits”) than for others.
In simple words: an rMAC on the detector side that consists of many weak bits, for whatever
reason, has a lower confidence level than other rMACs. Hence a feasible extension the rMAC
verification could be to evaluate |d ′| so that a confidence measure of the verification result is
obtained based on the ”weaknesses” of the rMAC bits.
Also psychoacoustic modeling could be incorporated in this context. The reader is reminded
that perceptual audio models were successfully incorporated in the overall watermarking de-
tection. The motivation for this was to allow an assessment and weighting of every spectral
coefficient according to its significance for the final detection and retrieval result. Applying
this general principle on the rMAC extraction, an observed attack on an rMAC bit (indicated by
its bit flip) should can be regarded as less significant with regards to ”perceptual integrity” if
the corresponding N contributing spectral coefficients are by themselves less or even inaudible
anyway. Note that this idea shall not be confused with the investigated but later discontinued
research approach as outlined at the end of Section 3.2: calculating the rMAC bits from spectral
coefficients that were subject to psychoacoustic model-based quantization priory would not be
intended. Instead the weighting should better be carried out after the rMAC bit modeling is
processed.
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Both, the former ”weakness” measure and the latter ”inaudibility” measures could be combined
in an appropriate manner to obtain eventually a meaningful measure of confidence in the case
that integrity breaches are indicated.
6.4.3 Model-based Authentication of Speech Content
In some application scenarios pure voice data has to be protected and acoustic events in the
background can be omitted. Here, the message authentication could benefit from different
technologies in speech processing as outlined in the following.
Speech Hashing
Speech hashing could be carried out instead of using universal audio hashing (audio fingerprint-
ing, resp.) as it was carried out in this thesis work. This technique incorporates extracts an
identifier from voice data using mathematical models for speech production in the human
vocal tract. This should allow for an greater robustness to admissible data modifications.
For example works from the state of the art in speech hashing use linear spectrum frequen-
cies [JLN2008, JJN2009], or they carry out a principle component analysis on linear prediction
coefficients (LPC) [CW2009] for extracting robust hashes. Especially the latter proposal appears
plausible because LPC models are a well-understood ”mathematical standard tool” in many
disciplines of digital speech processing.
Phonetic and Phonemic Transcription
As alternative to rMAC or voice hashing, elements from automated speech recognition (ASR)
techniques could be included for the extraction of a voice data authentication code. One can
make use of the fact that across human languages a so-called phonetic inventory of approxi-
mately 150 different phones is known, which can be represented by 8 bit per phone symbol.
Here, a phone is defined as the shortest meaningful element of perceivable and distinguishable
speech sounds ”without regard to its place in the sound system of a language” [MWe2009]. A pho-
netic transcription or pseudo-randomly selected features from intermediate processing steps in
ASR could be used to derive a phonetic-based message authentication code.
An even more robust approach could be developed if also the language of the spoken words can
be assumed to be known a priori. Each human language consist of phonemes as their shortest
semantically relevant and distinguishable elements. In a given language the phonemic inventory
describes existent and non-existent phones and sequences thereof. For instance the English and
the German language consists of a phonemic inventory of only 50 to 60 characteristic phonemes
which could be represented with as little as 6 bit each [Mad2013].
As an example, the oral statement by a suspect during a police interview, saying
”...I am guilty...”
can be transformed to its phonemic representation
”... /aI æm gIltI/ ...’’
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using the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) notation71. To achieve this technical, ASR tech-
nology often implements hidden Markov modeling (HMM) [Rab1990] and suitable acoustic
and language models to reflect the ”dictionary” of the particular language. An IPA-like phone-
mic transcription or pseudo-randomly selected internal HMM-quantities could be investigated
to compute a phonemic message authentication code.
It is very promising to utilize elements from ASR for protecting voice content as this tech-
nology is very mature72: reliable solutions are nowadays included commercially in operating
systems (like in Microsoft Windows, Apple MacOS/iOS or in Google Android), used for taking dic-
tations in word processor software conveniently, or for controlling military equipment73. Cur-
rent ”speech-to-text” transcription software in monitoring centers for strategic surveillance of
telephone communication is capable for analyzing and recognizing even heavily distorted/noisy
speech content at virtual ”NSA-grade” level74.
Biometric Speaker Verification
From the perspective of both perceptual and semantic integrity of voice content it is of course
vital to know who gave a certain oral statement. Carrying out ’replay attacks” by exchanging
one speaker by another would be very difficult to carry out because an adversary would need
to be very precise in repeating the pronunciation and the timing of the original data. But such
attacks are possible in principle though. Phonetic and phonemic authentication are invariant to
such malicious attack. Hence identification of the individual speaker as the very initial source
of the voice data in question would also have to be considered. About this, speaker recognition
technology from biometry could verify that the authenticity of speech data is maintained.
The technologies outlined above often use the same mathematical tools like MFCCs, LPCs or
HMM as a source of inspiration. To summarize, it would be worthwhile investigating speech-
based message authentication can be carried out in a reliable and robust manner which is – at
the same time – difficult to forge.
6.4.4 Joint Audio-Video Authentication
Another feasible extension of this thesis work could be realized in the context of integrity pro-
tection for video data in different ways. At first, the reader is reminded that sensitive audio in-
formation can also be contained in the soundtrack of multimedia-based ”video” content. Here,
video watermarking could be used in addition to audio watermarking for increasing the embed-
ding capacity. For example, this could allow to further reduce the duration of protected snippets
which would in return increase the sensitivity to malicious acts of tampering.
As an alternative, content-fragile watermarking for audio and video could be combined: audio
hashes (like the investigated rMAC) approach could be embedded by means of video water-
marking, and vice versa. This allows joint approaches using both, the video and audio track for
mutual authentication purposes, as proposed already in 2000 by Dittmann [DMS2000] or very
71 International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) developed by the International Phonetic Association.
https://www.internationalphoneticassociation.org
72 The interested reader is referred to an exhaustive list of ASR tools and APIs which is kept up-to-date at
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_speech_recognition_software
73 Example: DARPA project Robust Automatic Transcription of Speech (RAST):
http://www.darpa.mil/program/robust-atuomatic-transcription-of-speech
74 Andrew Fishman, ”The Computers are Listening”, in: The Intercept (2015)
https://theintercept.com/2015/05/11/speech-recognition-nsa-best-kept-secret (by First Look Media)
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recently by Rigoni [RFF2016]. It also saves oneself from elaborate mechanisms for avoiding
influence on the hashing process caused by the embedding process.
6.4.5 Miscellaneous Watermarking Applications
The proposed mechanism for audio hash extraction and enhanced audio watermarking can
also have an impact on watermarking applications beyond this thesis context: for example,
elements of the proposed rMAC can be used by itself in audio hashing applications as explained
in Section 2.2.2. For example, it was argued by Fridrich [FG2000] that key-dependent feature
extraction is vital for (more) secure audio hashing.
This was justified by the work published in co-authorship with Thiemert [TNSZ2009].
The latter work showed that audio hash based filtering mechanisms could be circumvented by
deliberate attacks on the hash. For this, the internal (pseudo) randomization will make such
attacks much more difficult.
Another impact can be seen in improvements in general Patchwork audio watermarking: The
commercial application of the audio watermarking core algorithm can benefit by a higher ro-
bustness and security in anti-piracy activities for example music, movies or video games as it
was discussed in co-authorship in [BSL+2013].
6.4.6 Authentication of Time and Location of Recording
Another reasonable extension to the proposed protection mechanism could be covering the
context of audio data with regards to the time and the place of its initial creation/recording. For
example, when protecting video data, the additional embedding capacity provided by the video
track could be utilized for embedding such meta data for geographic and temporal referencing.
This can not only prevent deliberate acts of forgery. It can also help resolving inadvertent mix-up
of media content and facilitate organizing media repositories in the future.
The source of such geographic or temporal information can be
• global navigation satellite systems (such as GPS, GALLILEO, or GLONASS),
• timing signals by radio (like the DCF77 timing signal75),
• time servers (according to the NTP protocol as in RFC 5905 [MMBK2010]) or
• trusted digital time-stamping services (as in X.509/RFC 3161 [ACPZ2001]).
This extension is already known on a conceptual level for example as described and patented
in [Whi2004, Rho2011] or developed in military video intelligence systems as for example
announced76 and demonstrated77 by the commercial watermarking supplier Digimarc Inc.
75 DCF77 timing signal: transmitted by the operator Media Broadcast GmbH, Köln, Germany, on behalf of the
German federal National Metrology Institute (Physikalisch-technische Bundesantalt, PTB), http://www.ptb.de
76 Digimarc press release:
http://defensenews-updates.blogspot.de/2009/09/digimarc-awarded-contract-to-enhance-us.html (2009)
77 Digimarc’s watermarking solution for video surveillance in military unmanned aerial vehicles, demonstrated
at the conference IS&T SPIE Electronic Imaging/SSWMC, invited demo session, San Francisco, USA, Jan. 2012.
Video integrity watermarking was described to be embedded in unmanned aerial vehicles ”on-the-fly” (sic!)
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Appendix A
Theoretical Background
This Chapter introduces the technical background of the proposed approach for perception
based audio data authentication. For this, basic principles of digital audio data representations
and human auditory perception are explained.
A.1 Representations and Transformations of Digital Audio
This Section describes digital representations of audio data for further processing that are rele-
vant for this PhD thesis.
A.1.1 The Physical Nature of Sound
The nature of acoustic sound and its perception by a human listener has been under research
since ancient times: Already the Greek philosopher and scientist Aristotle (381-322 B.C.) de-
scribed sound as a physical phenomenon of compression and decompression of the air that can
be observed when it is
”...contracted and expanded...and again struck by the impulses of the breath and
the strings”,
see Whewell et al. [Whe1859, p. 24]. Physically, acoustic sound is the phenomenon of the varia-
tion of the pressure p = p(~x , t) in the air or in any other suitable gaseous, liquid or solid propaga-
tion media caused by a sound source and propagating as a longitudinal wave through the media.
Such sources can be, for example, musical instruments (”strings”) or human voice (”breath”).
At a remote and fixed location ~x0 in the propagation medium, the amplitude of the sound
(pressure) wave is a purely time-dependent quantity p(t) = p(~x , t)|~x=~x0 . The magnitude of
the pressure variations is usually many orders of magnitude smaller than the constant hydro-
static/barometric pressure. This oscillation can be measured using suitable technical sensor
devices (e.g. a microphone) and can be processed further in a computer, as in this thesis work.
Alternatively, it can be perceived by the ear of a human listener and the consecutive cognitive
processing in his auditory system. The following two Subsections describe how the recorded
sound is digitized and then represented in the temporal domain as PCM samples or in spectral
domain as Fourier coefficients for further processing as in this thesis work.
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Figure A.1.: Sampling and quantization – continuous line: analog input signal U ; dots: sampling
points/nodes; grid: given resolution of time-axis and amplitude-axis for input signal
A.1.2 Temporal Domain Representation
The data domain of this work is digital audio data. Thus, in order to process or analyze audio
by a computer, it needs to be available and accessed in digitized form. Unless the audio data is
created synthetically and digitally by a computer in the first place, it needs to be captured with
suitable devices. Then it must be converted from analog to digital and finally saved in a suitable
standard format.
An important standard for audio signals is the Pulse-Code-Modulation (PCM) as explained in
the following [ITU1988]. Other common file formats based on (lossy) spectral representations,
(e.g. MP3, AAC, AC-3) or linear prediction modeling (as in GSM or G.7xx voice codecs) are not
considered in this Section.
The analog input signal can be the continuous, time-dependent electrical voltage amplitude
U(t) for example captured with a microphone or electrically picked-up from a musical instru-
ment. Then, this signal is expressed as a time-series which is discrete in time and amplitude by
means of sampling and consecutive quantization.
A.1.2.1 Signal Sampling and (Anti-) Aliasing
The continuous signal is analyzed at regular points in time or instants (see vertical grid
lines in Figure A.1). Those instantaneous values are considered specific, representative
measurements, or samples, of the original signal. All other continuous states of the in-
put signal between the sampling instants are neglected. However, the Sampling Theorem by
Nyquist/Shannon [Sha1948, Sha1949] states that this approximation is sufficiently precise un-
der the condition that the sampling frequency fS is at least twice as high as the highest frequency
component present in the signal. Oscillations at frequencies higher than the so-called Nyquist
frequency fN = 1/2 · fS will be ”overlooked” in the course of sampling and cannot be observed
(correctly).
Even more: if a signal component at a frequency fN + f2 greater than the Nyquist frequency
was present, it can be shown that it would be interpreted by the sampler as the presence of a
low frequency signal at frequency ( f2 mod fN ) instead. This is often denoted as aliasing. This
terminology has its origin in computer science, in which the phenomenon of one a particular
piece of data being accessible or ”appearing” several times is commonly called aliasing. For
avoiding such ”phantom” sounds as aliasing artifacts, the input signal usually is subject to an
appropriate anti-aliasing low-pass filter that removes any frequency components above fN first.
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Typical values of the sampling frequency (often denoted as sampling rate) are
• 44.1 and 48 kHz for consumer media like MP3, Audio CDs, DVD /BluRay sound tracks,
• 8 kHz or 16 kHz for telephony,
• 48 kHz and multiples thereof up (to 192 kHz) in professional music production or in
Digital Cinema.
in practical applications.
A.1.2.2 Signal Quantization
As explained, the sampling step finally provides a series of real-valued, i.e. numerical sam-
ples (x t). Usually, an integer representation with a certain bit length B, i.e.
x t ∈ [−2B;+2B − 1] ⊂ Z , t = 1,2,3, ...
or a normalized floating point representation, i.e.
x t ∈ [−1.0;+1.0] ⊂ R , t = 1,2,3, ...
is used for representing the original signal in the time domain. Most common is a linear quan-
tization of the analog signal.
As for every numerical value processed by a computer, a feasible data representation needs to
be chosen. Typical examples in PCM audio processing are
• 16 bit integer representation on Audio CDs for consumers,
• 24-32 bit integer or 32 bit float normalized to the range [−1.0;1.0] in Digital Cinema, pro-
fessional music production systems or in multimedia processing SDKs like in AudioUnits
under Apple iOS,
• 8 or 14 bit integer representation for voice data in telephony.
For integer representation of music-like sound data, the quantization steps are typically linear.
For example, on Audio CDs, 16 bit signed integer linear-quantization is used, i.e. quantized sam-
ple values are in the range −32,767 to +32,768. This provides a range and resolution of the
volume dynamics that offers sufficient sound quality to most of the users. For speech trans-
mission, logarithmic quantization steps (e.g. A-law, µ-law characteristics) are more suitable,
especially at low bit resolutions in telephony [ITU1988].
The representation as integer or float values is only an approximation of the original real-valued
input sample. Due to rounding errors, the quantized digital value differ from its original/actual
analog value by up to the half of the quantization step size (see Figure A.1). Given by the
Quantization Theorem by Widrow [Wid1961], rounding errors can be modeled as a uniformly
distributed additive noise, the so-called quantization noise. If the quantization steps are suffi-
ciently small, reconstructing the original signal by interpolation from those quantized nodes is
possible.
To achieve a reasonable sound quality, appropriate sample settings of rate and quantization
must be chosen dependent on the application and the audio content characteristics (voice,
music etc.). In this thesis work, typical settings for sample rate/resolution are 44.1 kHz/16 bit
like on Audio CDs which offers sufficient sound quality to most users.
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A.1.3 Spectral Audio Representation in the Fourier Domain
In the course of this thesis work also spectral representations of audio data are utilized to a large
extent.
The readers of this thesis probably are a little familiar with the concept of ”spectrum” and ”fre-
quencies” of audio already. For example, it is common knowledge that most musical instruments
provide a certain range of tones they can generate. The colloquial wording for describing such
tones as ”low” or ”high” reflect that most humans have a natural understanding that they can
be linearly ordered according to the their physical frequency. Quantitatively, the audio spectrum
can be measured by computationally analyzing the digitally sampled audio signal. For this,
suitable mathematical transforms have been well known in theory and in practice for long and
are utilized in this thesis work as well.
With regards to perceptual hashing applications, the majority of commercial audio hash-
ing/fingerprinting systems perform the analysis on the amplitude spectrum of suitable spectral
transforms (not necessarily DFT) or on quantities derived from it. The same is true for many
audio watermarking algorithms in commercial services.
A very common spectral transform is the Fourier transform, named in honor of Jean Baptiste
Joseph Fourier (1768-1830). According to Heidemann [HJB1985] its theoretical foundations
were developed independently by Fourier and Johann Carl Friedrich Gauß (1777-1855) already
in the first years of the 19th century but only published much later [Fou1822, Gau1866]. Nowa-
days, the Fourier transform is a vastly used ”mathematical tool” in numerous theoretical subjects
in natural sciences as well as an analysis technique in signal processing.
A.1.3.1 Definition of the Discrete Fourier transform
In this thesis’ context especially the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) for time-discrete digitally
sampled audio data will be utilized. The following simplified explanation of the DFT is based on
the compact description in the mathematical handbook by Stöcker [Stö1995] or in the textbook
by Smith [S+1997].
At first, the PCM audio signals x t are expected to be partitioned and analyzed in short sections
of length L, i.e. t = 1...L. Such audio section is often denoted as a frame in audio processing.
The DFT itself is described as a decomposition of any real-valued frame data x t ∈ IR into a
sum or superposition of sinusoids. Using the exponential notation of trigonometric sine/cosine
functions the decomposition is defined as
x t =
L−1∑
k=0
Xk · ei2pik/L·t . (A.1)
In most cases the Fourier coefficient Xk is a complex quantity. It is calculated as follows:
Xk = 1/L
L−1∑
t=0
x t · e−i2pik/L·t ∈ IC . (A.2)
Note about the wording:
• The transition F : (x t) −→ (Xk) as in Equation (A.2) is commonly denoted as the (for-
ward) Fourier transform or Fourier analysis.
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• The transition F−1 : (Xk) −→ (x t) in Equation (A.1) is commonly denoted as the inverse
Fourier transform or Fourier synthesis.
Polar representation – Magnitude and Phase
In practice, the polar representation of the complex-valued Fourier coefficients
Xk = Re [Xk] + i · Im [Xk] = |Xk| · e−iφk ∈ IC .
is more descriptive than the Cartesian representation: Here, the Fourier transform is described
by magnitude rk := |Xk| and phase φk which can easily be obtained from basic properties of
complex numbers:
rk := |Xk|=
q
X 2k =
q
Re [Xk]
2 + Im [Xk]
2 ∈ IR ,
φk = tan
−1

Re [Xk]
Im [Xk]

∈ [−pi,+pi) ⊂ IR .
The reader should note:
• The magnitude rk at index k describes how much oscillatory behavior the signal shows at
frequency fk = k/L. This can also be seen from Equation (A.2) in which Xk formally is
the cross-correlation coefficient between the (x t) and the complex oscillations e−i2pik/L·t .
This quantity by itself is dimensionless.
• The phase φk describes the initial angular offset of the oscillation at frequency fk; loosely
spoken the phase describes if the particular fk oscillation behaves more ”sine-like” or
”cosine-like”.
• The Equation (A.1) also implies that the transform is not meaningfully defined for an
instant of sound: no spectrum can be calculated from a a single PCM sample, i.e.
when L = 1. For a graphic explanation the reader should recall that measuring frequency
components implies measuring oscillations. The nature of any oscillation is characterized
by a periodic behavior of a quantity over time – not during an instant. At least the dura-
tion of one period length T of the oscillation must be observable somehow, i.e. it must be
L ≥ T > 1 which is also in line with the Sampling Theorem.
• Closer analysis of the fundamental properties of the DFT shows [Stö1995]: because the
input frame data is real-valued it follows that the magnitude spectrum shows the following
symmetry:
x t ∈ IR ⇒ rk = rL−k+1 k = 1...L .
That is, only the first L/2 coefficients with k = 1, ..., L/2 are significant: The upper half of
coefficients for k = (L/2+ 1), ..., L is redundant and is discarded in this thesis work.
• A different wording for the set of rk is the amplitude spectrum or loosely and imprecisely:
”the spectrum”. The latter reflects also that the magnitudes are often much more relevant
so that that the phase spectrum is negligible in many applications.
A.1.3.2 Frequency versus Temporal Resolution Trade-off
It should be recalled that the definition in Equation (A.1) is given for audio signals that were
partitioned in frames previously. The calculated amplitude and phase spectrum are valid and
189
defined only for the duration L of the particular frame. But for regular music, voice etc. the
sound, and so its spectrum, will obviously vary over time and the audio will have to be par-
titioned in many consecutive and independent frames. For obtaining a meaningful transform
result for each of the frames, its temporal duration must be short enough so that the signal is
sufficiently stationary: its sound characteristics shall not change (too much) during the elapsed
playing time ∆t = L/ fS [s].
On the other hand, the precision of the spectral representation, the frequency resolution ∆ f ,
must be sufficient as well for avoiding to loose spectral information. By comparing with the
Nyquist theorem it can easily be shown that every DFT coefficients describes a frequency interval
of
∆ f = fN/(L/2) = 2 fN/L = fS/L = 1/(∆t) [in Hz]
so that the basic uncertainty relation of the Fourier transform is
∆ f ·∆t = 1 .
In practice a suitable trade-off between frequency resolution and temporal resolution has to be
identified.
Example: In this thesis work, a typical frame length with regards to sufficient stationarity is
L=2048 samples which corresponds to ∆t=46.4 msec (at sample rate of 44.1 kHz).
Hence, the frequency resolution is ∆ f =21.5 Hz.
Example: In this thesis work, the framelength N = 2048 PCM samples is commonly used and
the audio content typically has fS = 44.1 kHz sample rate. That means,
• the temporal resolution is ∆t = N/ fS = 2048/44100 [s] which represents 46 mil-
liseconds,
• the frequency resolution is ∆ f = fS/N = 22.050/1024 [Hz] which is approximately
21.5 Hz.
That means that for example the first magnitude coefficient r1 represents not only the DC
component at 0.0 Hz but the averaged presence of all frequency components from 0.0
to 21.5 Hz. Note that for distinguishing sounds at low frequencies, this is a rather low
resolution. For example, the frequency range of the lowest octave on a standard 88 keys
piano keyboard (from tone A0 to A1) is from 27.5 to 55 Hz. The correspondent Fourier
coefficients represent in that range cannot distinguish the presence of single half tones.
A.1.3.3 Spectral leakage
What has been concealed in the simplified description so far was that the Fourier analy-
sis as in Equation (A.2) in fact not only approximates the framed signal (x t) in the do-
main t ∈ {1,2,3, ..., L}. Closer theoretical analysis shows that the infinite periodic extension
by the sample values as if it was
x˜ t = x(t mod L)
in the domain t ∈ {−∞, ...,+∞} is actually approximated. This means: the synthesis rela-
tion as in Equation (A.1) describes the signal also beyond the frame boundaries as if it was
periodically repeated infinite times. This can cause inaccuracies in the DFT results which is
demonstrated by the following empirical...
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Figure A.2.: Left Figure: Example audio frame with sine tone at 10.5 Hz;
Right Figure: correspondent (magnitude) spectrum – a peak is visible at 10 and
11 Hz. Significant magnitudes are visible at other frequencies due to spectral leak-
age
Figure A.3.: Example: Periodic extension of 10.5 Hz signal. Discontinuities can be observed as
sharp dips (see circle markers) every 512 samples.
...Example: In Figure A.2 a pure sinusoid signal at frequency 10.5 Hz is subject to a 512-point
DFT. Instead of a peak/spike the output spectrum indicates seeming frequency compo-
nents in the whole domain of 0-20 Hz (and beyond, actually) i.e. at frequencies other
than 10 to 11 Hz. A portion of the signal energy figuratively ”leaks” to side-lobes at
frequencies adjacent to the actual main peak. The notable behavior in the example can
be explained by the fact that the periods of the 10.5 Hz oscillation do not ”fit” in the
512-sample DFT frames. Thus, the virtual periodic extension (see Figure A.3), which the
Fourier transform actually approximates, shows significant notches every 512 samples.
The audio playback of such discontinuous curve shape obviously sounds different from
the pure sine tone: impulses noise or clicks become audible. Those distortions introduce
additional frequency components in the spectrum.
This effect is called spectral leakage. Leakage occurs for every audio signal that contains fre-
quency components that do not ”fit” in the analysis frame window. For real-world audio content
(music, voice etc.) such leakage can be expected as well. Hence, it will become relevant in the
watermarking and perceptual hashing investigated in this thesis work too.
An abstract and formal explanation of the leakage is the following: In the previous example,
the notion of a ”pure sinusoid signal at frequency 10.5 Hz ” strictly speaking is very idealized: it
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would only correct if the signal duration was infinite. In fact, the framing of the signal can be
expressed as sample-wise multiplication of the input signal with the function
w(rect)r =
¨
1.0 , if t ∈ {1...L}
0.0 , else
which is has a rectangular shape in the time domain, the so-called rectangular window (func-
tion). From the fundamental convolution theorem of the DFT it is known that the spectrum of
such sample-wise product can be calculated as the convolution of the DFT of the signal with the
DFT of the window function. Hence, the spectrum of the sample-wise product obviously will
differ from the spectrum of the ”pure” sinusoid.
A.1.3.4 Windowing
The common approach in signal processing for reducing the leakage effect is applying a multipli-
cation of the input signal with a suitable window function other than the rectangular window.
The shape of the window function is defined so that it approaches zero towards the frame
boundaries without discontinuities. Because the windowed frame data vanishes at the frame
boundaries, its periodic extension becomes seamless again and there appear no discontinuities
at the frame boundaries.
As an example, the cosine-based von Hann window (commonly denoted as Hanning win-
dow) was introduced by Blackmann and Tukey [BT1959] in honor of the meteorologist
Julius von Hann (1839-1921) with
w(Hanning)t =
¨
1/2
 
1+ cos(2pi/L · t) , if t = 1...L
0.0 , else
,
Other common window types are the Blackman window, the Hamming window (not to be con-
fused with the Hanning/von Hann window), which is named in honor of the mathematician and
computer scientist Richard Hamming (1915-1998):
wt = 0.54+ 0.46cos(2pit/L) ,
or or the Bartlett window, see [S+1997, Chap. 9 and 16].
Example: In the example in Figure A.4 a Hanning window was applied on the pure sine-like
audio signal at 10.5 Hz from the earlier example. Closer analysis and comparison of the
plots Figures A.2 and A.4 (right Figures, resp.) shows that the leakage effect in is reduced
by two orders of magnitude in the side-lobes due to windowing.
Although the shape of the windowed signal is indeed different from the original, closer analysis
of the theory of the DFT shows that the position of the peaks in the magnitude spectrum is
not influenced by the windowing: leakage effects and ”phantom” frequency components are
reduced significantly. Closer analysis shows that leakage effects are not completely removed,
though. Leakage is an immediate consequence of partitioning the audio input into frames – no
matter if/which a windowing is applied.
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Figure A.4.: Left Figure: Example audio frame data (solid line: 10.5 Hz sine tone) that was win-
dowed (dashed line: Hanning window);
Right Figure: correspondent Fourier magnitude spectrum; observation: spectral
leakage is reduced
A.1.3.5 Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
In practice, a numerical optimization of the DFT algorithms is used very often, namely the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). According to Heidemann et al. [HJB1985] not only the roots of the
general DFT but also of the FFT optimization go back to the work by Gauß (not Fourier) from
the 19th century [Gau1866]. It was rediscovered and adapted to modern computing by Cooley
and Tukey in the 1960s [CT1965].
The FFT mainly utilizes an algorithmic divide-and-conquer design for the DFT for reducing com-
putational efforts. For this, in most FFT implementations the frame length L has to be a power
of two, i.e. L = 2k, k ∈ IN or the product of small prime numbers at least. The algorithmic de-
tail go beyond the scope of this overview. The interested reader can find a comprehensible
explanation of the overall FFT algorithm in the mathematical handbook by Stöcker [Stö1995].
In this thesis work, a number of numerically optimized FFT implementations are used for ex-
ample
• the ”Fastest Fourier Transform in the West (FFTW)” as introduced by Frigo and John-
son [FJ2005] from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA79,
• the ”Math Kernel Library (MKL)” by the Intel Corp. which is a math library optimized for
Intel compatible CPUs80.
In practice the FFT allows a significant reduction in algorithmic complexity: it can be shown
that calculating the DFT according to Equation (A.2) has a complexity O(L)∝ L2. In contrast,
the FFT has a lower algorithmic complexity of only
OFFT(L)∝ L log2(L) .
Example: In this thesis work a frame size of L = 2048 will commonly be used. Using the FFT-
optimization instead of the plain DFT ”textbook definition” reduces computational needs
to 2048 · log2(2048)/20482 ≈ 1/186 i.e. by more than 99%!
A.1.4 Other Spectral Audio Representations
79 FFTW Project: http://www.fftw.org
80 Intel Math Kernel Library (MKL): https://software.intel.com/en-us/intel-mkl
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A.1.4.1 The Cepstrum
The cepstrum (as defined by Bogert, Healey and Tukey [BHT1963]) is a common ”mathematical
tool” in signal processing. Using the notation as given in Section A.1.3, the cepstrum Ck related
to a Fourier audio magnitude spectrum Xk =F{(x t)} is defined as the inverse Fourier transform
of the logarithm of the Fourier magnitude spectrum:
(Cl) =F−1
¦
log(|(Xk)|2)
©
.
For this representation, the original authors creatively defined the somewhat unique term of the
”cepstrum” as a paraphrase of the word ‘”spectrum’. Furthermore, the independent index l of
the cesptral coefficients Cl is denoted as the quefrency (instead of frequency). This shall reflect
that the relevant data domain is neither the frequency domain nor truly the temporal domain.
It can be shown that by its analytical properties the cepstrum is well suited for many signal
processing tasks like identifying pitch/fundamental frequencies and detecting/compensating
for echoes in signals. The latter property is relevant for watermarking approaches based on
echo hiding as explained in Section 2.3.4 or MFCC-based audio hashing from the state of the art
as recalled in Section 2.2.4.
A detailed description of the cepstrum can be found in the comprehensible work on the ”History
of the Cepstrum” by Oppenheim and Schafer [OS2004].
A.1.4.2 The SVD Domain
The SVD is a decomposition/factorization of an arbitrary matrix M (the measurement matrix)
according to
M = USV T .
Here, U and V are orthogonal matrices containing the so-called singular vectors as columns.
The matrix S = diag(s21, s
2
2, ...) is a diagonal matrix containing the so-called singular values si
which are the sorted non-zero eigenvalues of the matrix M TM . The SVD allows for identify-
ing/removal of dependencies and noise in the measurement input. It is mathematically similar
to the techniques of principal component analysis (PCA) or the Karhunen-Loeve transform. In-
dependent signal components can be identified by the presence of singular values that are
significantly greater than those of noise components. Such components can be suitable for
carrying an audio watermark embedding or serving as robust features in audio hashing.
In numerous fields of natural science and engineering the SVD formalism is used as a ”mathe-
matical tool” for for example solving systems of linear equations, least-squares estimation or
in approximating a matrix by another matrix of lower rank etc. It must be admitted that
the SVD factorization and the spectrum of singular values result are a highly abstracted rep-
resentation of M . Nevertheless, in watermarking the spectrum of the singular values easily
allows identifying independent – and hence robust – signal components which are suitable for
embedding.
The detailed explanation of the SVD and its properties would go beyond the scope of
this brief overview. It can be studied in the comprehensible textbooks by Mendel or by
Golub/van Loan [Men1995, GVL1996]. The mathematical similarity between SVD, PCA and
KL transform is elaborated on by Gerbrands [Ger1981].
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A.1.4.3 The DCT, Wavelet and MFCC domain
The Mel Frequency Cepstrum Transform is another common transform in signal processing. Here,
the spectrum is expressed in terms of the Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) derived
from the cepstrum representation (as explained before in Section A.1.4.1). In extension, if
features a sub-sampling of the linearly spaced quefrency scale to the Mel scale (as explained in
Section A.2.6). The MFCC representation reflects human perception in terms of critical band
characteristics. It is a useful ”mathematical tool” in music analysis, speech/speaker recognition
and in watermarking and audio hashing as well.
The mathematical detail of MFCCs go beyond this overview and the explanation on the cepstrum
in this thesis. The interested reader can find a very comprehensible explanation of MFCCs and
their utilization by Logan [Log2000].
Other frequently utilized transforms, which are not explained in detail here, are the Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) (introduced in the 1970s by Ahmed [ANR1974]) and the Wavelet trans-
form (introduced as early as 1909 by Haar [Haa1910]) which are distantly related to the DFT.
The interested reader can find a very comprehensible explanations of these transforms and their
utilization as ”mathematical tools” in multimedia processing in the works by Smith [S+1997]
on DCT or in [Cas1979, Dau1992, Mal1999] on Wavelets.
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A.2 Psychophysics – Modeling of Human Sound Perception
This Section explains the foundations of psychophysics, i.e. the modeling of the relationship be-
tween the objective physical properties of sound as a stimulus and its correspondent subjective
auditory perception. Most important findings and quantities that are relevant for understanding
this thesis work are explained in the following.
According to Helmholtz [Hel1863, p. 27] research on acoustical sound has been conducted
already in ancient times for example by Aristotle, Pythagoras and in early modern times for
example by Galilei, Newton, Euler or Bernoulli. At those times, research was rather focused on
the creation and propagation of sound, the theory of vibrating strings in musical instruments
and other fundamental objective physical quantities like frequency, sonic velocity, pitch etc.
From the 19th century, the subjective aspect of human perception of sound became increasingly
under investigation. Since then the overall concept of psychophysics has been increasingly in-
vestigated in physiology and psychology. For example, Helmholtz explained that sounds can be
grouped into either ”musical” or ”noises” (see [Hel1863, p. 14, 19]). It is interesting to see that
this view is still persistent to some extent in modern MP3/AAC audio encoding techniques in
which so-called ”tonal” and ”non-tonal components” are identified during encoding.
A.2.1 Anatomy of the Human Ear
Many characteristics of human auditory perception can be understood from the anatomy of the
inner ear (see Lennarz [LB2012]): Sound waves pass the outer ear canal and the ear drum, then
propagate through the middle ear bones (auditory ossicles) to the spiral cochlea in the inner
ear. Inside the cochlea the sound is perceived by the sound receptors, the so-called hair cells on
the organ of Corti. The outer hair cells can react on incoming sound by mechanical contraction
and hence actively amplify the sound. The actual conscious perception of sound by the brain
is eventually stimulated triggered by the sound receptors of the inner hair cells. It was found
that hair cells are present in bundles of many dozens of hair cells. Their tips are mechanically
tethered with their neighboring bundles by so-called tip links.
Figure A.5.: Anatomy of the human cochlea : sound waves entering from the lower left. Regions
being sensitive for frequencies at ”500 Hz” and ”10,000 Hz” are tagged accordingly;
Source: [LB2012]
As can be seen from Figure A.5, the sensation of certain frequencies correspond to certain
spatial areas in the organ of Corti: high frequencies are perceived at the beginning of the outer
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section of the organ. In return, low frequencies are perceived in the inner section. The selective
frequency sensitivity of the hair cells and their coupling via tethered tip links causes some
remarkable properties of the human sound sensation as explained in the following.
A.2.2 The Weber-Fechner Law
In the 19th century Weber discovered that the just noticeable difference of two stimuli like sound
is proportional to the magnitude of the stimuli themselves [Web1834]. From this result Fechner
derived [Fec1860, pp. 64, pp. 134] that the magnitude of subjective perception s of a stimulus
is proportional to the logarithm of its objective intensity I so that
s∝ log10(I) ,
known as the term Weber-Fechner Law. According to the authors, it applies to acoustical percep-
tion like loudness or pitch but also to sensation of brightness of light, temperature, heaviness of
weights etc.
It should be mentioned that the logarithmic model was later questioned and generalized to other
sensations by Stevens by showing that ”a power law, not a log function, describes the operating
characteristic of a sensory system” [Ste1961] so that
s′∝ In ,
with n ≈ 0.54 to 0.60 for audio loudness. However, both Fechner’s log law and Stevens’ power
law describe the loudness characteristics qualitatively alike, namely as a strictly monotonic
curve that is downward increasing. The following explanations stick to the Weber-Fechner defi-
nition for simplicity.
The interested reader can find an exhaustive analysis of Fechner’s versus Stevens’ results in the
text book on ”The Measurement of Sensation” by Laming [Lam1997] from 1997.
More modern research on psychophysics from the 20th century made important discoveries
with respect to perception of loudness and frequencies. The most important eventually led into
the development of efficient lossy audio coding and are being utilized for this thesis work.
A.2.3 The dB and Phon scale for sound pressure levels
An objective measure for the perceived loudness in quantitative figures instead of qualitative
terms as ”loud”, ”soft”, ”fortissimo” or the like was defined by Heinrich Barkhausen (1881-
1956). For this, at first the objective intensity of sounds with average sound pressure p¯ is
expressed (in line with the Weber-Fechner law) as sound pressure levels (SPL) on the logarithmic
Decibel (dB) scale:
L := 10 · log10

p¯2
p20

[in dB] .
At the time of its first definition the value of the so-called reference pressure p0 was regarded
as the minimum sound pressure required so that a sound is just noticeable to an average lis-
tener (at 1 kHz). Note that these Decibel values are actually dimensionless as they are the
logarithm of the dimensionless ratio p¯2/p20. The usage of the (pseudo) unit ”dB” shall remind
of the logarithmic dependency.
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Then, for describing and comparing the subjective loudness of different tones or noises with
different characteristics, timbre etc., the Phon scale was defined by Barkhausen:
Phon scale: a loudness level of ”n Phon” of an arbitrary sound or noise means that it
appears as loud as the reference tone increased by n dB to an average listener.
As a rule of thumb, loudness level differences of approximately ±1 Phon are just noticeable by
an average listeners.
Helmholtz also describes that sound can be characterized by its ”pitch”. The pitch concept im-
plies that tones can be characterized by their (base) frequency. It was said that the range of
frequencies that can be ”perceived at all”, are in the range of ”16 to 38,000” Hz. oscillations”.
Note that the author used the terminology ”oscillations” because the physical unit Hertz (Hz) was
officially introduced not until 1935 in honor of the physicist Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894). Actu-
ally, more modern research from the 20th century as collected by Zwicker and Fastl [ZF1990]
found the upper frequency limit rather to be approximately at 20,000 Hz, at best.
A.2.4 Absolute Hearing Threshold in Silence and Equal Loudness Perception
In the 1930s, Fletcher and Munson provided empirical results about how sensitive the human
ear is to different frequencies [FM1933]. For example, the human ear is most sensitive at
approximately 4 kHz and the total range of sensitivity is from 20 Hz to 20 kHz, approximately.
In Figure A.6 each so-called masking curve corresponds to equal loudness for a given loudness
level. The lowest curve in the Figure was regarded as the absolute hearing threshold in silence
(corresponding to the reference level p0).
The correct shape of the equal-loudness-curve, especially for low frequencies smaller than 1 kHz
has been under research, debate and refinement for decades [RD1956, ST2004]. The results
finally became an ISO standard for ”Equal-loudness-level Contours” in 2003 [ISO2003].
The research proved that the human ear has fascinating capabilities as an organ of perception:
The area of sensitivity covers many orders of magnitude across frequencies and sound pressure
levels (which for example outperforms the human eye in perception of light).
A.2.5 Auditory Masking
Frequency Masking
In extension to the work by Fletcher and Munson another important psychoacoustic effect is
frequency masking [ZF1990, Moo1995]. Masking means that the presence of a so-called masking
tone (commonly denoted as: masker) significantly reduces the sensitivity to sounds at other
frequencies. The results from lab testing as shown in Figures A.7 and A.8 demonstrate how
the shape of the contour curves are lifted or flattened, resp. Here, tone-like maskers and noise
markers cause different shapes of the updated contour curve modification and, hence, have to
be treated slightly differently in mathematical modeling of masking. As a surprising example,
even a white noise masker that would be imperceptible by itself (i.e. being below the absolute
hearing threshold) does reduce the ear’s sensitivity to an additional test tone (see dotted line in
Figure A.7).
Frequency masking is relevant for complex sounds like music or voice data. Here, the given
”mixture” of spectral components interacts with itself. Some components will be reduced in
loudness or can even be extinguished completely – although they are physically present.
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Figure A.6.: Equal loudness level contours (in Phon); threshold of pain denoted as ”feeling” ;
Horizontal axis: frequency (in Hz); Vertical axis: input sound pressure level (in dB );
Example (see circle markers): A test tone with sound pressure level 40 dB at 1 kHz
is perceived at 40 Phon. Another test tone at the same intensity but at 200 Hz is
perceived 20 Phon softer;Source: Fletcher, Munson [FM1933]
In the course of this PhD thesis, the frequency masking effect is utilized for transparent wa-
termark embedding, more reliable watermarking detection and it is discussed for identifying
perceptually relevant components in audio hashing.
Temporal Masking
For completeness note that also temporal masking can be observed and modeled: a masking tone
can attenuate or even annihilate the perception of consecutive sound events in the respective
near future (”forward masking”). Especially for very short sound events (like pulses etc.) It can
last up to 150 msec if there is a large volume difference between the masker and the consecutive
test tone. Surprisingly, maskers can even influence the perception of other sound ex post. This
”backward masking” has a range up to 50 msec. seemingly into the past. Both are thought to be
caused by time-dependent process during the neural reception [Lak1976].
Temporal masking can and will be ignored in the course of this thesis work for simplicity: the
temporal resolution of the FFT framing as carried out in this thesis work (≈ 46 msec) is quite
in the same range as backward masking. Also forward masking can be ignored in sufficient
approximation for most of the sound content.
A.2.6 Critical Band Characteristic
It was a discovery by Fletcher in the 1940s that several masking tones present inside a certain
frequency range effectively contribute as one single masker, see Zwicker [ZF1990, pp. 149].
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Figure A.7.: Equal loudness level contours in the presence of noise maskers; dashed lines: hear-
ing threshold in silence for comparison
Solid lines: equal loudness level contours in the presence of broad band white noise
at levels LWN from -10 to +50 dB ; Circle markers: example of a white noise masker
at LWN=10 dB lifts the absolute hearing threshold at 1 kHz by 25 dB
Source: Zwicker et al. [ZF1990, p. 62]
That frequency range is called a critical band (CB). Experimental results show that for low
frequencies, the critical bands have equal width of 100 Hz. From 500 Hz, the critical band
width increases exponentially, see Table A.1 for detail. In total, approximately 26 critical bands
fit in the frequency range of 20 to 20,000 Hz in which the ear is sensitive to sound.
CB 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ... 22 23 24
f1 [in Hz] 0 100 200 300 400 510 630 770 ... 7700 9500 12000
f2 [in Hz] 100 200 300 400 510 630 770 920 ... 9500 12000 15500
Bark 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ... 21 22 23
Table A.1.: Critical bands: f1 and f2: lower and upper CB bounds in Hz ; last row: correspondent
Bark range
Source: rounded values taken from [ZF1990, Zwi1961]
To count the index of the critical band, the non-linear Bark scale (named in honor of Heinrich
Barkhausen) was proposed by Zwicker in the 1960s [Zwi1961, ZF1990]. For example, the value
of 5 Bark corresponds to the cut-off frequency of the 5th critical band at 510 Hz. The mapping
from Hz to Bark, and vice versa, can be modeled by
[Bark] = 12 tan−1
 
0.00076 · [Hz]+ 3 tan−1  ([Hz]/7500)2
[Hz] = 52548/([Bark]2 − 52.66 · [Bark] + 690.39) .
Note that the CB characteristic does not imply that a masker does not have an influence beyond
the range of ±0.5 Bark around its respective center frequency. Instead, the CB characteristic
reflects how a set of maskers within a CB range accumulates and eventually contributes to the
overall masking threshold. This is exploited for the psycho acoustic modeling as conducted
in this thesis work, and by other authors in the Related Work on integrity protection, as for
example by Gulbis [GMS2008a, Gul2013].
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Figure A.8.: Equal loudness level contours in the presence of tone maskers; dashed lines: hearing
threshold in silence for comparison
Solid lines: equal loudness level contours in the presence of a tonal masker at
1 kHz at different levels LM from +30 to +90 dB ; Circle markers: example of a
1 kHz masker at 70 dB affects the hearing threshold in a broad range from 0.6
to 5 kHz ; Source: Zwicker et al. [ZF1990, p. 68]
The related Mel scale is also common in psycho acoustics. It is defined as
100Mel = 1Bark .
It is the foundation for the so-called Mel-frequency cepstral transform (MFCC) widely used in
speech processing and audio fingerprinting algorithms (see A.1.4.3).
Note that both frequency masking and CB characteristics can be explained from the anatomy
of the hair cells in the human ear: The nonlinear coupling/tethering by their tip-links can
influence excited hair cell bundles in a certain spatial neighborhood in terms of masking. The
overall coupling is however spatially limited due to damping which explains ranges of both
masking and CBs.
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Appendix B
List of Audio Test Files
The following audio content was used in the experimental evaluation. The total duration of the
files was trimmed to 3:00 min. In most test runs in the experimental evaluation each file was
further divided in snippet of 0:30 min. duration.
Total duration of the audio test set is 4.5 hours (2.66 GibiByte).
B.1 Audio books
The following audio book examples were captured from Audio CDs.
File No. Title/Content
A 01-07 Hermann Kurze, ”Thomas Mann – Leben und Werk”
A 08-10 Rainer M. Schroeder, ”Das Geheimnis der weissen Moenche”
A 11-19 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, ”Mein Leben”
A 20-23 Barbara Auer liest Tobe Jansson, ”Mumins lange Reise”
A 24-26 Tschechow, ”Erzaehlungen”
A 27-30 Heinz Ludwig Arnold, ”Die Gruppe 47”
Table B.2.: Audio test set (audio books)
B.2 Music songs
The following music examples were captured from Audio CDs.
File No. Title/Content
M 01 Adrian Bond – Die Calmly Like A German
M 02 Adrian Bond – The Gods of Old
M 03 Conjunto Explosao Do Samba – Barra Pesada
M 04 Exit 100 – Beams A Gonna Plaint
M 05 Black Pete – Saviour
M 06 Black Pete – Vicious
M 07 Cassandra Wilson – Blue in Green
M 08 Neneh Cherry – Buffalo Stance
M 09 Chora Viola Chora – Tempestade Do Amor
M 10 Phillip Glass – Cloudscape
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File No. Title/Content
M 11 David C. Arthur – An Evening in D.C.
M 12 Thomas Newman – Dead Already
M 13 Juergen Knieper – Der Himmel Ueber Berlin
M 14 D-Flame – Es tut mir leid
M 15 Dirk Darmstadter – Best Day
M 16 DJ Fraternity – Alec Empire
M 17 Joao Nogueira – Espere Oh! Nega
M 18 Fleshhouse – The Flamingo People
M 19 Commodores – Gonna Blow Your Mind
M 20 Suicidal Tendencies – Gotta kill Cpt. Stupid
M 21 Grant Lee Phlillips – Under the Milky Way
M 22 Orchestra Claude Debussy - Gymnopedie No .1
M 23 Jungle Brothers - I’ll House You
M 24 Indigo Girls – Language to the Kiss
M 25 Jeff Buckley – Lover, You Should’ve Come Over
M 26 Benito di Paula – Jeito de Felicidade
M 27 Phillip Glass – Koyaanisqatsi
M 28 K’s Choice – Dad
M 29 Lloyd Cole – Late Night
M 30 Exit 100 – Louie Frantic
Table B.4.: Audio test set (music songs)
B.3 Voice recordings
Most of the following examples of voice recordings were captured from Youtube as secondary
source.
File No. Title/Content
V 01 ”Michael D. Bailey police interrogation”
V 02 ”Dalia Dippolito questioned by Police”
V 03 ”Russel Williams confession”
V 04 ”Police officer slaps U.S. soldier”
V 05 ”Harvey Wince child abuser”
V 06 ”Man in court accused of murder”
V 07 ”Collateral Murder” (Wikileaks)
V 08 ”President Reagan’s address at Brandenburg Gate”
V 09 ”How to survive a traffic stop”
V 10 ”Klaus Kinksi unmoegliches Interview”
V 11 ”Threatened with psychological evaluation”
V 12 ”Michael Jackson/Oprah Winfrey, interview
V 13 ”Entlastungsmaterial Lothar Koenig”
V 14 ”Am Strassenrand, Polizei stoppt Motorradfahrer”
V 15 ”Bushido, Stress ohne Grund Interview”
V 16 ”Tagesschau 18.10.89, Honecker tritt zurueck”
V 17 ”Helmut Schmidt, Rede an die Nation”
V 18 ”Gerhard Schroeder, Elefantenrunde”
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File No. Title/Content
V 19 ”Helmut Kohl gegen Helmut Schmidt”
V 20 ”Helmut Kohl vs. Herbert Wehner”
V 21 ”Juergen Trittin Kurzintervention”
V 22 ”Martin Luther King Jr., I have a dream!”
V 23 ”Sunday Times Interview with President al-Assad
V 24 ”Cpt. Schettino sulla telefonata con De Falco”
V 25 ”Challenger disaster live footage”
V 26 ”Der Nuernberger Prozess (Urteil, 1/9)”
V 27 ”Nixon, raw Watergate tape, smoking gun”
V 28 ”Marcel Reich Ranicki lehnt Deutschen Fernsehpreis ab”
V 29 ”Tagesschau zu Tschernobyl”
V 30 ”WM 1990 Achtelfinale Deutschland Holland 2:1”
Table B.6.: Audio test set (misc. voice recordings)
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Appendix C
Exhaustive Test Results
This Appendix provides more exhaustive test results about detail about the experimental evalu-
ation.
C.1 rMAC Flag Ratio: Boxplots versus Time – Admissible Attacks
Figure C.1.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; only admissible attacks applied (obviously
all over the file); upper: ”scattered mode”, lower: ”serial mode”
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C.2 rMAC Flag Ratio: Boxplots versus Time – Malicious Attack – ”Scattered Mode”
”Scattered Mode” – Mix noise
Figure C.2.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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”Scattered Mode” – Deletion
Figure C.3.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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”Scattered Mode” – Replacement
Figure C.4.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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”Scattered Mode” – Mix audio
Figure C.5.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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C.3 rMAC Flag Ratio: Boxplots versus Time – Malicious Attack – ”Serial Mode”
”Serial Mode” – Mix noise
Figure C.6.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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”Serial Mode” – Deletion
Figure C.7.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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”Serial Mode” – Replacement
Figure C.8.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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”Serial Mode” – Mix audio
Figure C.9.: rMAC flag ratio versus time as boxplots; dashed lines enclose attacked portion in
audio snippets (starting at time index 86 = 4.0s from the beginning)
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C.4 rMAC Flag Ratio: ROC curves – ”Scattered Mode”
”Scattered Mode” – Mix Noise
Attack: mix noise
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Figure C.10.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Scattered Mode” – Deletion
Attack: deletion
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Figure C.11.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Scattered Mode” – Replacement
Attack: replacement
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Figure C.12.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Scattered Mode” – Mix Audio
Attack: mix audio
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Figure C.13.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Scattered Mode” – All Attack Durations Combined
Attack: mix noise
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Attack: deletion
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Attack: replacement
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Attack: mix audio
rMAC mode: scattered mode
Figure C.14.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots including all attack durations from 1/8 s to 8 s
220
C.5 rMAC Flag Ratio: ROC curves – ”Serial Mode”
”Serial Mode” – Mix noise
Attack: mix noise
rMAC mode: serial mode
Figure C.15.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Serial Mode” – Deletion
Attack: deletion
rMAC mode: serial mode
Figure C.16.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Serial Mode” – Replacement
Attack: replecement
rMAC mode: serial mode
Figure C.17.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Serial Mode” – Mix audio
Attack: mix audio
rMAC mode: serial mode
Figure C.18.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots
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”Serial Mode” – All Attack Durations Combined
Attack: mix noise
rMAC mode: serial mode
Attack: deletion
rMAC mode: serial mode
Attack: replacement
rMAC mode: serial mode
Attack: mix audio
rMAC mode: serial mode
Figure C.19.: rMAC flag ratio as ROC plots including all attack durations from 1/8 s to 8 s
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